Ladue v. Kettle Falls Int'l Ry.
| Decision Date | 08 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:21-CV-00205-MKD |
| Parties | MICHAEL LADUE and AMANDA LADUE, Plaintiffs, v. KETTLE FALLS INTERNATIONAL RAILWAY, LLC, and OMNITRAX, INC., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Washington |
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF MICHAEL LADUE'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ECF No. 73
Before the Court is Plaintiff Michael Ladue's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 73. On September 28, 2022, the Court heard argument on the motion. See ECF No. 117. Dylan R. Williams and Scott H. Levy appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs. Paul S. Stewart, Scott Cifrese, and Sabrina Affice appeared on behalf of Defendants. Plaintiffs Michael LaDue and Amanda LaDue bring negligence and strict liability claims under the Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq., and in common law against Defendants Kettle Falls International Railway, LLC (“KFR”) and OmniTRAX, Inc. (“OmniTRAX”), railroad companies for whom Mr. LaDue performed work. ECF No. 62.
Mr LaDue moves for summary judgment as to his Second and Fourth[1]Causes of Action. In these claims, Mr LaDue alleges that Defendants violated federal railroad regulations and such violations caused Mr. LaDue's injuries, resulting in liability under a negligence per se theory. ECF No. 73 at 1. In his reply brief and at the September 28, 2022 motions hearing, Mr. LaDue limited the scope of his request, no longer seeking summary judgment but asking the Court to find that Defendants violated federal railroad regulations, that the violations played a role in causing Mr. LaDue's injury, and that, therefore, Mr LaDue's comparative fault is irrelevant as a matter of law. ECF No. 107 at 1-2.
For the reasons stated below, Mr. LaDue's motion is granted in part and denied in part.
The Court's November 18, 2022 Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment sets forth relevant and undisputed factual background. ECF No. 121 at 2-3. The undisputed facts discussed below supplement the record as needed for consideration of the instant motion.
On November 9, 2018, Mr. LaDue worked as a tamper operator on the Kettle Falls International Railway. ECF No. 112 at 1 ¶ 1. Mr. LaDue worked for All-American Track (“AAT”), a contractor that KFR retained to perform repair work. ECF No. 112 at 1 ¶ 2.
On November 9, 2018, Brady Peters, OmniTRAX's project manager for the San Poil Subdivision repair work, planned for all equipment to “tie down” at a location called “Boyds siding.” ECF No. 112 at 1 ¶ 4, 2 ¶ 5. After Mr. LaDue competed his work on November 9, 2018, Mr. LaDue called Wyatt Willey, KFR's employee in charge (“EIC”) assigned to Mr. LaDue's track crew, to ask to tie down at a different yard, called the “Kettle Falls yard.” ECF No. 112 at 2 ¶ 19. Mr. Willey gave Mr. LaDue permission to take his equipment to the Kettle Falls yard rather than Boyds siding. ECF No. 112 at 2 ¶ 20.
As Mr. LaDue travelled to the Kettle Falls yard, he called out his milepost locations on the radio. ECF No. 112 at 2-3 ¶ 35. Mr. Willey heard Mr. LaDue call out his milepost locations but did not respond. ECF No. 112 at 3 ¶ 36.
Mr. LaDue was unaware that there was a row of stationary railcars on the track between him and his destination. ECF No. 112 at 3 ¶ 51. Mr. LaDue saw the stationary railcars and attempted to stop the tamper. ECF No. 112 at 3 ¶ 51. The tamper slowed, slid, collided with the railcars, and partially ejected Mr. LaDue, causing him to lose consciousness and suffer injury. ECF No. 112 at 3 ¶ 52, 4 ¶ 53.
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on October 5, 2020. ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on July 7, 2022. ECF No. 62.
A district court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Barnes v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 934 F.3d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 2019). A party may move for summary judgment on part of a claim or defense. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Corp. of Gonzaga Univ. v. Pendleton Enters., LLC, 55 F.Supp.3d 1319, 1321 (E.D. Wa. 2014). “A fact is ‘material' only if it might affect the outcome of the case, and a dispute is ‘genuine' only if a reasonable trier of fact could resolve the issue in the non-movant's favor.” Fresno Motors, LLC v. Mercedes Benz USA, LLC, 771 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
The moving party “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,'” that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (quoting former Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). A moving party who bears the burden of persuasion at trial must show that “no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party.” Engley Diversified, Inc. v. City of Port Orchard, 178 F.Supp.3d 1063, 1070 (W.D. Wash. 2016) (quoting Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986)).
Once the moving party has satisfied its burden, to survive summary judgment, the non-moving party must demonstrate by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file “specific facts” showing that there is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
The Court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inference in the nonmoving party's favor.” Rookaird v. BNSF Ry. Co., 908 F.3d 451, 459 (9th Cir. 2018). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts “are jury functions, not those of a judge ....” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. “Summary judgment is improper ‘where divergent ultimate inferences may reasonably be drawn from the undisputed facts.'” Fresno Motors, 771 F.3d at 1125 (quoting Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 988 (9th Cir. 2006). “[W]hen parties submit cross-motions for summary judgment, [e]ach motion must be considered on its own merits,” but the court must consider all evidence submitted in support of both cross-motions when separately reviewing the merits of each motion. Fair Hous. Council of Riverside Cty., Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001) (second alteration in original).
FELA provides, in relevant part, that “[e]very common carrier by railroad,” while engaged in interstate or international commerce, “shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce ....” 45 U.S.C. § 51. Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 432 (1958).
As a preliminary matter, FELA provides a remedy for employees against their employer railroads. Defendants, in their motion for summary judgment, argued that Mr. LaDue was not their employee when he suffered injury, and therefore, his FELA claims should be dismissed. ECF No. 67 at 2. The Court denied Defendants' motion because there are disputed facts which, if established at trial, may lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Mr. LaDue was “employed” by Defendants for FELA purposes. ECF No. 121 at 20. Defendants make the same argument in opposition to Mr. LaDue's motion for summary judgment, and the Court's conclusion remains the same.
Mr. LaDue asks the Court to find that Defendants did, in fact, violate federal railroad regulations, that those violations caused Mr. LaDue's injuries, and that any comparative fault on the part of Mr. LaDue may not serve as a defense. ECF No. 107 at 1-2.
Congress has directed the Secretary of Transportation to “prescribe regulations and issue orders for every area of railroad safety[.]” 49 U.S.C. § 20103(a); see also Ass'n Am. R.Rs. v. Dep't of Transp., 198 F.3d 944, 945-46 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The Secretary of Transportation has delegated its authority to promulgate regulations related to railroad safety to the Federal Railroad Administrator. 49 C.F.R. § 1.89 (2022); see also 49 U.S.C. § 103 (creating the Federal Railroad Administration (“FRA”)). Mr. LaDue argues that there remains no genuine dispute that Defendants violated two federal railroad regulations.
The FRA promulgated a set of Railroad Workplace Safety regulations at 49 C.F.R. Subtit. B, Ch. II, Pt. 214, and more specifically, Roadway Worker Protection regulations at Subpart C, known as the Roadway Worker Protection Rule (“RWPR”). See Zimmerman v. Long Island R.R., 2 F. App'x. 172, 173 (2d Cir. 2001); Ass'n Am. R.Rs., 198 F.3d at 946; Lessert v. BNSF Ry. Co., 476 F.Supp.3d 926, 942 (D.S.D. 2020); Robinson v. AMTRAK, No. 18-341, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122541, at *10 (E.D. Penn. July 22, 2019). RWPR, Section 214.315, provides as follows:
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