Ladnier v. Murray
Decision Date | 27 September 1983 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. Y-82-1420. |
Citation | 572 F. Supp. 544 |
Parties | Peter E. LADNIER v. Fred Eugene MURRAY, Jr., et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
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David H. Martin, Washington, D.C., and Arthur G. House, Bethesda, Md., for plaintiff.
George L. Huber, Jr., William J. Kobokovich, Jr., Baltimore, Md., and John J. O'Neill, Jr., Rockville, Md., for defendants.
Plaintiff Peter Ladnier brought this federal civil rights and state tort suit against defendants Fred Murray, a Greenbelt, Maryland police officer; William Lane, Greenbelt's police chief; and the City of Greenbelt. Plaintiff alleges that on August 14, 1981 at approximately 4:30 a.m. while riding his motorcycle, he was struck from behind by a police car driven by Murray. Plaintiff further alleges that while he was lying in the roadway after the collision, he was repeatedly kicked by Murray and then handcuffed with excessive force and shoved into Murray's police car. Defendants deny that they committed any wrongful acts and further contend that any injuries sustained by plaintiff resulted from his own misconduct.
A jury trial was commenced on July 18, 1983. The case was submitted to the jury on July 25, 1983. The jury was given a special verdict form which required them to answer as many as seventeen questions. The jury gave the following answers to the special verdict questions:
Based on the jury's answers to the special verdict questions, the Court will enter judgment as follows:
The jury's finding that plaintiff's own negligence was a contributing cause of the collision between the motorcycle and police precludes plaintiff from recovering for any injuries he may have suffered as a result of the collision. The Maryland Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed the Maryland common law rule that contributory negligence is an absolute bar to recovery in a negligence case. Harrison v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 295 Md. 442, 456 A.2d 894 (1983).
The jury found that Murray applied physical force to plaintiff that was so disproportionate to the need presented as to be shocking to the conscience and that such force caused injuries to plaintiff. The jury further found that Murray did not commit a battery on plaintiff and that Murray's use of force or threatened use of force was not inspired by an evil purpose or malicious intent. Although the Court acknowledges that these findings are not entirely consistent, application of the governing law to these findings requires an entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff and against Murray in his individual capacity on the § 1983 claim of unjustified use of force.
Murray argues that the jury's finding that he did not act with an evil purpose or malicious intent immunizes him from liability for damages under § 1983. In support of this position, Murray relies on Hughes v. Blankenship, 672 F.2d 403 (4th Cir.1982). The court in Hughes cited Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) for the proposition that under the defense of qualified immunity a police officer is immune from damages in § 1983 cases unless he:
knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within the sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the ... individuals affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury. emphasis added.
Thus, Murray, focusing on the words "malicious intention" used by the Supreme Court in Wood, argues that the jury's finding that his actions were not inspired by an evil purpose or malicious intent requires an entry of judgment in his favor on the § 1983 claim against him. This argument is plainly without merit. First, under Wood qualified immunity is applicable to a governmental officer who acted without malice only if he did not know or should not have reasonably known that his actions violated the constitutional rights of others. Juncker v. Tinney, 549 F.Supp. 574, 580 (D.Md.1982). Implicit in the jury's finding that Murray's use of force was shocking to the conscience is the further finding that Murray knew or at least should have known that his actions violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiff. See Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir.1980) ( ). Second, the quality of malice referred to in Wood is not "actual malice" which requires evil purpose but rather recklessness or deliberate indifference to the rights of others which is often referred to as "legal malice." Hughes, 672 F.2d at 406; see also Smith v. Wade, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632, (1983) ( ). While the jury found that Murray acted without actual malice, the jury's assessment of punitive damages against Murray after being instructed that they could do so only if they found that Murray acted with reckless disregard or indifference to plaintiff's rights reveals that the jury found that Murray acted with legal malice. Third, the aspect of the defense of qualified immunity that involves the issue of whether or not a governmental officer acted with malice was abandoned by the Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). In short, three reasons, each one of them sufficient alone, require that the Court reject Murray's argument that the jury's finding that he acted without actual malice immunizes him from § 1983 liability.
Three other arguments that Murray might have made but did not should be briefly addressed. The first argument is that the jury's finding that Murray did not commit a battery ipso facto precludes liability under § 1983 for unjustified use of force. Some support for this argument may be found in Hall, supra; King v. Blankenship, 636 F.2d 70 (4th Cir.1980); and Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.1973). These three cases indicate that § 1983 liability for unjustified use of force is narrower than liability for common law assault and battery. None of these cases, however, hold that the finding that a defendant committed a common law battery is essential to hold the defendant liable under § 1983 for unjustified use of force. Indeed, in King the Fourth Circuit made clear that the issue of § 1983 liability is to be determined wholly apart from state common law. The court stated:
The key phrases "unjustified striking, etc." and "without just cause" in our statement of the rule must be read with reference to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and not to state tort law even though an excessive use of force under § 1983 most probably will also give rise to a cause of action under state tort law.
Accordingly, the Court holds that the jury's finding that Murray did not commit a battery on plaintiff does not require entry of judgment in favor of Murray.
Another argument that might have been advanced by Murray is that an essential element of the § 1983 claim of unjustified use of force is that the defendant acted with actual malice and therefore the jury's finding that Murray acted without actual malice precludes holding him liable under § 1983. Some support for this argument may also be found in Hall, King and Johnson. Those cases indicate that in determining whether a defendant used excessive force so as to violate the Due Process Clause, one of the factors to be considered is whether "the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." King, 636 F.2d at 73, quoting Johnson, 481 F.2d...
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