Laenen v. Laenen
| Decision Date | 16 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. ED 100672.,ED 100672. |
| Citation | 451 S.W.3d 715 |
| Parties | Frank J. LAENEN, and Jennifer R. Laenen, Appellants, v. Beth A. LAENEN, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Michael H. Izsak, James J. Lang, Klar, Izsak & Stenger, L.L.C., St. Louis, MO, for appellant.
Ryan J. Helfrich, Union, MO, for respondent.
Appellant Jennifer Laenen (“Jennifer”) appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Franklin County ordering the entry of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO”)1 affecting the pension of Jennifer's deceased husband, Frank Laenen (“Frank”)2 . The QDRO recognized the right of Beth Laenen (“Beth”), Frank's former spouse, to receive a portion of Frank's pension pursuant to a separation agreement incorporated into Beth and Frank's marriage dissolution decree. On appeal, Jennifer contends that the trial court lacked authority to enter the QDRO because Frank died before the trial court entered the QDRO. Jennifer further asserts that the separation agreement contained no terms evidencing the parties' intention that the separation agreement be considered a QDRO, and that the QDRO improperly modifies the terms of the separation agreement by awarding Beth an interest in Frank's pension that differs from the interest granted her in the separation agreement.
We hold that Section 452.330.5 RSMo authorized the trial court to enter a QDRO to effectuate the terms of the dissolution decree previously entered. However, when the trial court substantively modified the language of the QDRO from the terms of the dissolution decree previously entered, it did so in violation of Section 452.330.5. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to the trial court to enter an amended QDRO consistent with the terms of the dissolution decree.
On November 12, 2010, the trial court entered a judgment dissolving the marriage of Beth and Frank. The judgment incorporated an attached separation agreement dividing the couple's marital property (hereinafter, “the Separation Agreement”). The parties agreed to divide Frank's Anheuser–Busch Employee Pension equally between them. The Separation Agreement states, in pertinent part:
Frank married Jennifer on August 31, 2011. Frank died on February 27, 2012. At the time of his death, Frank remained employed with Anheuser Busch.
In April 2012, Beth sent a letter to the trial court requesting that it enter a QDRO to protect her interest in Frank's pension. In her letter Beth stated that she was not represented by counsel in the divorce, and Frank's attorney did not advise her or Frank that a QDRO was necessary for Beth to obtain the one-half share of Frank's pension to which she was entitled under the Separation Agreement.
The trial court subsequently directed Charles Hurth, the attorney who represented Frank in his divorce, to “prepare a QDRO, in conformance with the Judgment entered on Nov. 21, 2010, to enable [Beth] to obtain the share of [Frank's] employment benefits to which she is entitled to, per the Judgment.” On May 31, 2012, the trial court entered a QDRO naming Beth as an alternate payee entitled to 50% of the accrued benefit of Frank's pension as of November 9, 2010. The QDRO further stated that Beth should be considered Frank's surviving spouse for the purpose of receiving any death benefits under the pension.
On June 1, 2012, Jennifer moved the trial court to intervene in the matter and to vacate the QDRO entered May 31, 2012. Jennifer asserted that the trial court had no authority to enter a QDRO because Frank died prior to Beth's request for a QDRO and because the entry of a QDRO was not supported by the law or the record of the case. Beth argued that the trial court had authority pursuant to Section 452.330.5 to enter a QDRO to enforce her right to the share of Frank's pension granted by the dissolution decree.3 After a hearing on the matter, the trial court determined that it had authority under Section 452.330.5 to enter the QDRO and approved the QDRO for submission to the plan administrators.
On or about January 16, 2013, the plan administrator for Frank's pension determined that the QDRO submitted by Beth did not qualify as a QDRO under applicable federal law in accordance with the pension plan's procedures and policies. Beth submitted a revised proposed QDRO for the trial court's review and signature. Jennifer filed renewed objections to the proposed QDRO as well as a motion for stay of execution of the QDRO pending appellate review. On October 9, 2013, the trial court entered its final judgment, again holding that it had authority to enter the QDRO under Section 452.330.5. The trial court also granted Jennifer's motion for stay of execution of the QDRO pending appellate review of its judgment. Jennifer now appeals.
First, Jennifer asserts that the trial court erred in entering the QDRO because the trial court lost authority to enter any order in the underlying dissolution of marriage action once Frank died. Second, Jennifer contends that the trial court erred in entering the QDRO because orders affecting the distribution of marital property may be modified only if the order was intended to be a QDRO. Jennifer maintains that the Separation Agreement did not include any terms expressing the parties' intent that the agreement be considered a QDRO. Finally, Jennifer asserts that the trial court erred in entering the QDRO because the QDRO improperly modifies the terms of the Separation Agreement in that the QDRO ignores the conditions that Frank retire and Beth never remarry.
We review the trial court's decision modifying a QDRO pursuant to Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). In re Marriage of Green, 341 S.W.3d 169, 174 (Mo.App.E.D.2011). Thus, we will affirm the decision unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law.
Murphy, 536 S.W.2d at 32. “Interpretation of a dissolution judgment and a QDRO is an issue of law that we review de novo. ” Roberts v. Roberts, 432 S.W.3d 789, 793 (Mo.App.W.D.2014) (quoting Kuba v. Kuba, 400 S.W.3d 869, 875 (Mo.App.W.D.2013) ).
Jennifer's first point on appeal challenges the trial court's authority to enter the QDRO after Frank's death. Citing a longstanding rule in Missouri that a divorce action abates upon the death of either spouse, Jennifer reasons the trial court lacked authority after Frank's death to enter any order in the divorce action, including a QDRO. We disagree.
Generally, once a decree or judgment for dissolution of marriage becomes final, the property provisions of the decree are not modifiable. Ochoa v. Ochoa, 71 S.W.3d 593, 595 (Mo. banc 2002). However, Section 452.330.5 creates an express but limited exception to this rule specifically related to QDROs:
The court's order as it affects distribution of marital property shall be a final order not subject to modification; provided, however, that orders intended to be qualified domestic relations orders affecting pension, profit sharing and stock bonus plans pursuant to the U.S. Internal Revenue Code shall be modifiable only for the purpose of establishing or maintaining the order as a qualified domestic relations order or to revise or conform its terms so as to effectuate the expressed intent of the order.
Section 452.330.5. Accordingly, under Section 452.330.5, the trial court may modify its judgment and decree of dissolution “to establish, to maintain, or to revise a QDRO in order to ensure that the order is ‘qualified’ ” under applicable federal law. In re Marriage of Green, 341 S.W.3d at 174 (quoting Shelton v. Shelton, 201 S.W.3d 576, 580 (Mo.Ct.App.2006) ). In enacting Section 452.330.5, Ochoa, 71 S.W.3d at 597. The statute places no time limits or restrictions as to when modification for this purpose can be done. Shelton, 201 S.W.3d at 580.
Jennifer argues that a trial court loses any authority it possessed to enter a QDRO under Section 452.330.5 once a party to the dissolution action dies. In support of her argument, Jennifer cites three cases—Shepler v. Shepler, 348 S.W.2d 607 (Mo.App.St.L.1961), Leventhal v. Leventhal, 629 S.W.2d 505 (Mo.Ct.E.D.1981), and Smithart v. Sportsman, 614 S.W.2d 320 (Mo.App.W.D.1981) —where the Court of Appeals determined that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify a dissolution decree after the death of one of the spouses. The facts of these cases are distinguishable from those before us, and we are not persuaded that these cases control our analysis here. Notably, Shepler, L...
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