Lafargue v. Lafargue

• Decision Date: 13 May 1946
• Docket Number: 4-7886
• Citation: 194 S.W.2d 438,210 Ark. 97
• Parties: LaFargue v. LaFargue
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

194 S.W.2d 438

210 Ark. 97

LaFargue v. LaFargue

No. 4-7886

Supreme Court of Arkansas

May 13, 1946

Rehearing Denied June 10, 1946.

Appeal from Arkansas Chancery Court, Southern District; Harry T Wooldridge, Chancellor.

Modified and Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part.

Botts & Botts, for appellant.

George E. Pike, for appellee.

OPINION

Griffin Smith, Chief Justice.

The complaint alleges breach of a written contract. The prayer was for cancellation of a five-year lease of lands, with judgment for $ 3,356.60. All issues were decided in favor of the plaintiff, who is appellee here.

While the briefs are replete with information regarding two tracts -- one containing 305.95 acres, the other 819.69 -- decree findings that Florence LaFargue was owner of an undivided fourth of the smaller farm and an undivided third of the larger, are not challenged.

E. B. LaFargue died in 1936, leaving four children: Quinn, Lloyd, and Florence LaFargue, and Edna Terrill. At that time Quinn LaFargue was in possession of both tracts through an arrangement made with his father, each of whom owned half of the farming tools and machinery. The acreage is what the witnesses refer to as improved rice lands, with wells, pumping equipment, etc.

Appellee testified that for several years after her father's death, Quinn made some payments to her as rental, but that he did not render an account of any kind -- "didn't say anything; just gave me a check."

Edna Terrill testified that she signed a contract with Quinn in 1943 in order to collect the rentals due her -- "I thought it would be the only way, except through the Court."

It is in evidence that appellee employed T. J. Moher, a Stuttgart attorney, to procure settlement under her father's will, and that in 1943 she employed G. W. Botts for the purpose of collecting, by legal process if necessary, the rents due for 1942. The suit resulting in this appeal was filed in July, 1944. It was shown that in June, 1943, Quinn LaFargue entered into a written contract with his two sisters to lease their interest in the property for a period of five years, beginning with January, 1943. Mrs. Terrill owned a fourth interest in the smaller (305.95-acre) tract, but she was not interested in the farm containing 819.69 acres. Lloyd owned a fourth interest in the smaller tract and an undivided third of the larger. However, the contract of 1943 was executed by Mrs. Terrill and Florence LaFargue as lessors and Q. D. (Quinn) LaFargue as lessee.

Appellee and appellant disagreed regarding the amount of rent to be paid for 1942, an offer having been made by Quinn to settle for $ 1,375. With refusal to accept a check for this sum, appellee notified the Smith Rice Mill to withhold, on her account, a fifth of the crop, but the mill failed to do this. Subsequently the disagreement was adjusted through payment of $ 1,800 to appellee and $ 600 to Mrs. Terrill. At the same time the rental contract now sought to be cancelled was made. It provides that appellee shall receive a fifth of the rice, but that other crops shall be rent-free. There is this paragraph:

"[The lessee] agrees to make any and all minor necessary repairs; . . . but all major repairs, consisting of repairs to wells or pumping plant machinery or replacing of these items, are to be borne equally by the owners of the land."

There was the further agreement that ". . . the sale of all rice is to be made in the names of the parties hereto and the checks received therefor are to be payable in like manner."

Instead of complying with the agreement that checks should be made payable to appellee, appellant collected the full amount, applied proceeds to his own account, and then offered to settle with appellee after computing the cost of alleged major improvements. Although, according to appellant's own figures, the gross sum paid him by the rice mill for appellee's share was $ 2,434.60, deductions claimed for major repairs were $ 912.78, leaving a balance of $ 1,521.82. This was tendered and refused.

Appellant insists that in fact major repairs cost $ 5,022.46. However, he had not claimed the full pro rata due from appellee. If this had been done the amount actually due her, says appellant, would have been $ 922.82.

An item of $ 65.80 was charged against appellee "for hauling the rice to the mill and insurance."

It is difficult to determine whether any appreciable part of the charge correctly falls within the contractual provision that appellee shall pay pro rata for major repairs. Much of the work admittedly was done in anticipation of requirements for 1944 and succeeding years. Machinery and parts were virtually unobtainable. An old heavy duty oil engine was purchased in Texas at Tyler and shipped to appellant. It was dismantled so that parts could be used in overhauling power plants. Wells were cleaned, pumping equipment was replaced in some instances, and houses were roofed. Lumber was bought for $ 646.89, and a carpenter was paid $ 332.50.

In 1931 appellant was adjudged a bankrupt; yet in 1944, as a witness, he claimed to have spent $ 42,091.64 on the properties, adding by way of testimony, "None of the other heirs paid out anything."

The evidence clearly shows that appellant had pursued a consistent policy of building up the property, supplying modern machinery as circumstances permitted, and lowering cost of pumping. Indeed, witnesses who charged substantial sums for overhauling wells and engines testified that efficiency of the equipment was probably increased fifteen per cent. There is also testimony by a witness for appellant that incidental repairs to a single engine would vary: one year they would be $ 150, "and maybe the next year $ 350."

There is nothing in the contract permitting appellant to build houses and charge a proportionate part of the cost to appellee; and while appellant testified that almost $ 1,000 was spent for lumber and carpentering, there is absence of a sufficient showing that this was not done to facilitate appellant and lower his "overhead" costs. The statements filed are somewhat vague, and the claims are based primarily upon appellant's testimony. Our view is that the Chancellor...