Ladd v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 24 October 1950
• Citation: 313 Ky. 754
• Parties: Ladd v. Commonwealth.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

313 Ky. 754

Ladd v. Commonwealth.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

October 24, 1950.

Proceeding by the Commonwealth of Kentucky against C.A. Ladd to revoke respondent's license to solemnize marriages. The Circuit Court, Christian County, Ira D. Smith, J., entered a judgment confirming the judgment of county court revoking respondent's license and respondent appealed. The Court of Appeals, Knight, J., held that the evidence established that respondent had violated state laws concerning marriage by soliciting persons to come before him to be married, that statute authorizing county court to revoke licenses to solemnize marriages does not give county court arbitrary power in violation of Constitution and that respondent was not denied due process of law and that statute forbidding solicitation of marriages is a reasonable regulation of the performance of marriage ceremonies in proper exercise of police power and not unconstitutional.

Judgment affirmed.

1. Marriage — In proceeding to revoke minister's license to solemnize marriages, evidence established that licensee had violated state law concerning marriage by soliciting persons to come before him to be married. KRS 402.060, 402.090(3).

2. Constitutional Law — The right of a licensed minister under statute to perform marriage ceremonies is not a "property right" within meaning of constitutional provision that arbitrary power over property of free men exists nowhere in a republic. KRS 402.060; Const. sec. 2.

3. Marriage — Payment of a fee to minister or civil official for performing a marriage ceremony is not authorized or required by law and cannot be enforced as a condition to the performance of marriage.

4. Marriage — The state does not recognize religious marriage ceremony alone, unless performed by a minister who is licensed to perform marriage ceremonies and has become a civil official for that purpose, meeting the regulations imposed by statute as a condition precedent to right to perform marriage ceremonies as a representative of the state, including execution of a bond or covenant to state not to violate state laws concerning marriage. KRS 402.060 5. Constitutional Law; Marriage — Statute authorizing county court, which is also authorized to license ministers to perform marriage ceremonies, to revoke any such license after notice to licensee does not give county court "arbitrary power" over lives, liberty and property of free men in violation of Constitution. KRS 402.060; Const. sec. 2.

6. Constitutional Law — Where minister's license to solemnize marriages was revoked on account of violation of state laws concerning marriage after notice and hearing at which licensee was represented by counsel, licensee was not denied due process of law in violation of federal Constitution. KRS 402.060; U.S.C. A. Const. Amends. 5, 14.

7. Marriage — In proceeding to revoke minister's license to solemnize marriages, licensee waived any right to more specific charges against him by not accepting offer to grant a motion to make more specific and for a bill of particulars. KRS 402.060.

8. Marriage — The statute forbidding a person licensed to solemnize marriage to solicit any person to come before him to be married constitutes a reasonable regulation of the performance of marriages in proper exercise of police power for protection of public welfare and good order of the community. KRS 402.090(3).

9. Marriage — While the state has no right to interfere with the religious aspects of marriage ceremony, it is entitled to regulate its civil aspects and impose reasonable limitations and restraints upon the performance of marriage ceremony by licensed minister. KRS 402.060, 402.090.

10. Constitutional Law — Any attempt by statute to prevent the preaching or teaching of religious belief that marriages should be solemnized only by regular ministers of the gospel would be unconstitutional as constituting an infringement upon right of free speech and right to promulgate religious views.

Hubert Meredith for appellant.

W.E. Rogers, Jr., John T. King, A.E. Funk, Attorney General, H.D. Reed, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before Ira D. Smith, Judge.

JUDGE KNIGHT.

Affirming.

This appeal is prosecuted from a judgment of the Christian Circuit Court revoking the license of appellant, Rev. C.A. Ladd, to perform marriage ceremonies. The proceedings for the revocation of appellant's license were begun in the Christian County Court when the judge of that court served notice on him to appear in the county court on November 10, 1948, to show cause why his license to perform marriages should not be revoked. The county judge disqualified himself and, by agreement of the parties, Hon. W.R. Clark of the Hopkinsville bar was agreed on to try the case. After a hearing held on November 17, 1948, at which hearing the testimony was transcribed, Special Judge Clark entered an order annulling and revoking the license heretofore issued to appellant and he appealed to the circuit court from the judgment of the county court. In the circuit court the case was submitted on the record, which had been brought up from the county court, and on briefs of counsel, and on April 1, 1949, the judge of the Christian Circuit Court entered a judgment in which he "sustained and confirmed the judgment (of the county court) cancelling defendant's (Rev. Ladd's) license." This appeal is prosecuted from the latter judgment.

What Proof Shows.

The evidence produced at the hearing, which resulted in revoking his license, was in substance as follows: It was shown by the records of the county clerk of Christian County that appellant and his surety executed a bond in the penal sum of $500 by which he covenanted and agreed not to violate the laws of this state concerning marriage, whereupon he was issued a license on May 3, 1930. It was shown by the records of the circuit clerk that on June 11, 1946, the grand jury of Christian County returned three indictments against appellant charging him with unlawfully soliciting marriages. On September 24, 1946, on motion of the commonwealth's attorney, each of the above indictments was ordered dismissed on condition that defendant remain away from the county clerk's office. It was further shown by the records that on June 3, 1947, and October 18, 1948, appellant appealed to the circuit court from judgments of conviction in the quarterly court and it was stipulated that both these convictions were on charges of soliciting marriages. In one of these cases the appeal was dismissed and the judgment sustained. In the other case he paid the fine of 1 cent and costs as adjudged by the lower court. It was shown by the records of the clerk of the quarterly court that on June 12, 1946, appellant was charged with soliciting a marriage performance but this was dismissed on motion of the county attorney. On February 26, 1947, he was tried and found guilty on a charge of using abusive language to provoke assault and was fined $20 and costs which were paid. On February 10, 1948, he was tried before a jury pleaded guilty to a charge of breach of the peace and was fined $25 and costs which he paid. On July 6, 1948, he was tried before a jury on the charge of soliciting a marriage performance and was found guilty and was fined $50 and costs which were later paid.

At the hearing only appellant testified in his own defense and his testimony was in substance that he is 73 years old and has been a regularly ordained minister of the Baptist Church for the past fifty years; that it is his belief that only a minister of the gospel has authority to perform a marriage ceremony and that it is not scriptural for one possessing only temporal authority to perform marriages; that he thought and felt that he was carrying out his religious duty in soliciting the marriages of which he was accused rather than allowing them to be performed by some civil official about the court house; that in the exercise of his right to solicit and perform marriages under his license, he did not do anything except what he thought was his religious duty.

The Law of the Case.

The authority under which the hearing above referred to was held is KRS 402.060 which provides that no minister shall solemnize marriages until he has obtained a license therefor from the county court of the county in which he resides, upon satisfying the court that he is a man of good moral character and giving bond with good surety not to violate the law of this state concerning marriages. The section further provides that "Any such license may be annulled by any county court, after notice to the person holding the license." The particular section of the statutes...