Laforge v. Leblanc

• Decision Date: 03 February 1941
• Citation: 18 A.2d 138
• Court: Maine Supreme Court
• Parties: LAFORGE et al. v. LEBLANC et al.

18 A.2d 138

LAFORGE et al.

v. LEBLANC et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Feb. 3, 1941.

[Copyrighted material omitted.]

Appeal from Superior Court, Penobscot County, in Equity.

Three bills in equity by one Laforge and others against Adolphe E. LeBlanc and the Commercial Casualty Insurance Company, brought under statute, to apply insurance money to payment of losses occasioned in an automobile accident by personal injury to the various plaintiffs, who had secured final judgments against defendant LeBlanc. The three bills were consolidated for trial upon motions by the plaintiffs. From decree for plaintiffs, the defendant insurance company appeals.

Appeal dismissed and decree affirmed.

Argued before STURGIS, C. J., and THAXTER, HUDSON, MANSER, WORSTER, and MURCHIE, JJ.

John H. Needham, of Orono, for plaintiffs.

William S. Cole, of Bangor, for defendants.

MANSER, Justice.

On appeal by defendant insurance company. This is a bill brought under R.S, c. 60, §§ 177-180, to reach and apply insurance money to payment of losses occasioned in an automobile accident by personal injury to the various plaintiffs, who had secured final judgments against the defendant LeBlanc aggregating $11,426.40. The insurance coverage was $10,000. The Court below found for the plaintiffs and that each of them was entitled to 87507% of the judgments, which percentage aggregated $10,000, and decree was entered accordingly.

There were three separate bills by different groups of plaintiffs, of whom there were eight in all. Answers and replications were filed.

There were motions for consolidation by the plaintiffs in the three separate suits and an interlocutory order providing therefor. No objection to this course of procedure appears to have been made below and none is argued here. Inasmuch as there is no statute in this jurisdiction having general application to consolidation of causes in equity and no judicial ruling thereon by this Court, and further as the method of procedure is squarely before the Court in the present case, it is deemed advisable to give it consideration. In the earlier chancery practice there appears to have been some conflict of opinion and some divergence of practice. As said in Burnham v. Dalling, 1863, 16 N.J.Eq. 310, the earlier books of equity practice are silent on the subject. In Daniell's Chancery PI. & Pr, 5th Ed, Vol. 1, p. 797, there appears in the text the following:

"Neither in the Court of Chancery nor in the Court of Exchequer has the practice prevailed of compelling the plaintiff to consolidate his different suits against several defendants."

The annotation to this text shows that in some of the early English chancery cases, the practice of consolidating causes was recognized at one time, but afterwards disapproved.

The annotation to Logan v. Mechanics' Bank, 1853, 58 Am.Dec. 512 also speaks of the former practice, and then says:

"This rule has, however, been changed, and instances of the consolidation of suits in equity are numerous, and it has been held that the rules for consolidation are alike in law and equity; Beach v. Woodyard, 5 W.Va. 231; Wyatt v. Thompson, 10 W.Va. 645. Federal courts also may order consolidation of actions: Desty's Federal Procedure, sec. 921."

The federal statutes relating to the judiciary have the following provision:

"Sec. 921. When causes of a like nature or relative to the same question are pending before a court of the United States, or of any Territory, the court may make such orders and rules concerning proceedings therein as may be conformable to the usages of courts for avoiding unnecessary costs or delay in the administration of justice, and may consolidate said causes when it appears reasonable to do so." 28 U.S.C.A. § 734.

In the Century Digest under the title Action, § 625, in chancery, it is stated the rule as now generally adopted in most jurisdictions is that,

"A court of equity has the inherent power to order a consolidation of causes in its discretion."

Cited in support are Burnham v. Dalling, 16 N.T.Eq. 310; Woodburn v. Woodburn, 123 Ill. 608, 14 N.E. 58, 16 N.E. 209; Patterson v. Eakin, 87 Va. 49, 12 S.E. 144.

There is an informative discussion by Rugg, C. J. In Lumiansky v. Tessier, 213 Mass. 182, 99 N.E. 1051, 1054, Ann.Cas. 1913E, 1049, as to the consolidation of causes, both at law and in equity. Concerning the latter, the opinion says:

"In suits in equity, where there are several different parties but the same res is the subject of the litigation, or where there is such identity in the nature of the proceeding, the interests of the parties or the relief to be afforded as to require or render highly expedient a unification of divers proceedings, an order of consolidation in appropriate instances may bring all into one suit."

The only statutory provisions in Maine relating to consolidation of causes, have to do with mechanics' liens, R.S., c. 105, §§ 35 and 42. That legislative authority in such cases may have been deemed advisable arises from the fact that these provisions authorize the consolidation of two or more proceedings, either at law or in equity, pending at the same time in whatever court or courts, to enforce liens on the same building. That the power is inherent in the court itself, without legislative sanction, in the ordinary equity procedure, is laid down in 1 C.J.S., Actions, § 110:

"A consolidation in equity is therefore ordinarily proper wherever the subject matter involved and relief demanded in the different suits make it expedient for the court, by hearing them together, properly to determine all of the issues involved and adequately adjudicate the rights of the different parties." See also 1 Am.Jur., Actions, § 92.

Undoubtedly there has existed in this State some uncertainty with respect to equity procedure as to consolidation of causes. This may have arisen in part from the fact that, as to actions at law, our practice has been limited to permitting or ordering several cases relating to the same subject matter to be tried together. Field v. Lang, 89 Me. 454, 36 A. 984. It may be noted, however, that in equity, consolidation has been recognized by the Court, as appears from Cushman Co. v. Mackesy, 135 Me. 294, 195 A. 365.

The court adopts as a proper exercise of discretion by the presiding justice, the rule as quoted above from Lumiansky v. Tessier, supra.

Considering now the case upon its merits: The bills all alleged that, while defendant LeBlanc was operating his car on June 26, 1938, a collision occurred with a car operated by James R. Ballard, one of the plaintiffs, as a result of which the plaintiffs sustained personal injuries; that the plaintiffs brought separate actions against LeBlanc, and recovered judgments thereon; that on May 4, 1938, the defendant insurance company issued to LeBlanc its automobile liability insurance policy; that the policy was in full force and effect on the date of the accident; that the insurance company had seasonable notice of the accident and of the injuries and damages sustained. Prayers in the bills were that the plaintiffs be found entitled to the insurance money to be applied to their respective judgments and that the insurance company be ordered to pay them the same.

The appellant insurance company denied that the policy was in full force and effect, and also set up as substantive defense that "the defendant LeBlanc had no insurable interest in the automobile, that no premium was ever paid for the policy, that on June 17, 1938 (nine days before the accident) LeBlanc voluntarily surrendered the policy to the Company's agent for flat cancellation as of the date of issue and it was so cancelled; that LeBlanc, having been adjudicated a bankrupt (June 7, 1938) subsequently undertook to assume liability to assist the plaintiffs to obtain their judgments and that there is fraud and collusion between the judgment creditors and the defendant LeBlanc."

The statute R.S., c. 60, § 177, makes the liability of an insurer absolute except under the conditions set forth in section 180. Fraud and collusion constitute a statute designated defense. The statute provides and it is, of course, clear that to establish liability there must be a policy in...