Ladner v. Northside Hosp., Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 February 2012
• Docket Number: No. A11A1696.,A11A1696.
• Citation: 723 S.E.2d 450,314 Ga.App. 136,12 FCDR 646
• Parties: LADNER v. NORTHSIDE HOSPITAL, INC.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

12 FCDR 646

314 Ga.App. 136

723 S.E.2d 450

LADNER

v.NORTHSIDE HOSPITAL, INC.

No. A11A1696.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Feb. 16, 2012.

Steel & Moss, John D. Steel, Orr & Edwards, James G. Edwards II, Susan Mary Cremer, Atlanta, for appellant.

Allen, McCain & O'Mahoney, Hunter S. Allen Jr., Scrudder, Bass, Quillian, Horlock, Taylor & Lazarus, Henry E. Scrudder, Jr., R. Keith Whitesides, Tawana Blocker Johnson, Atlanta, for appellee.

ELLINGTON, Chief Judge.

In this medical malpractice case, Barbara Ladner, individually and as executrix of her deceased husband's estate, appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Northside Hospital, Inc. Ladner contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based upon its ruling that she had failed to offer expert witness testimony on the specialized medical question of whether the hospital's allegedly negligent credentialing of her husband's surgeon to perform prostatic cryosurgery was the proximate cause of her husband's postoperative complications and death. As explained below, it is unnecessary for this Court to reach the issue of whether Ladner was required to present expert witness testimony to show causation, however, because the undisputed evidence shows that the surgeon did not perform the cryosurgery negligently. Consequently, Ladner has failed to show that there is a jury question on the issue of whether the hospital's alleged negligent credentialing caused her husband's postoperative complications and death, and we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment.

In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment under OCGA § 9–11–56, the moving party must show that there exists no genuine issue of material fact, and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demand judgment as a matter of law.

(Citation omitted.) Benton v. Benton, 280 Ga. 468, 470, 629 S.E.2d 204 (2006). Under OCGA § 9–11–56(e), when a party moves for summary judgment and supports the motion by submitting affidavits, depositions, or answers to interrogatories, the opposing party

may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his [or her] pleading, but his [or her] response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Code section, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he [or she] does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him [or her].

Further, “[a]lthough the nonmoving party on a motion for summary judgment is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence, such inferences cannot be based on mere conjecture or possibility or upon evidence which is too uncertain or speculative.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Whiteside v. Decker, Hallman, Barber & Briggs, 310 Ga.App. 16, 19, 712 S.E.2d 87 (2011). Ultimately, “on appeal from the denial or grant of summary judgment[,] the appellate court is to conduct a de novo review of the evidence to determine whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact, and whether the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.” (Citations omitted.) Benton v. Benton, 280 Ga. at 470, 629 S.E.2d 204. So viewed, the record shows the following facts.

Dr. Vahan Kassabian is a board-certified urologist who has been employed by Georgia Urology, P.A., since 1994, the same year he began practicing at Northside Hospital. In May 2001, the hospital added prostatic cryosurgery to his list of privileges, and he performed eight such procedures prior to May 2002. On May 9, 2002, Dr. Kassabian performed prostatic cryosurgery on Ladner's husband, Clyde Ladner, at the hospital to treat Mr. Ladner's prostate cancer. No significant or unusual complications were observed during or immediately after surgery, and Mr. Ladner was released from the hospital the next day. During follow-up visits with Mr. Ladner on May 17 and June 7, Dr. Kassabian recorded that Mr. Ladner was experiencing bleeding, bruising, constipation, and discomfort, which are common postsurgical complications of prostatic cryosurgery; in addition, during the latter visit, Mr. Ladner exhibited symptoms of a bladder infection and was prescribed antibiotics.

Then, on June 12, five weeks after the cryosurgery, Mr. Ladner started experiencing problems with voiding his bladder and had blood clots in his urine. Dr. Kassabian provided some treatment and performed tests in his office the next day, and Mr. Ladner went home. That night, however, Mr. Ladner went to the hospital's emergency room and was hospitalized due to unusual and excessive bleeding and abnormal results from blood tests. Over the next two weeks, Mr. Ladner's condition worsened, and he required additional treatment and surgeries, including the removal of part of his intestines and colon. At some point during such treatment, it was determined that Mr. Ladner had sustained a rectal injury during the May 9 prostatic cryosurgery. Mr. Ladner remained hospitalized for three months (hereinafter, the “hospitalization”) and, despite treatment for the rectal injury and the other complications, he died on September 22, 2002.

Ladner sued Dr. Kassabian and his employer, Georgia Urology,¹ alleging that Dr. Kassabian negligently performed the prostatic cryosurgery, that he breached the applicable standard of care by failing to timely diagnose and treat her husband's postoperative complications, and that such negligence caused her husband's injuries and death.² The complaint also named the hospital as a defendant ³ and alleged that it had negligently credentialed Dr. Kassabian to independently perform prostatic cryosurgery by failing to fully comply with its bylaws, its rules and regulations, and other applicable standards for the credentialing process.⁴

The hospital answered and filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that there was no evidence that its credentialing of Dr. Kassabian to perform prostatic cryosurgery—regardless whether such credentialing failed to comply with applicable standards—was the proximate cause of the postoperative complications Mr. Ladner experienced during his hospitalization or his eventual death.

Following a hearing on the hospital's motion, the trial court ruled that, even if it were to assume that the hospital was negligent in credentialing Dr. Kassabian to perform the prostatic cryosurgery, the issue of whether such negligent credentialing was the proximate cause of Mr. Ladner's postoperative complications and death constituted a specialized medical question for which Ladner was required to come forward with expert witness testimony, citing Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622, 697 S.E.2d 779 (2010). ⁵ The trial court also determined that Ladner had not come forward with such evidence and, therefore, granted the hospital's motion for summary judgment.⁶

On appeal from that order, Ladner contends that the trial court erred in ruling that she was required to present expert witness testimony on the issue of proximate causation. She argues that the issue of whether the hospital's negligent credentialing of Dr. Kassabian to perform prostatic cryosurgery was the proximate cause of her husband's postoperative complications and death is the sort of medical question that lay jurors are qualified to answer using their experience and common knowledge.⁷ According to Ladner, it follows that the trial court erred in granting the hospital's motion for summary judgment.

As explained below, however, it is unnecessary for this Court to decide whether the trial court erred in ruling that Ladner was required to present expert witness testimony to show that the alleged gaps in the credentialing process were the proximate cause of her husband's postoperative complications and death, because Ladner presented no evidence of any kind from which a jury could find such causation.⁸ Thus, pretermitting whether the trial court's conclusion was correct as to the need for expert witness testimony in this case, we conclude that its judgment granting the hospital's motion for summary judgment was proper.⁹

“[I]t is a well settled principle of negligence law that the occurrence of an unfortunate event is not sufficient to authorize an inference of negligence.” (Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Hardnett v. Silvey, 285 Ga.App. 424, 426, 646 S.E.2d 514 (2007). Further,

[b]efore any negligence, even if proven, can be actionable, that negligence must be the proximate cause of the injuries sued upon. To establish proximate cause, a plaintiff must show a legally attributable causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the alleged injury. The plaintiff must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result. A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to grant summary judgment for the defendant.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Grinold v. Farist, 284 Ga.App. 120, 121–122(1), 643 S.E.2d 253 (2007). See Hardnett v. Silvey, 285 Ga.App. at 426, 646 S.E.2d 514 (“On the issue of the fact of causation, as on other issues essential to the cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff, in general, has the burden of proof.”) (citation, punctuation and footnote omitted).

The record shows that Ladner presented the deposition testimony of two expert witnesses: Dr. John Hyde, an expert in the area of hospital credentialing of medical personnel, and Dr. Jeffrey Cohen, who testified about the standard of care for performing prostatic cryosurgery and treating complications resulting therefrom, as well as his opinions on the issue of Dr. Kassabian's alleged negligence in treating Mr. Ladner.

According...