Lafave v. State

• Decision Date: 16 October 2014
• Docket Number: No. SC12–2232.,SC12–2232.
• Parties: Debra LAFAVE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

149 So.3d 662

Debra LAFAVE, Petitioner

v.STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC12–2232.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Oct. 16, 2014.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Julius Joseph Aulisio, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, FL, for Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Robert Jay Krauss, Bureau Chief, and Cerese Crawford Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Respondent.

Opinion

QUINCE, J.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in State v. LaFave, 113 So.3d 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). In its decision, the district court ruled upon the following question and certified it to be of great public importance:

IN THE ABSENCE OF A STATUTORY RIGHT TO APPEAL, MAY THE STATE SEEK CERTIORARI REVIEW OF AN ORDER TERMINATING PROBATION WHERE IT CAN SHOW THAT THE CIRCUIT COURT DEPARTED FROM THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW BY VIOLATING THE PLEA AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE DEFENDANT WHICH CALLED FOR NO EARLY TERMINATION?

Id. at 37. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

For the reasons stated below, we answer the certified question in the negative and quash the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal which reinstated LaFave's probation pursuant to the terms and conditions of her negotiated plea agreement and original sentence. Because we determine that the Second District lacked jurisdiction to review the circuit court's order terminating LaFave's probation, we do not reach the merits of its decision.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

As summarized by the district court below, the facts in this case are:

Debra LaFave, a school teacher, was charged in Hillsborough County with two counts of lewd or lascivious battery, see § 800.04(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003), for committing sexual battery on a fourteen-year-old middle school boy. She was also charged in Marion County for committing additional incidents of sexual battery against the same child in that county.

Her two Hillsborough County charges, both second-degree felonies, were each punishable by up to fifteen years in prison. See § 775.082(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (2003). However, under the Criminal Punishment Code, her lowest permissible sentence was 15.1875 years in prison. See §§ 921.0024(2), .00265(1), Fla. Stat. (2003).

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement with the State, LaFave pleaded guilty in 2005 to the Hillsborough County charges in exchange for a nonprison sentence of supervision, which was a downward departure from the prison requirements of the Criminal Punishment Code. The circuit court accepted her plea, according to the agreement, and sentenced her to three years of community control to be followed by seven years of sex offender probation. As an express condition of her plea agreement, LaFave agreed to serve her entire sentence and to not seek early termination of probation. This agreement was ratified and confirmed by the circuit court by virtue of its acceptance of her negotiated plea. Subsequent to her plea in Hillsborough County, the State Attorney's Office in Marion County dropped the Marion County charges against her, deeming the matter resolved by the Hillsborough County disposition.^{[ 1 ]}

Six years into her ten-year nonprison sentence, LaFave unabashedly sought early termination of her probation in 2011 in direct violation of her plea agreement. She asked the circuit court to terminate her sex offender probation four years early. On October 3, 2011, over objections from both the state attorney and the Department of Corrections [ (DOC) ], the circuit court granted her motion and terminated her probation as requested.

Id. at 33–34.

LaFave's Motion

At the hearing on LaFave's Motion to Terminate Probation, LaFave argued that under section 948.05, Florida Statutes (2011), the trial court has inherent jurisdiction to hear the motion and to reward defendants based on their successful completion, or substantial completion, of such strict probationary and community control terms, regardless of what the parties may have agreed to. The State argued that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear the motion, in light of the “no early termination” provision. The State further argued that if the court in fact had jurisdiction, that the motion should be dismissed on the merits, as the DOC and the victim strongly opposed LaFave's release from probation. The trial court granted LaFave's motion. The State filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari with the Second District Court of Appeal, which the Second District granted.

The Second District's Discussion of Jurisdiction

The Second District acknowledged that the State had no right of appeal in this case, as section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes (2011), and its procedural counterpart, Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c), set forth the limited circumstances in which the State has a right to appeal and neither the statute nor the rule specifically provides the State with a right to appeal a circuit court's order granting early termination of probation. LaFave, 113 So.3d at 34. The Second District observed that the trial court's order terminating LaFave's probation “is not a type of interlocutory or pretrial order that has been held to be reviewable by certiorari.... [b]ut ... does not fall into the category of ‘final orders of dismissal’ that are not subject to certiorari review.” Id. at 36–37.

The Second District decided that the trial court's order “is a rare, postsentencing order which ... constitutes a violation of the plea agreement ... [is] extremely prejudicial to the State, and the ability of the State to seek certiorari review of such an order, where there is no other avenue for relief, is crucial ‘to the fair administration of criminal justice’ and necessary ‘to correct an erroneous and highly prejudicial ruling.’ ” Id. at 37 (citing State v. Pettis, 520 So.2d 250, 253 (Fla.1988) ). The district court concluded its discussion of jurisdiction by stating, “we rely on the rationale of Harris,² Pettis, and Wilson³ and hold that in this rare instance, the State may seek certiorari review of the circuit court order terminating LaFave's probation[,]” and certified the question presented to this Court. Id. at 37 (footnote omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

The district court certified a question of great public importance to this Court. Because this is a question of law arising from undisputed facts, this Court reviews the district court's decision de novo. Aills v. Boemi, 29 So.3d 1105, 1108 (Fla.2010).

II. Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction of Florida District Courts of Appeal

The Florida Constitution provides district courts with the authority to hear appeals from trial court final orders and to review interlocutory orders of trial courts as provided by the procedural rules. Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const. The constitution also allows district courts to issue writs of certiorari “necessary to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction.” Art. V, § 4(b)(3), Fla. Const.

Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(1)–(3) more fully outlines the appellate and certiorari jurisdiction of our district courts of appeal and provides:

(b) Jurisdiction of District Courts of Appeal.

(1) Appeal Jurisdiction. District courts of appeal shall review, by appeal

(A) final orders of trial courts, not directly reviewable by the supreme court or a circuit court, including county court final orders declaring invalid a state statute or provision of the state constitution;

(B) non-final orders of circuit courts as prescribed by rule 9.130;

(C) administrative action if provided by general law.

(2) Certiorari Jurisdiction. The certiorari jurisdiction of district courts of appeal may be sought to review

(A) non-final orders of lower tribunals other than as prescribed by rule 9.130;

(B) final orders of circuit courts acting in their review capacity.

(3) Original Jurisdiction. District courts of appeal may issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and common law certiorari, and all writs necessary to the complete exercise of the courts' jurisdiction; or any judge thereof may issue writs of habeas corpus returnable before the court or any judge thereof, or before any circuit judge within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

Fla. R.App. P. 9.030(b)(1)–(3) (footnotes omitted). The jurisdictional dispute before the Second District centered on the parties' disagreement over how to reconcile subsections (b)(2)(A) and (b)(3) of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030. LaFave argued that because subsection (b)(2)(A) explicitly limits the certiorari jurisdiction of district courts to review non-final orders entered by lower courts, the reference to the original jurisdiction of the district courts to issue writs of certiorari is also limited to cases involving non-final orders. The State, however, argued that such a reading would render the two subsections redundant and does not reflect the true meaning of the rules. Instead, the State argued that subsection (b)(3) provides a district court with original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, in accordance with its duty to review decisions of lower courts, with no requirement that the order be a non-final one.

The district court did not explicitly agree with either jurisdictional argument, but nonetheless found that it had jurisdiction to hear the case. We find that the jurisprudence of this Court does not support the district court's jurisdictional analysis and we, therefore, quash the decision of the district court.

The State's Right to Petition for Common Law Certiorari

In 1962, this Court granted jurisdiction in State v. Harris, 136 So.2d 633 (Fla.1962), where the State petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari based on an alleged conflict of decisions, after the district court reversed the defendant's conviction. Id. at 634. This Court questioned “whether the [S]tate has the right to seek certiorari from a decision of a district court in which...