Ladson v. State
| Decision Date | 13 November 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 37787,37787 |
| Citation | 285 S.E.2d 508,248 Ga. 470 |
| Parties | LADSON v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Alva J. Hopkins, III, Folkston, for Charles Edward Ladson.
Stephen L. Jackson, Sp. Pros., Gibson, McGee, Blount & Jackson, Waycross, for the State.
The defendant, Charles Edward Ladson, was indicted, along with John Ellis Starling, on nine counts of burglary and three counts of theft by taking by a Ware County Grand Jury. The trial court granted Ladson's motion to sever parties and ordered separate trials for Ladson and Starling.
At Ladson's trial Starling testified that Ladson had assisted him in burglarizing a number of the residences set out in the indictment. Starling testified that, on other occasions, Ladson would tell Starling what he wanted stolen, Starling would then steal it and turn it over to Ladson for a fee; Starling's testimony was that Ladson instructed him to steal "color T.V.'s, microwaves, guns or anything of value." Starling testified that he continued to "work for" Ladson in this capacity for two and one-half years because Ladson had threatened not only his life, but the lives of Starling's family if Starling attempted to "get out of" the operation. In support of its case, the State introduced into evidence two microwave ovens and a television set found in Ladson's possession. The serial numbers on these three items matched the serial numbers of two microwave ovens and one television set stolen in three of the burglaries for which Ladson had been indicted.
At the close of the State's case the trial court granted Ladson's motions for directed verdict as to all three theft by taking counts and to five counts of burglary on the ground that the State had failed to corroborate Starling's testimony.
Ladson testified at trial that Starling had offered, at various times, to sell him merchandise including the two microwave ovens and television introduced into evidence. Ladson testified that he had purchased these items and many others from Starling because Starling needed money. Ladson stated that he had neither played a part in any of the burglaries in question nor was he ever aware that any of the merchandise Starling sold him had been stolen.
The jury acquitted Ladson on one count of burglary and convicted him of the three counts of burglary in which the microwave ovens and television set had been stolen. The trial court sentenced Ladson to three twenty year sentences in the penitentiary, to run concurrently.
(1) Defendant first argues that Code Ann. § 26-1601 (Ga.L.1978, p. 236), the burglary statute under which he was convicted, is unconstitutional because it violates Article III, Section VII, Paragraph IV of the Georgia Constitution (Code Ann. § 2-1304). This section of the Constitution provides: "No law shall pass which refers to more than one subject matter or contains matter different from what is expressed in the title thereof."
The caption of Georgia Laws 1978, p. 236 of which defendant complains, states as its purpose "[t]o amend Code Section 26-1601, relating to the crime of burglary, so as to provide for periods of mandatory imprisonment upon second and third convictions of said offense; to repeal conflicting laws; and for other purposes."
Former Code Ann. § 26-1601, Ga.L.1968, pp. 1249, 1287; Ga.L.1977, p. 895, set out the elements of the offense of burglary and provided for punishment by imprisonment of not less than one nor more than twenty years. Georgia Laws 1978, p. 236 retained the earlier definition of burglary with the singular exception of deleting "aircraft" from the list of structures which can be burglarized. Georgia Laws 1978, p. 236, added to Code Ann. § 26-1601 a section providing for periods of mandatory imprisonment upon a second or third conviction of burglary.
Defendant argues that the language in the caption of former Code Ann. § 26-1601, Ga.L.1978, p. 236, 1 stating as the purpose of the Act "to amend Code Section 26-1601 ... so as to provide for mandatory imprisonment upon second and third convictions of said offense," "expressly and specifically limited said act to providing only such mandatory periods of imprisonment." Since this language does not encompass an amendment to the definition of the crime of burglary, defendant posits, the act "contains matter different from what is expressed in the title thereof" and thus is in violation of the Constitution. Code Ann. § 2-1304.
We find it unnecessary to reach the question of whether defendant, not having been charged with burglarizing an aircraft, has standing to attack the statute since we base our decision here on other grounds.
We emphasize that the legislature enacted Georgia Laws 1978, p. 236 "to amend Code Section 26-1601 relating to the crime of burglary," and to provide for mandatory imprisonment upon subsequent convictions of "said offense." [Emphasis supplied]. Further the caption of the Act contained the broad language "and for other purposes."
We have recently held that . Frazer v. City of Albany, 245 Ga. 399, 401, 265 S.E.2d 581 (1980). Howell v. State, 71 Ga. 224 (1883).
As held in Martin v. Broach, 6 Ga. 21(2) (1849), "Where the title specifies some of the objects for which the Statute was passed, and contains this general clause--'And for other purposes therein contained,' portions of the Act not specially indicated in the title, are, nevertheless, good, under this general clause." Devier v. State, 247 Ga. 635, 636, 277 S.E.2d 729 (1981).
It is clear that the definition of "burglary" in Georgia Laws 1978, p. 236 "relates to the main object of [the] legislation," contains "no matter variant from the title," and bears "a natural connection" to the matter contained in the enacting clause. We conclude that this Act does not violate Code Ann. § 2-1304.
(2) Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the introduction in evidence of a microwave oven found at his former place of employment. The oven had been stolen from one of the mobile homes defendant was accused of burglarizing.
Defendant contends that since the property was found at a place which was neither owned nor controlled by him, and since many others had access to the oven at this place, this evidence should have been suppressed at trial. Defendant's position is that, absent a showing that he was in exclusive possession of the oven, evidence that he had access to the microwave "is not sufficient to support a conviction."
There is no constitutional right to suppress evidence solely on the ground that others have access to it. Defendant has not asserted a violation of any interest which is protected by the Constitution. The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress.
(3) At trial the State introduced two stereo speakers into evidence which had allegedly been taken by defendant during one of the burglaries. The victim of the burglary testified that while the speakers in evidence were "similar" to hers, they did not belong to her. Thereafter, defendant made a motion for mistrial. Out of the presence of the jury the trial court denied the motion, but instructed the jury "not [to] consider any evidence, testimony or reference" to the speakers. The State then withdrew the speakers from evidence. Defendant renewed his motion for mistrial on the ground that the instructions were insufficient. The trial court denied the second motion and again instructed the jury to disregard any reference to the speakers.
Relying on Hess v. State, 132 Ga.App. 26, 207 S.E.2d 580 (1974), defendant argues that the introduction of evidence unconnected to him was so harmful as to require a new trial. In Hess, the victim of the burglary was permitted to testify that over forty items were missing from her house. None of these items had been listed in the indictment and the State had introduced no evidence, either circumstantial or direct to link the defendants with any of them. Concluding that the testimony was "irrelevant and inadmissible", the Court of Appeals determined that defendants were entitled to a new trial.
Unlike the situation in Hess we find that the trial court in this case acted promptly and properly in twice cautioning the jury to disregard any testimony or reference to the speakers and in instructing the State to withdraw the speakers from evidence. Under these circumstances we find that the trial court did not err in overruling defendant's motion for mistrial.
(4) On cross-examination of Ellis Starling, defendant asked, "Didn't you steal seven hundred and something dollars from [Ella Mae Newman] while you were living with her?" The State objected that this was not the proper way to impeach a witness. Defendant responded that he was not attempting to impeach the witness, but that his purpose in asking the question was to show motive--"that [Starling] was stealing just out of pure greed, as he always had stolen out of pure greed." The trial court sustained the State's objection.
Defendant argues that the...
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