Lago v. Adrion

• Citation: 2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 01800,93 A.D.3d 697,940 N.Y.S.2d 287
• Parties: Nancy LAGO, appellant, v. Harold Lewis ADRION, respondent.
• Decision Date: 13 March 2012
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 01800
93 A.D.3d 697
940 N.Y.S.2d 287

Nancy LAGO, appellant,
v.
Harold Lewis ADRION, respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

March 13, 2012.

[940 N.Y.S.2d 288]

Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Alex V. Chachkes, Christina Von Der Ahe, and Zheng Liu of counsel), for appellant.

Terry D. Horner, Poughkeepsie, N.Y., for respondent.

PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., THOMAS A. DICKERSON, ARIEL E. BELEN, and ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.

[93 A.D.3d 697] In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Dolan, J.), dated July 13, 2010, as, upon findings of fact and conclusions of law dated May 5, 2010, and upon supplemental findings of fact dated July 13, 2010, made after a nonjury trial, imputed annual income of $80,000 to her, limited her child support award to $2,041 per month, provided that “should the Defendant lose his law license by suspension, revocation, or otherwise, and be unable to sustain his current level of income, such event shall constitute a sufficient change of circumstances warranting application for downward modification” of child support, and directed her to pay $234,238, constituting one half of the unpaid tax liabilities of the parties incurred during the last two years of the marriage.

ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law, on the facts, and in the exercise of discretion, (1) by deleting the fourth decretal paragraph thereof, providing that “should the Defendant lose his law license by suspension, revocation, or otherwise, and be unable to sustain his current level of income, such event shall constitute a sufficient change of circumstances warranting application for downward modification” of child support, and (2) by deleting the provision thereof directing the plaintiff to pay $234,238, constituting one half of the unpaid tax liabilities of the parties incurred during the last two years of the marriage, and substituting therefor a provision directing the defendant to pay the total tax liability of $468,476; as so modified,

[940 N.Y.S.2d 289]

the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

The parties were married on September 10, 1995, and have [93 A.D.3d 698] one child, born October 28, 1996. The plaintiff wife commenced the instant action by filing a summons and complaint on September 19, 2006, after 11 years of marriage. The parties agreed on joint custody of the child and the primary physical residence of the child with the plaintiff, and consented to a divorce on the ground of constructive abandonment. In March 2010 the parties proceeded to a nonjury trial on certain financial issues.

At the conclusion of the trial, the Supreme Court found that the defendant was a tax attorney with a current income of $475,000 per year, that the plaintiff was not working, and that the plaintiff had a masters' degree in architecture from Harvard University and performed some doctoral work at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Based upon her educational qualifications and experience, and expert testimony, the Supreme Court imputed income of $80,000 per year to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court determined that the defendant was obligated to pay $2,041 per month in basic child support based on the plaintiff's imputed income of $80,000 per year, and a finding that the child support percentage should only be applied to the first $150,000 of the defendant's annual income. The supplemental findings of fact stated that “[t]o the extent that this court may have deviated from the guideline standards,” it did so for the...