Ladd v. Krupp

• Decision Date: 11 February 2016
• Citation: 136 A.D.3d 1391,24 N.Y.S.3d 834
• Parties: In the Matter of Danielle R. LADD, Petitioner–Respondent, v. Matthew F. KRUPP, Respondent–Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

136 A.D.3d 1391

24 N.Y.S.3d 834

In the Matter of Danielle R. LADD, Petitioner–Respondent,

v.Matthew F. KRUPP, Respondent–Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Feb. 11, 2016.

D.J. & J.A. Cirando, Esqs., Syracuse (John A. Cirando of Counsel), for Respondent–Appellant.

Michael G. Cianfarano, Oswego, for Petitioner–Respondent.

Kristin A. Shanley, Attorney for the Child, Oswego.

PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, CARNI, AND SCUDDER, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

In this proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, respondent father appeals from an amended order that, among other things, awarded petitioner mother sole legal and physical custody of the subject child, with visitation to the father. We note at the outset that the father contends that the mother was required to establish that there was a significant change in circumstances since the date of entry of the prior custody order, i.e., February 5, 2013, rather than from the date of the court appearance underlying that order, i.e., July 19, 2012. According to the father, the mother supported her petition with evidence of events occurring prior to February 5, 2013 and thus failed to meet her burden. Even assuming, arguendo, that the father is correct that the mother was required to establish "that a significant change in circumstances occurred since the entry of the ... custody order" (Matter of Drew v. Gillin, 17 A.D.3d 719, 720, 792 N.Y.S.2d 691 ; see Matter of Pauline E. v. Renelder P., 37 A.D.3d 1145, 1146, 829 N.Y.S.2d 383 ), rather than from the date of the court appearance upon which the order was based (see generally Matter of Giambattista v. Giambattista, 154 A.D.2d 920, 921, 545 N.Y.S.2d 957 ), we conclude that the mother established the requisite change in circumstances subsequent to the entry of the prior order. It is well settled that "the continued deterioration of the parties' relationship is a significant change in circumstances justifying a change in custody" (Matter of Gaudette v. Gaudette, 262 A.D.2d 804, 805, 691 N.Y.S.2d 681, lv. denied 94 N.Y.2d 790, 700 N.Y.S.2d 421, 722 N.E.2d 501 ; see Lauzonis v. Lauzonis, 120 A.D.3d 922, 924, 992 N.Y.S.2d 586 ). Here, the evidence at the hearing established that "the parties have an acrimonious relationship and are not able to communicate effectively with respect to the needs and activities of their child[ ], and it is well settled that joint custody is not feasible under those circumstances" (Leonard v. Leonard, 109 A.D.3d 126, 128, 968 N.Y.S.2d 762 ). Thus, Family Court properly concluded that there had been a sufficient change in circumstances justifying a review of the preexisting custody arrangement.

Contrary to the father's further contention, the court properly considered the appropriate factors in making its custody determination (see generally Matter of Caughill v. Caughill, 124 A.D.3d 1345, 1346, 1 N.Y.S.3d 652 ). The court's determination with respect to the child's best interests "is entitled to great deference and will not be disturbed [where, as here,] it is supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record" (Sheridan v. Sheridan, 129 A.D.3d 1567, 1568, 12 N.Y.S.3d 434 ; see Fox v. Fox, 177 A.D.2d 209, 211–212, 582 N.Y.S.2d 863 ). Here, the evidence in the record supports the court's determination that the mother had attempted to foster a relationship between the father and the child, while the father interfered with the mother's relationship with the child by, inter alia, blatantly and repeatedly violating the court's directive not to discuss the litigation with the child, repeatedly telling the child...