LaFayette v. Moody
| Decision Date | 14 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 4D18-3687,4D18-3687 |
| Citation | 316 So.3d 708 |
| Parties | Willie LAFAYETTE, individually, and Southeastern Freight Lines, Inc., Appellants/Cross Appellees, v. Samuel A. MOODY, individually, Rita Genovese, individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael A. Genovese, Appellees/Cross Appellants. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Sarah Lahlou-Amine of Banker Lopez Gassler P.A., Tampa, for appellants/cross appellees.
Elaine D. Walter, Yvette R. Lavelle, and Craig J. Shankman of Boyd Richards Parker Colonnelli, Miami, for appellee/cross appellant, Samuel A. Moody.
Julie H. Littky-Rubin of Clark, Fountain, La Vista, Prather, Keen & Littky-Rubin, LLP, West Palm Beach, and Steven G. Calamusa of Gordon & Partners, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee/cross appellant, Rita Genovese.
Appellants Willie Lafayette and his employer Southeastern Freight Lines, Inc. appeal the trial court's order granting appellee Rita Genovese, the personal representative of the Estate of Michael Genovese, a new trial following a jury verdict in appellants’ favor. Ms. Genovese and Samuel Moody, a co-defendant of Lafayette and Southeastern, both cross-appeal regarding issues stemming from that same order. We agree that the trial court committed several errors during the trial and post-trial proceedings for which a new trial is the only appropriate remedy.
In 2012, Michael Genovese was driving northbound on a two-lane highway that was under construction and lined with concrete barriers on both sides, leaving no shoulder or emergency stopping lane. Mr. Genovese was traveling behind Samuel Moody's vehicle, which was also in the northbound lane. At the same time, Lafayette was driving southbound in one of Southeastern's tractor-trailers. Moody's and Lafayette's vehicles were approaching each other at opposite ends of an S-curve, and according to the evidence, both cars were driving under the posted speed limit.
At some point, Moody's vehicle crossed over the centerline and into Lafayette's lane. Neither vehicle was able to avoid the collision, and Moody's vehicle "sideswiped" Lafayette's tractor-trailer near its left steer axle and made another impact near the left rear of the truck. Because of this collision, Lafayette's tractor-trailer jackknifed and entered the northbound lane where it crashed into Mr. Genovese's car, killing Mr. Genovese. The Estate of Mr. Genovese filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Moody, Lafayette, and Southeastern. Southeastern also brought a cross-claim against Moody for the damage incurred to its tractor-trailer from the accident.
During jury selection, Ms. Genovese and Moody endeavored to strike potential jurors whom they believed might have potential biases favoring either Southeastern specifically or truck drivers in general. During voir dire, several prospective jurors were struck for cause because they either explicitly articulated, or it was otherwise clear, that they were biased in favor of truck drivers.
One prospective juror, C.W., indicated that her husband worked as a truck driver for over thirty years. However, unlike the other jurors who had ties to the trucking industry, C.W. stated that nothing about her husband's occupation would cause her to favor "one side or the other." When asked if she would like to serve on the jury and why, C.W. answered yes, because "everybody deserves to be heard." Neither Moody nor Ms. Genovese made a cause challenge against C.W. However, before voir dire ended, Ms. Genovese decided to use a peremptory strike on her. Because C.W. was African American, and at this point was the only African American remaining on the prospective jury panel, appellants requested a race-neutral reason from counsel for the peremptory strike. Ms. Genovese first asserted that C.W.'s husband's significant experience as a truck driver was the reason for the challenge. Moody's counsel accepted this as a race-neutral reason; counsel for appellants did not. Appellants stated that if this was a true concern, Ms. Genovese should have asked to strike C.W. for cause as she did with the other jurors who had ties to the trucking industry. In response, counsel for Ms. Genovese also proffered that C.W. knew another member of the prospective jury panel (who was not ultimately selected as a member of the panel).
The trial court denied Ms. Genovese's peremptory strike, ruling that she "failed to meet the race neutral test as enunciated in the Neil / Batson cases."1 C.W. was selected as a member of the jury panel, and Ms. Genovese noted her objection to that selection on the record.
The day after the jury was selected, counsel for Ms. Genovese revisited the issue regarding juror C.W. by noting that the reasons provided for striking her, namely C.W.'s husband's experience as a truck driver, were genuine. Counsel also stated that C.W.'s perceived eagerness to serve on the jury was another reason to support a peremptory strike because it suggested that she wanted to defend the honor of her husband's profession. Finally, Ms. Genovese informed the trial court that it did not make a finding that either of the two reasons she initially offered for the peremptory challenge were not genuine. In response, appellants repeated their argument that Ms. Genovese should have used a cause challenge on C.W. if she wished to strike her due to her ties to the trucking industry. When Moody's counsel was asked to respond, he voiced his agreement with Ms. Genovese's request for a peremptory strike of C.W. because C.W. was "susceptible to being influenced" by her marriage to a truck driver. Moody's counsel agreed that this was a genuine and race-neutral reason.
Despite the proffered explanation from counsel, the trial court nonetheless stood by its original ruling denying Ms. Genovese's peremptory strike. The trial court noted that Neil , Batson , and Melbourne2 discussed the "reasonableness" and "genuineness" associated with the use of a peremptory strike. It stated that those cases required courts to place particular emphasis on the "genuineness" of the reasons stated for the challenge. The trial court then stated for the record that it did not believe that Ms. Genovese's reason for striking C.W. was race neutral; thus, it did not believe that the reason given for the strike was genuine. In so ruling, the trial court appeared to focus considerably on the racial make-up of the jury—C.W. was the only African American left on the panel—as well as a minority group's right to serve on a jury.
During the trial, the attorneys and numerous witnesses recounted the details of the fatal car accident. Both sides emphasized aspects of the testimony given by both Lafayette and Moody as they were the ones involved in the accident.
Lafayette testified he was very familiar with this stretch of the highway because he drove it every day on his package delivery route. On the day of the accident, Lafayette said he had been talking on his cell phone with the aid of a hands-free device but had ended the call before entering the construction zone. He first saw Moody's vehicle when it was 600 feet away from him. At that time, there was no indication that Moody's vehicle would enter his lane. After this, Lafayette checked his mirrors to ensure that he was maintaining his lane in the construction area. The next time Lafayette saw Moody's vehicle, it was twelve to fifteen feet in front of his truck and suddenly crossing into his lane. Lafayette also said that he saw Moody leaning over. Lafayette testified that he tried to take action to avoid the accident, but he was unable to. The impact of the collision with Moody's car knocked his hands off the steering wheel and caused him to lose control of the truck.
Ms. Genovese called witnesses to support her claim that Lafayette was inattentive when the accident occurred. One witness testified that Lafayette did not need to check his mirrors and should have kept his eyes on the road, particularly because he was travelling in a construction zone. Therefore, Ms. Genovese theorized that if Lafayette had kept his eyes on the road from the time he saw Moody's vehicle 600 feet away (which she noted was the approximate length of two football fields), instead of checking his mirrors and talking on his cell phone, he would have had enough time to react to Moody's lane shift and avoid the crash. Additionally, Ms. Genovese argued that the impact of Moody's and Lafayette's vehicles was insufficient to throw Lafayette's hands off the steering wheel as Lafayette claimed.
Moody testified that he could not recall whether he crossed the center of the road and into Lafayette's lane. He stated that he was knocked unconscious after the accident and did not remember. Moody's expert confirmed, however, that Moody's vehicle crossed into Lafayette's lane before crashing into the tractor trailer.
The trial court then allowed Ms. Genovese to introduce evidence of Lafayette's driving history with Southeastern to the jury. This evidence included fourteen documented work incidents. Though some of these incidents involved Lafayette's operation of a tractor-trailer, i.e., backing into a parked car, several others were for non-trucking infractions such as clocking into work early or forgetting to sign after making a delivery.
After the conclusion of a three-week trial, the jury returned a verdict for Ms. Genovese, finding Moody 100% responsible for the accident and awarding her the economic and non-economic damages she sought. The jury found no liability for either Southeastern or Lafayette. The jury also returned a verdict for Southeastern on its cross-claim and awarded it the total amount it sought for the damage to its tractor trailer.
Post-trial motions
Shortly after the verdict, Ms. Genovese and Moody both moved for a new trial. Additionally, Moody made an alternative motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict regarding Southeastern's cross-claim. The trial court granted both Ms. Genovese's and Moody's ...
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