Ladd v. Polidoro
Decision Date | 04 February 1997 |
Citation | 675 N.E.2d 382,424 Mass. 196 |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Parties | George T. LADD v. Jeffrey POLIDORO & another. 1 |
Matthew P. Poppel, Boston, for defendants.
Richard A. Simons, Pittsfield (William W. Simons with him), for plaintiff.
Before WILKINS, C.J., and ABRAMS, LYNCH, GREANEY and MARSHALL, JJ.
The central issue in this appeal, which is here on further appellate review, is whether a person may properly be held liable for abuse of process solely because he knowingly brought a groundless action and obtained an attachment of the defendants' property that caused harm to the defendants. The debate is whether liability may be imposed only if it is proved additionally that the action was brought for an ulterior purpose.
The Appeals Court concluded in a memorandum and order that proof of an ulterior purpose is required and reversed a judgment awarding damages for abuse of process. See 40 Mass. App.Ct. 1115, 663 N.E.2d 587 (1996). We agree with the Appeals Court on this point and additionally agree with it on other issues raised in the cross appeals.
This action began when George Ladd filed a complaint alleging that Jeffrey Polidoro and Brian Homeyer owed him an accounting based on an oral partnership agreement to develop land in Great Barrington. Ladd obtained a $150,000 attachment on property of each. A jury found that Ladd had voluntarily withdrawn from the partnership, and judgment was entered against Ladd.
Polidoro and Homeyer had filed a counterclaim alleging malicious abuse of process based on Ladd's attachments. After deciding Ladd's claim against him, the jury took up the abuse of process claim. 2 The judge denied Ladd's motion for a directed verdict on the abuse of process claim. Although the judge concluded that the evidence did not warrant a finding that the defendant had any ulterior motive when he commenced the action, the judge denied the motion because, in his view, a claim of abuse of process can be made out when a person obtains an attachment to enforce a claim that he knows is groundless. In a special verdict, the jury found that Ladd's claim was baseless and that he knew it when he brought suit. The jury also found that the amount of each attachment was not excessive. The jury awarded $35,000 for damages caused by the attachments. Subsequently, the judge denied the defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Both parties appealed. We granted the plaintiffs' application for further appellate review. Polidoro and Homeyer challenged the judge's denial of two motions. We agree with the Appeals Court that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying (a) Polidoro and Homeyer's motion to amend their complaint or (b) their motion for sanctions against Ladd and his counsel. The only issue that we need discuss in any length is the question whether the evidence warranted submission of the abuse of process claim to the jury.
The plaintiffs' argue first that the defendant did not adequately preserve the directed verdict issue for appellate review because he did not specify the absence of evidence of an ulterior motive as a reason in his written motion for a directed verdict. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 50(a), 365 Mass. 814 (1974) (). The argument is meritless. The grounds need not be stated in a written motion. See J.W. Smith & H.B. Zobel, Rules Practice § 50.10 (1977); 9A C.A. Wright & A.R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2533, at 313 (1995). The judge acknowledged that the issue had been before him when he denied the motion for a directed verdict. The subject had been raised at other points during the trial. The safer practice is to put the reasons for the motion in writing (D'Annolfo v. Stoneham Hous. Auth., 375 Mass. 650, 655 n. 5, 378 N.E.2d 971 [1978] ), but a colloquy or other circumstances can fulfil the purpose of showing that the point was adequately brought to the judge's attention. See, under the analogous Federal rule, Stewart v. Thigpen, 730 F.2d 1002, 1006 n. 2 (5th Cir.1984); Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 832 (3d Cir.1983).
"To constitute a cause of action for [abuse of process] it must appear that the process was used to accomplish some ulterior purpose for which it was not designed or intended, or which was not the legitimate purpose of the particular process employed." Gabriel v. Borowy, 324 Mass. 231, 236, 85 N.E.2d 435 (1949). See Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 775-776, 489 N.E.2d 185 (1986); Beecy v. Pucciarelli, 387 Mass. 589, 595-596, 441 N.E.2d 1035 (1982); Jones v. Brockton Pub. Mkts., Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 389, 340 N.E.2d 484 (1975); Powers v. Leno, 24 Mass.App.Ct. 381, 383-384, 509 N.E.2d 46 (1987); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682, at 474 (1977) (); W.L. Prosser & W.P. Keeton, Torts § 121, at 899 (5th ed. 1984) ().
The plaintiffs appear to accept the principle that an ulterior motive is an essential element of the tort of abuse of process when the claim is based solely on commencement of an action. Where, however, an attachment is obtained in an action where the party seeking the attachment knows the claim is groundless, it is contended that proof of an ulterior motive is not an essential element of the claim. This distinction has not been explicitly recognized in our opinions, and it is not recognized in treatises on the subject.
The plaintiffs rely on language in Reardon v. Sadd, 262 Mass. 345, 348, 159 N.E. 751 (1928), which the judge in the case before us thought justified submitting the abuse of process claim to the jury. Reardon v Sadd, supra at 348, 159 N.E. 751. The Reardon case involved the attachment and removal of machinery to collect a debt (allegedly by interfering with the defendant's business) where the attaching claimant knew or should have known that the debt was that of a third person, not the...
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