Laine v. Speedway, LLC

Decision Date08 January 2018
Docket NumberNo. 149, 2017,149, 2017
Citation177 A.3d 1227
Parties Michael LAINE, Plaintiff–Below, Appellant, v. SPEEDWAY, LLC, Defendant–Below, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Delaware

Nicholas H. Rodriguez, Esquire, Schmittinger & Rodriguez, P.A., Dover, Delaware, for Appellant, Michael Laine.

Jessica L. Tyler, Esquire, and Sarah B. Cole, Esquire (Argued), Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee, Speedway, LLC.

Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, VAUGHN, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.

VAUGHN, Justice:

The Plaintiff/Appellant, Michael Laine, slipped and fell on ice near a gas pump on the premises of a convenience store-gasoline station operated by the Defendant/Appellee, Speedway, LLC ("Speedway") in Dover. He was the driver of a Modern Maturity Center shuttle bus and slipped when he stepped off the shuttle to fill its tank with gasoline. The fall caused him to sustain serious physical injuries. The ice was caused by a light, freezing rain which was then falling. Mr. Laine filed suit against Speedway, alleging that negligence on Speedway's part was the proximate cause of his injuries. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for Speedway, holding that under the continuing storm doctrine Speedway was permitted to wait until the freezing rain had ended and a reasonable time thereafter before clearing ice from its gasoline station surface. There are two questions on appeal. The first is whether a business owner that remains open during a winter storm should be able to avail itself of the continuing storm doctrine at all, that is; whether we should continue to recognize the doctrine. The second is whether the continuing storm doctrine applies to the facts of this case. For the reasons which follow, we have concluded that the continuing storm doctrine should continue to be recognized and that it does apply to the facts of this case. The Superior Court is affirmed.

I

On January 10, 2014, Speedway's convenience store-gasoline station in Dover opened at 6:00 a.m. Two employees were on hand, Jessica Lorilla and John Tetuan.

According to weather records, rain was falling at 6:54 a.m. The previous weather reading was taken at 6:20 a.m. and did not show rain falling. Therefore, it can be inferred that rain began falling sometime between 6:20 a.m. and 6:54 a.m. The temperature when those readings were taken was 32 degrees Fahrenheit. The rain was a freezing rain which continued throughout the day.

At 7:00 a.m. Ms. Lorilla slipped on ice outside the front door of the convenience store. She notified Mr. Tetuan, who was to call the ice and snow removal company used by Speedway. Ms. Lorilla worked until 11:00 a.m. or 1:00 p.m. and has no recollection of the ice and snow removal company being there, but there is a record of an invoice from the company for work done sometime that day. The two employees took no further steps concerning ice outside the store.

Meanwhile, at 7:05 a.m. Mr. Laine, a shuttle bus driver for Modern Maturity Center, began driving a shuttle bus from the Center to Speedway's gasoline station. In his deposition, Mr. Laine testified that he recalled that the roads from the Modern Maturity Center to Speedway's property were wet, and a light rain or drizzle was falling. After stopping the shuttle bus at a gas pump at Speedway's gas station, Mr. Laine stepped out, slipped on ice and fell. It is undisputed that the ice upon which Mr. Laine slipped was caused by the rain freezing upon contact with the gasoline station surface.

Another customer reported Mr. Laine's fall to Ms. Lorilla and she came out to assist him. An incident report prepared that day records Mr. Laine's fall as occurring at 7:15 a.m. Mr. Laine carried out his Modern Maturity Center duties for the rest of that day but later began to feel pain. Ultimately, it was determined that the fall caused him to suffer serious physical injuries, and he has not been able to return to work.

Schools remained open that day, and there is no evidence of businesses closing.

Mr. Laine filed suit against Speedway, alleging negligence on its part for failure to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition, failure to make reasonable inspections of the premises, failure to warn him of the hazardous conditions that existed, and failure to remove ice at the pump where he fell. Speedway filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that under the continuing storm doctrine it was permitted to wait until the freezing rain ended and a reasonable time thereafter before removing the ice from its premises. The Superior Court granted the motion, finding that the continuing storm doctrine was a valid defense to Mr. Laine's claims of negligence. This appeal followed.

II

"This Court reviews de novo the Superior Court's grant or denial of summary judgment ‘to determine whether, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party has demonstrated that there are no material issues of fact in dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ "1

III

Generally, a landowner has a duty to exercise reasonable care in keeping its premises safe for the benefit of business invitees.2 This includes keeping the premises reasonably safe from natural accumulations of ice and snow.3 In Young v. Saroukos , the Superior Court recognized that the landowner's duty to keep its premises reasonably safe from natural accumulations of ice and snow was subject to a rule known as the continuing storm or storm in progress doctrine.4

In Young , the plaintiff slipped on ice and snow about 9:30 p.m. on March 4, 1960 while proceeding down a ramp entrance toward the door of her basement apartment. Seven or eight inches of snow fell on March 3 and March 4, with snow flurries continuing late into the evening of March 4. The weather conditions on March 4 were cold and windy, and snow was drifting. After considering authorities from other jurisdictions, the Superior Court adopted the continuing storm doctrine, stating:

The authorities are in substantial accord in support of the rule that a business establishment, landlord, carrier, or other inviter, in the absence of unusual circumstances, is permitted to await the end of the storm and a reasonable time thereafter to remove ice and snow from an outdoor entrance walk, platform, or steps. The general controlling principle is that changing conditions due to the pending storm render it inexpedient and impracticable to take earlier effective action ....5

Under the continuing storm doctrine, it is reasonable for a business owner to wait until a storm has ended and a reasonable time thereafter to remove natural accumulations of ice and snow in the absence of unusual circumstances. The rationale for the rule, as stated in Young , is that it is "inexpedient and impracticable to take earlier effective action."6

Since Young , the Superior Court has discussed the continuing storm doctrine in a number of cases. In Woods v. Prices Corner Shopping Center Merchants Ass'n , the plaintiff slipped and fell on ice and snow in the parking lot of the Prices Corner Shopping Center.7 It snowed three times in the week before her fall. Temperatures were in the 0 to 10 degrees Fahrenheit range. No effort had been made to remove ice and snow. In denying a defense motion for summary judgment, the court held that a business owner's duty to keep its business premises safe includes keeping the premises safe from natural accumulations of ice and snow, that the owner is entitled to wait until the end of a snow storm and a reasonable time thereafter to remove ice and snow, and that the reasonableness of any delay should be treated as any question of fact.

In Kovach v. Brandywine Innkeepers, Ltd. P'shp , the plaintiff slipped on an icy, snowy surface in the defendant's parking lot during a snow storm.8 The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the defendant under the continuing storm doctrine. In doing so, the court rejected a contention the defendant assumed a duty to make the parking lot safe by beginning snow removal operations while the storm was still in progress.

In Morris v. Theta Vest, Inc. , the plaintiff slipped and fell on ice just outside his landlord's business premises.9 Witnesses described precipitation which was falling at the time as freezing rain or sleet. It was undisputed that the storm was ongoing when the plaintiff fell. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the defendant under the continuing storm doctrine. The landlord had salted the area about five or six hours before the plaintiff fell. The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that by salting the area, the landlord had assumed a duty to make the premises safe. Morris was affirmed by this Court on appeal.10

In Elder v. Dover Downs, Inc. , the plaintiff slipped and fell on a patch of ice which was obscured by snow in a bus stop area in Dover Downs' parking lot.11 Her fall occurred at approximately 1:30 p.m. on January 30, 2010. A snow storm began around 10:00 a.m. on January 30 and lasted until the early morning hours of the next day. The Superior Court again granted summary judgment for the defendant under the continuing storm doctrine. The plaintiff argued that it was not snowing when she fell. The court rejected the contention that a lull interrupted a continuing storm.

In Schnares v. General Floor Indus., Inc. , the plaintiff slipped and fell on ice in the defendants' parking lot.12 The Superior Court denied summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that there was a dispute of fact as to whether the plaintiff's fall came before or after the storm involved there began.

In Demby v. Del. Racing Ass'n , the plaintiff slipped and fell on ice at Delaware Park on December 14, 2013.13 Weather records indicated that a storm arrived in the afternoon of December 14, 2013 with weather conditions alternating between light snow, freezing rain, and heavy rain from 2:40 p.m....

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