Lahart v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 23 November 1908
• Citation: 118 N.W. 398,140 Iowa 298
• Parties: EDWARD LAHART and DANIEL MILLER, Appellants, v. A. THOMPSON, STEVE MODDY and others, Appellees
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

118 N.W. 398

140 Iowa 298

EDWARD LAHART and DANIEL MILLER, Appellants, v. A. THOMPSON, STEVE MODDY and others, Appellees

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

November 23, 1908

Appeal from Monroe District Court.--HON. M. A. ROBERTS, Judge.

Affirmed.

Jaques & Jaques, for appellants.

J. C Mabry and R. T. Mason, for appellees.

OPINION

THE opinion states the case.--Affirmed.

WEAVER J.

The board of supervisors of the county of Monroe, at its June session for the year 1902, acting under the authority conferred by Code, section 416, divided said county into three supervisor districts. In the year 1908 there being a prospective vacancy in said office in districts No. 1 and No. 3 to be filled at the general election for that year, the plaintiff Miller, residing in district No. 1, and the plaintiff Lahart, residing in district No. 3, became candidates for the Democratic nomination to said position, while the defendants Thompson, residing in district No. 1, and Moddy, in district No. 3, became candidates for the Republican nomination. At the primary election held June 2, 1908, the several persons above named received a majority of the votes of their respective political parties in their respective districts, and were declared to have been duly nominated. Four days later, on June 6, 1908, the board of supervisors, acting, as it claims, under the authority given by said statute, passed a resolution abolishing said supervisor districts and providing that thereafter members of said board be elected by the voters of the county at large. The plaintiff's petition herein sets out the foregoing facts and alleges that said board has directed and the county auditor proposes to put the names of said candidates upon the official ballot to be voted by the electors of the county at large, and not in their respective districts only, and upon the showing an injunction is asked to restrain said action on part of the auditor, and that he be required to place the names of said candidates upon the ballots to be used in their respective districts only. The defendants demurred generally to said petition, and, the demurrer being sustained, the plaintiffs appeal.

The fundamental inquiry in the case thus presented is whether the board of supervisors had the power to discontinue the division of the county into districts, and, if so, whether said order could affect the status of the candidates theretofore nominated and deprive them of their standing as district candidates.

As to the authority or jurisdiction of the board to make such order there can be no reasonable doubt. The statute above cited (Code, section 416) expressly provides that the board of supervisors may, at its regular June meeting in any even numbered year, divide its county into as many districts as there are members of the board, or at such regular meeting it may abolish such supervisor districts and provide for electing supervisors for the county at large. This statute has never been expressly repealed, nor do we find any other statute since enacted which is so inconsistent therewith as to effect a repeal by implication. The recent enactment authorizing party nominations to office at a primary election, on which statute appellant relies, makes neither direct nor indirect reference to the provision here in...