Lahoma Oil Co. v. State Industrial Commission of Oklahoma
| Decision Date | 03 September 1918 |
| Docket Number | 9660. |
| Citation | 175 P. 836,71 Okla. 160,1918 OK 500 |
| Parties | LAHOMA OIL CO. et al. v. STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OKLAHOMA et al. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Petition for Rehearing Withdrawn November 14, 1918.
Syllabus by the Court.
Where one entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act (chapter 246, Laws 1915) secured a determination and award for permanent disability, and died before the lapse of the maximum number of payments had been made according to the terms of the award, the right to compensation under the award ceased with his death.
By the provisions of section 1, art. 6, of the Compensation Act, no provision of the act applies in case of accident resulting in death, and no right of action for recovery of damages for such injury is denied or affected.
Sections of the statute must be construed to be in harmony with the Constitution, and so as to give effect to the various sections, if such construction is possible without doing violence to the spirit and language of the act.
Appeal from State Industrial Commission.
Proceeding by Timothy A. Downing for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, opposed by the Lahoma Oil Company, the Maryland Casualty Company, and others. From an award made by the State Industrial Commission, the Lahoma Oil Company and the Maryland Casualty Company appeal. On the death of said Downing, the action was revived in the name of Malinda Downing, administratrix. On motion to dismiss action. Motion sustained.
Ross & Thurman, of Oklahoma City, for appellants.
Burdette Blue and H. H. Montgomery, both of Bartlesville, and Fulton Shirk & Danner, of Oklahoma City, for respondents.
Petitioners appeal from an award made by the Industrial Commission on November 26, 1917, to Timothy A. Downing for $5,000, to be paid at the rate of $10 per week for a period of 500 weeks. After the appeal was perfected to this court, Downing died as the result of the injuries for which the award was made, and the action was revived in the name of Malinda Downing administratrix of his estate. The case is before us on motion to dismiss the action on account of the death of Downing.
In support of the motion to dismiss it is contended, first, that an award made by the commission under the Workmen's Compensation Law (Laws 1915, c. 246) does not confer upon the injured workman a property right or an interest which upon his death becomes a part of his estate; and, second, that the Compensation Act does not apply to accidents resulting in death.
Two rights of action exist under the law of this state for wrongful injuries resulting in the death of a person. One is the right of action which survives to the estate, or the personal representatives, to recover damages sustained by the estate, and for pain and suffering, medical expenses, etc. The other is the right of action given for the benefit of the widow and children or next of kin for the pecuniary loss sustained by them on account of the death. It was held by this court in the case of St. L. & S. F. R. R. Co. v. Goode, Adm., 42 Okl. 784, 142 P. 1185, L. R. A. 1915E, 1141, that a recovery on one such cause of action does not bar recovery on the other.
The language of section 1, art. 6, of the Compensation Act, is:
"It is not intended that any of the provisions of this act shall apply in cases of accidents resulting in death, and no right of action for recovery of damages for injuries resulting in death is intended to be denied or affected."
Counsel for respondents contend that this section applies only to the right of action accruing to the next of kin for pecuniary loss sustained on account of the wrongful death of the employee, arguing that the Compensation Act supplants the right of action for pain, suffering, medical expenses, etc., and that an award made to the employee vests at his death in his representatives. We do not agree with this contention.
The compensation to be paid to the employee does not depend upon whether the injury was wrongfully caused by the negligence of the employer. It is paid when an accidental injury is sustained arising out of and in the course of the employment, without regard to the fault as a cause of such injury, except where the injury is sustained by the willful intention of the injured employee, or where the injury results directly from the willful failure of the injured employee to use a guard or protection furnished for his use. The act recognizes that a personal injury suffered by an employee arising out of and in the course of employment is an incident of the business in which he is employed. In consequence of that, the act provides that, as a matter of justice, the resulting burden should be borne by the business without regard to the question of fault on the part of the employer or employee.
The act makes no reference to the payment of the unpaid installments of the award, in the event of death of the employee, to dependents or next of kin. It, in effect, provides that the employee, if accidentally injured, shall receive in lieu of his wages the amount fixed by the terms of the act. The average weekly wage of the employee is taken as a basis upon which to compute the compensation. Had there been no injury, the payment of wages would cease on the termination of the relation of master and servant. When the relation is terminated by death of the employee, the occasion for making compensation in lieu of wages comes to an end.
The act provides that the compensation shall be paid only to the employee, and that the claim for such compensation shall not be assigned and shall be exempt from claims of creditors. The cause of action for pain, suffering, medical expenses, etc., arising from a wrongful injury, survives under the statute (section 5281, R. L. 1910) to the personal representatives when the injury results in the death of the employee, and becomes part of his estate and is subject to the claims of creditors. Section 7, art. 23, of the Constitution, provides:
"The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation."
By the terms of the Compensation Act the amount of compensation for each injury is limited and based upon the amount of the weekly wage. The provision excepting injuries resulting in death was no doubt incorporated so as to make the act in harmony with this provision of the Constitution under which the amount recoverable cannot be limited if death results from the injury.
So long as the employee was alive, the Industrial Commission would have...
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