LaGrand Steel Products Co. v. A.S.C. Constructors, Inc.

• Citation: 108 Idaho 817,702 P.2d 855
• Decision Date: 31 May 1985
• Docket Number: No. 14879,14879
• Parties: LaGRAND STEEL PRODUCTS CO., an Oregon corporation, Plaintiff-Counterdefendant- Appellant, v. A.S.C. CONSTRUCTORS, INC., an Idaho Corporation, Defendant-Respondent, and Steel Management, Inc., an Oregon Corporation, Defendant-Counterclaimant- Respondent, and The Travelers Indemnity Company, a Connecticut Corporation, Defendant- Respondent.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Idaho

Page 855

702 P.2d 855

108 Idaho 817

LaGRAND STEEL PRODUCTS CO., an Oregon corporation, Plaintiff-Counterdefendant- Appellant, v. A.S.C. CONSTRUCTORS, INC., an Idaho Corporation, Defendant-Respondent, and Steel Management, Inc., an Oregon Corporation, Defendant-Counterclaimant- Respondent,

and

The Travelers Indemnity Company, a Connecticut Corporation, Defendant- Respondent.

No. 14879.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

May 31, 1985.

Rehearing Denied July 31, 1985.

Petition for Review Denied Sept. 30, 1985.

Wayne V. Meuleman (argued), Meuleman & Miller, Boise, K. John Condon, Portland, for plaintiff-counterdefendant-appellant.

R. Michael Southcombe, Rory R. Jones (argued), Stanley W. Welsh, Clemons, Cosho & Humphrey, Boise, for defendant-respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The question presented is whether, under the facts of this case, a supplier of material to a public works project is entitled to recover against the prime contractor's payment bond. The district court said no. We reverse.

A.S.C. Constructors, Inc., was awarded the prime contract for construction of the Boise State University multi-purpose pavilion. As required by I.C. § 54-1926, A.S.C. obtained a payment bond, purchasing it from Travelers Indemnity Company. A.S.C. contracted with Steel Management, Inc., to provide fabricated steel for the project. Steel Management, in turn, contracted with the appellant, LaGrand Steel Products Co., to provide raw steel. LaGrand furnished the steel but was not paid for it.

LaGrand sued Steel Management and received a judgment of approximately $43 000 plus interest, but the judgment apparently proved to be uncollectible. In the same action, LaGrand also sued on the prime contractor's payment bond. The district court noted that a supplier may recover against the bond only if the materials have been furnished to a "subcontractor" as defined in I.C. § 54-1927. The court held that Steel Management was not such a subcontractor and, therefore, LaGrand could not recover. This appeal followed.

Idaho Code § 54-1925 et seq., the "Public Contracts Bond Act," is substantially similar to 40 U.S.C. § 270a et seq., commonly known as the Miller Act. Both the federal and state statutes were enacted to protect persons who furnish labor or materials to public works projects. The statutes serve a remedial purpose. Normally, in private construction projects, those who furnish labor and materials without receiving payment may file and foreclose mechanics' liens. However, because such liens cannot be asserted against public property, the payment bond is required by statute.

The scope of statutory protection is limited to two categories of potential claimants. First, those who have a direct contractual relationship with the prime contractor may recover against the payment bond. Second, those who have a direct contractual relationship with one of the prime contractor's "subcontractors" also may recover. See I.C. § 54-1927 and 40 U.S. § 270 b; Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 102, 64 S.Ct. 890, 88 L.Ed. 1163 (1944). This case focuses upon the second category.

A subcontractor has been defined, for the purpose of the Miller Act, as "one who performs for and takes from the prime contractor a specific part of the labor or material requirements of the original contract...." Id. at 109, 64 S.Ct. at 894. This definition has been augmented to take into account the "substantiality and importance" of the relationship with the prime contractor. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 116, 123, 94 S.Ct. 2157, 2162, 40 L.Ed.2d 703 (1974). These broad phrases must be read in light of the overriding purpose of limiting the protection of the payment bond to those who are in direct contractual relationships with the prime contractor or its subcontractors. In MacEvoy, the United States Supreme Court explained:

The relatively few subcontractors who perform part of the original contract represent in a sense the prime contractor and are well known to him. It is easy for the prime contractor to secure himself against loss by requiring the subcontractors to give security by bond, or otherwise, for the payment of those who contract directly with the subcontractors. But this method of protection is generally inadequate to cope with remote and undeterminable liabilities incurred by an ordinary materialman, who may be a manufacturer, a wholesaler or a retailer. Many such materialmen are usually involved in large projects; they deal in turn with innumerable submaterialmen and laborers.

322 U.S. at 110-11, 64 S.Ct. at 895-96. (citation and footnote omitted).

In litigation concerning payment bonds, the judicial task is to apply the statutory concept of a "subcontractor" to varying fact patterns. On appeal, when faced with mixed issues of fact and law, we defer to facts found upon substantial evidence but we freely review the application of law to the facts. See generally City of Burley v. McCaslin Lumber Co., 107 Idaho 906, 693 P.2d 1108 (Ct.App.1984).

In this case the central facts--undisputed or found by the trial court upon substantial evidence--are as follows....