Ladd v. State
| Citation | 3 S.W.3d 547 |
| Parties | (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) ROBERT CHARLES LADD, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS NO. 72,914 |
| Decision Date | 06 October 1999 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas |
Appellant, Robert Charles Ladd, was found guilty of capital murder under Texas Penal Code 19.03(a)(2) and sentenced to death. In 113 points of error, he argues that he is entitled to a judgment of acquittal or, at the least, a new trial. We have re-ordered and grouped appellant's points of error to facilitate a more orderly discussion. We will affirm the judgment of the trial court.
In points of error ten through fourteen, appellant claims that he is entitled to a judgment of acquittal because the evidence adduced at the guilt/innocence stage of his trial was both legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's finding of guilt. Appellant was charged with, and found guilty of, intentionally committing murder while in the course of committing robbery, burglary, aggravated sexual assault, and arson. The State presented forty witnesses (law enforcement personnel, forensic serologists, friends of the victim, etc.) and numerous exhibits at the guilt/innocence stage in an attempt to prove its case, and appellant presented four witnesses in his defense. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence presented established the following:
Early on the evening of September 24, 1996, Vicki Ann Garner entertained a friend at Garner's residence in Tyler. The friend left around 8:15 p.m. Sometime between 9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. that same evening, appellant met with John T. Robertson at Robertson's residence in Tyler. Robertson's residence was located less than one mile from Garner's residence. Appellant gave Robertson several small household appliances and other items in exchange for five "rocks" of "crack" cocaine. One of the appliances was an RCA-brand television-videocassette recorder (TV-VCR), serial number 619320052.
At around 6:45 a.m. the next morning, the Tyler Fire Department received a telephone call reporting a fire at Garner's residence. Tyler firemen responded immediately and arrived at the residence a few minutes later. The firemen forced open the front and back doors to the residence, which had been locked, and entered. Once inside, they found much smoke but little fire. They also found Garner's body in a bedroom. She was positioned face down on the floor, naked below the waist, her head and body battered and partially burned, her hands tied together with a cord. There was also a belt around her neck and ligature marks on her ankles. The residence itself appeared to have been ransacked, and the fire appeared to have been deliberately set.
A subsequent search of the residence by Tyler police revealed, among other things, an instruction manual for an RCA-brand TV-VCR. The serial number of the appliance was noted on the instruction manual as 619320052. The police also found a palm print matching appellant's on a kitchen cabinet.
An autopsy of Garner's body revealed that she died from manual strangulation. The autopsy also revealed the presence of spermatozoa in her vagina. Tests on that sperm revealed DNA1 with characteristics that, in many respects, paralleled the characteristics of appellant's DNA. Such a DNA "match" could be expected from only one male in 170,000.
We turn first to the question of legal sufficiency. Consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law, a criminal defendant may not be convicted of an offense and denied his liberty except upon proof sufficient to persuade a rational factfinder of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 2220 (1982). In assessing the "legal" sufficiency of the evidence, under the Fourteenth Amendment, to support a conviction, we consider all of the record evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational jury could have found the accused guilty of all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155, 158-159 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981). Furthermore, when we undertake to review the sufficiency of the evidence and, as was the case here, the trial court's charge authorized the jury to convict on several different theories, the verdict of guilt will be upheld if the evidence is sufficient on any one of the theories. Rabbani v. State, 847 S.W.2d 555, 558-559 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). If, given all of the evidence, a rational jury would necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, the due process guarantee requires that we reverse and order a judgment of acquittal. Narvaiz v. State, 840 S.W.2d 415, 423 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1422 (1993).
Applying these principles to the case at bar, we conclude that the evidence is not legally insufficient. Based on the circumstantial evidence presented at trial, a rational jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that sometime between 8:15 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. on September 24, 1996, appellant entered Garner's home, sexually assaulted2 her and then intentionally killed her, stole her property, and then set fire to her home in an attempt to hide his culpability.
We turn next to the question of factual sufficiency. Our state constitution allows an appellate court to reverse a judgment of conviction where the evidence preponderates greatly against a finding of guilt. Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 135 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). In assessing the "factual" sufficiency of the evidence, under Clewis v. State, to support a conviction, we consider all of the evidence in a neutral light, comparing the evidence which tends to prove guilt to the evidence, if any, which tends to disprove guilt, and we determine whether the evidence preponderates greatly against the jury's finding of guilt. Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 100 (1997). If the evidence preponderates greatly against the jury's finding of guilt, then we must remand for a new trial, so that a second jury will have a chance to evaluate the evidence.3 Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d at 133-134.
The record evidence that tends to prove appellant's guilt is strong, and we have found no record evidence that tends to disprove his guilt. Therefore, we hold that the evidence is not factually insufficient. We overrule points of error ten through fourteen.
In point of error 73, appellant contends that the evidence adduced at trial was legally insufficient to support the jury's affirmative answer to the first punishment issue, concerning his future dangerousness. Under the first punishment issue, the jury was asked to determine "whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." Art. 37.071, 2(b)(1).4 The State had the burden of proving the punishment issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Art. 37.071, 2(c). Thus, the State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability that appellant, if allowed to live, would commit criminal acts of violence in the future, so as to constitute a continuing threat, whether in or out of prison. Narvaiz v. State, 840 S.W.2d at 424. In its determination of the issue, the jury was entitled to consider all of the evidence presented at both the guilt/innocence and punishment stages of trial. Valdez v. State, 776 S.W.2d 162, 166-167 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 2575 (1990). As an appellate court reviewing the jury's finding, we must view all of the evidence before the jury in the light most favorable to its finding, and then determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the answer to the first punishment issue was "yes." Harris v. State, 738 S.W.2d 207, 225-226 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 207 (1987).
Viewed in the necessary light, the evidence at the punishment stage established that appellant committed an extraneous triple murder in Dallas on October 25, 1978. Furthermore, psychiatric evidence at the punishment stage established that appellant has an anti-social personality disorder, that the disorder is permanent, and that he is inherently violent and lacks any regard for the welfare of others. We hold that, based on the totality of the evidence presented at trial, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant is dangerous and incorrigible and that the answer to the first punishment issue is "yes." We overrule point of error 73.
In points of error 48, 49, and 52-56, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his challenges of various veniremen for cause under Article 35.16. The record reflects that appellant exhausted his peremptory challenges, that he asked for more, that the trial court granted him one more, and that appellant identified two jurors on whom he would have exercised peremptory challenges. Therefore, if we determine that two or more of appellant's challenges for cause should have been granted, reversible error would be shown. Martinez v. State, 763 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988).
In point of error 48, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his challenge of...
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