Ladra v. State

• Decision Date: 09 December 2021
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 21S-CT-235
• Citation: 177 N.E.3d 412
• Parties: Tracy LADRA, Appellant (Plaintiff below) v. STATE of Indiana and State of Indiana Department of Transportation, Appellees (Defendants below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

177 N.E.3d 412

Tracy LADRA, Appellant (Plaintiff below)

v.STATE of Indiana and State of Indiana Department of Transportation, Appellees (Defendants below).

Supreme Court Case No. 21S-CT-235

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Argued: June 23, 2021

Filed December 9, 2021

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: Janette E. Surrisi, Wyland, Humphrey, Clevenger & Surrisi, LLP, Plymouth, Indiana, Jesse R. Harper, Harper & Harper, Valparaiso, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Aaron T. Craft, Benjamin M. Jones, Natalie F. Weiss, Deputy Attorneys General, Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR AMICUS CURIAE: Christopher G. Stevenson, Wilson Kehoe & Winingham, LLC, Indianapolis, Indiana

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 20A-CT-1418

Goff, Justice.

Under the Indiana Tort Claims Act, a government entity is "not liable" for a loss or injury resulting from the "temporary condition of a public thoroughfare ... that results from weather." In deciding whether immunity applies in these circumstances, is the government's negligence in the design or maintenance of a public thoroughfare relevant to our inquiry? We conclude that it is and hold that, when the government knows of an existing defect in a public thoroughfare, and when it has ample opportunity to respond, immunity does not apply simply because the defect manifests during recurring inclement weather. In so holding, we expressly modify our rule in Catt v. Board of Commissioners .

Because the evidence designated by the plaintiff here shows that the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT) had long known of the defect causing the highway to flood, and because INDOT had more than ample opportunity to remedy that defect but failed in its duty, we hold that summary judgment was inappropriate. So, we reverse the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Facts and Procedural History

On a rainy evening in January of 2017, Tracy Ladra was driving home from church, heading eastbound along Interstate 94. As she approached mile marker 20.3, her car struck a flooded area extending from the far-left shoulder of the highway to the middle lane. Her car hydroplaned, struck the concrete median, and spun across traffic before rolling into a ditch.

When the first responding officer arrived on the scene, he witnessed flooding "all across the interstate," with water extending "up above [his] ankle." Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 57. This section of the interstate, he later testified, "flood[s] consistently." Id. at 58. When there's a heavy downpour, he stated, "debris collects," clogging the drains and flooding the area. Id. at 60. In fact, the area floods so consistently, the officer added, that he's had to call highway maintenance crews to "clear th[e] drains" at least ten to fifteen times during his six years on the force. Id. at 63. The officer, however, had received no reports of flooding in the area in the hours leading up to the accident. Id. at 64.

A second responding officer agreed that the "area was prone to flooding," the result of faulty drainage on the interstate. Id. at 125, 128. He noted the same problem in his accident report for Ladra, which attributed the hazard "to a clogged drainage system." Id. at 129. When this section of the interstate floods, the officer testified, police dispatch contacts INDOT "to come out and clear those drains." Id. at 128. After police contacted INDOT on the night of Ladra's accident, which happened to follow a similar accident at the same spot just moments before, a maintenance crew spent nearly three hours unclogging the drains and clearing the highway of flooding.

Ladra sued the State of Indiana and INDOT (collectively INDOT) for negligence, alleging that INDOT's "failure to post warnings of flooded roadway" and "failure to maintain proper drainage" resulted in "severe and permanent injury." Id. at 10–13. INDOT moved for summary judgment. Relying on Indiana Code subsection 34-13-3-3(3) (or Subsection (3)), INDOT claimed immunity from injury due to a "temporary condition of a public thoroughfare ... that results from weather." Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 19–20. The trial court ruled for INDOT.

The Court of Appeals affirmed in a divided opinion. Ladra v. State , 162 N.E.3d 1161, 1172 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). The majority held that immunity applies because, while Ladra presented evidence that INDOT knew the area was prone to flooding, no evidence in the record suggested that INDOT knew of the specific flooding that led to Ladra's accident. Id. at 1169. Citing this Court's decision in Catt v. Board of Commissioners , the majority emphasized that past incidents of flooding in this area have "no bearing on whether that condition is permanent." Id. (quoting 779 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. 2002) ). But while acknowledging Catt as binding precedent, the majority criticized that decision for creating "a circular analysis that makes any factual variance irrelevant" in granting immunity to the state. Id. at 1169 n.7. Under Catt , the majority explained, a condition inevitably "results" from the weather even when that condition results, not from the weather itself but, rather, from "the failure to repair or maintain" the public thoroughfare. Id. at 1170 n.7. And by prohibiting courts from considering the state's knowledge of similar conditions in the past when determining whether a condition "is truly from the weather" or from "the failure to take some action prior to the weather event," the Catt decision, the majority opined, not only permits government negligence, "it encourages it." Id.

While sharing the majority's concern that courts have interpreted Catt to cover every accident that occurs during bad weather, regardless of the state's negligence, the dissent found genuine issues of material fact on "whether the condition was ‘temporary’ or whether ‘the hazardous condition of [the] roadway [was] due to poor inspection, design or maintenance.’ " Id. at 1172, 1173 (Tavitas, J., dissenting) (quoting Catt , 779 N.E.2d at 4 ).

Ladra petitioned this Court for transfer, which we granted, vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standards of Review

This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. G&G Oil Co. of Indiana, Inc. v. Continental Western Insurance Co. , 165 N.E.3d 82, 86 (Ind. 2021). "We resolve all questions and view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Id. (cleaned up). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). A de novo standard of review likewise applies to questions of statutory interpretation. Ballard v. Lewis , 8 N.E.3d 190, 193 (Ind. 2014).

Discussion and Decision

Indiana has long held that the government "has a common law duty to exercise reasonable care and diligence to keep its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for travel." Catt , 779 N.E.2d at 3–4 (collecting cases). But, under Subsection (3) of the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ICTA or Act), a government entity, or a government employee acting within the scope of employment, enjoys immunity from liability for an injury or loss resulting from the "temporary condition of a public thoroughfare" or roadway "that results from weather." Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(3) (2016).

The dispute here centers on the proper standard for determining whether Subsection (3) applies. Ladra, along with the Indiana Trial Lawyers Association (ITLA) as amicus curiae, argues that the Catt rule is simply "unworkable." Pet. to Trans. at 7. See also Amicus Br. at 5 (asking this Court to create a "workable standard"). Echoing the panel's criticism below, ITLA insists that Catt "eliminates any meaningful incentive for the government to exercise reasonable care when designing and maintaining public roads." Amicus Br. at 6. INDOT, on the other hand, argues that Catt correctly interpreted Subsection (3)—an interpretation in which the legislature has ostensibly acquiesced.

Resolution of this dispute compels us to reconsider our precedent, to determine whether it was properly decided or whether it's in need of clarification or modification. See App. R. 57(H)(5). To that end, we begin our discussion by examining the common-law origins of sovereign immunity, the doctrine's substantial abrogation by Indiana courts, and the legislative codification of the common-law rule recognizing government liability for tortious conduct. See Pt. I, infra. With this context in mind, we then turn our analysis to Catt , ultimately concluding that the rule in that case sanctions negligent government conduct at Hoosiers’ expense. See Pt. II.A, infra. We go on to explain why legislative acquiescence and stare decisis present no bar to our modification of the rule in Catt . See Pt. II.B, infra. We then address INDOT's policy arguments, dispelling unfounded fears that our modified rule threatens the public treasury or opens the floodgate of negligence claims against the state. See Pt. II.C, infra. Finally, we analyze the merits of Ladra's claim under our modified rule, concluding that she designated sufficient evidence of INDOT's negligence to withstand summary judgment. See Pt. III, infra.

I. At common law and by statute, government liability for tortious conduct is the rule while immunity is the exception.

Premised on the "substantive principle that ‘the king could do no wrong,’ " the English common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity exempted the Crown from "being sued in his own court."¹ State v. Rendleman , 603 N.E.2d 1333, 1335 (Ind. 1992) (citation omitted). The adoption of this doctrine in post-Revolutionary America stood on the assumption that the fledgling states lacked the financial security to litigate claims of negligence for their official activities. Campbell v. State , 259 Ind. 55, 58, 284 N.E.2d 733, 734 (1972). In recent...