Lacy v. State

• Decision Date: 20 January 1954
• Docket Number: No. 26777,26777
• Citation: 267 S.W.2d 139,160 Tex.Crim. 95
• Parties: LACY v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 139

267 S.W.2d 139

160 Tex.Crim. 95

LACY v. STATE.

No. 26777.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 20, 1954.

Rehearing Denied March 31, 1954.

No attorney on appeal for appellant.

Wesley Dice, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

DAVIDSON, Commissioner.

Upon his plea of guilty before the court, appellant was convicted of the offense of selling beer in a dry area. His punishment, enhanced by reason of prior convictions for offenses of like character, was assessed at a fine of $1,000 and one year in jail.

The record is before this court with no statement of facts or bills of exception.

The proceedings necessary to waive trial by jury and to enter a plea of guilty before the court appear to have been complied with.

The judgment is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the court.

On Motion for Rehearing

MORRISON, Judge.

Complaint is raised that the information in insufficient to support the judgment. The information charged the primary offense, a sale of beer in a dry area. It also attempted to allege prior convictions to enhance the punishment. These allegations were insufficient because the accusation therein made is by the affidavit of I. V. Sims and is not the presentment of the prosecuting attorney. Sams v. State, 143 Tex.Cr.R. 588, 160 S.W.2d 265.

This was a trial before the court. The judgment recites that appellant 'pleaded 'guilty' to the information herein' and 'it is considered by the court that the defendant is guilty as charged.' The punishment assessed was within that prescribed for the primary offense.

Appellant would have us apply the rule stated in Martin v. State, 142 Tex.Cr.R. 623, 156 S.W.2d 144; McClain v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 428, 220 S.W.2d 896; and Waltrip v. State, 134 Tex.Cr.R. 202, 114 S.W.2d 555, and hold that the judgment should be condemned as the equivalent of a general verdict necessarily including the defective allegations of prior conviction.

In Martin v. State, supra [142 Tex.Cr.R. 623, 156 S.W.2d 145], we said:

'(2) The rule appears to be settled that, where an information contains several counts, one of which is fatally defective, and all counts are submitted to the jury, and the evidence tends to support the offense charged in the defective count, and a general verdict is returned by the jury, a judgment of conviction will, under such circumstances, be set aside. Reynolds v. State, 82 Tex.Cr.R. 326, 198 S.W. 958; Smith v. State, 57 Tex.Cr.R. 609, 124 S.W. 665.

'(3) While in the instant case the defective allegation did not attempt to allege another offense, yet its relation to the offense charged and to the punishment authorized to be assessed by the jury was such as to bring this case within the rule stated.'

This rule was again stated and applied in McClain v. State, supra.

Under the rule applied in those cases, 'the evidence tends to support the offense charged in the defective count,' and it affirmatively appeared that the trial court submitted the defective allegations of prior convictions to the jury and thus permitted them to enhance the punishment by reason thereof. It was because the trial court authorized the jury to consider such defective allegations, and not that the verdict necessarily showed that they did so that reversal was ordered.

In Waltrip v. State, 134 Tex.Cr.R....