Laird v. State

• Decision Date: 12 March 1913
• Citation: 155 S.W. 260
• Parties: LAIRD v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

155 S.W. 260

LAIRD v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 12, 1913.

Rehearing Denied April 2, 1913.

Appeal from Tyler County Court; R. A. Shivers, Judge.

Lee Laird was convicted of unlawfully and willfully disturbing a congregation assembled for religious worship, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Joe W. Thomas, of Woodville, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

HARPER, J.

Appellant was convicted of unlawfully and willfully disturbing a congregation assembled for religious worship in the county court of Tyler county, and his punishment was assessed at a fine of $25.

The evidence is undisputed that some six or seven parties had assembled at the Cherokee Methodist Church in Tyler county for the purpose of attending preaching, but that there was no preaching there that night; that they assembled there thinking that there would be, but that they were laboring under a misapprehension. Several of the witnesses testify that they saw appellant and Bob Haynes just before the jug was thrown in the window of the church; that they were riding by and came within four feet of the window.

Appellant makes several objections to the charge of the court, also insisting that the evidence was insufficient, that a new trial should have been granted on the ground of newly discovered testimony, and that certain testimony was improperly admitted in evidence.

Appellant insists that the court erred in refusing to give his special charge No. 3, instructing the jury as to what is meant by "willful." It is also contended that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the act must have been "willfully" done, etc. The court instructed the jury that "if you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense, or acted in conjunction with Bob Haynes in committing the offense, you will find him guilty," etc. However, at the beginning of his charge, the court instructs the jury that the defendant is charged "with the offense of disturbing a congregation then and there assembled for religious worship by unlawfully and willfully throwing a jug through the window," etc. And then proceeds to charge the jury as to the meaning of "willful" in the following language: "You are charged that by the term `willful' is meant with willful intent or without reasonable grounds to believe the act to be lawful." From the above it will be seen that the law requires, and the information charges, that the disturbing of the congregation be willfully done. The court instructs the jury that the defendant stands charged with unlawfully disturbing a congregation by willfully throwing a jug in at a window. To say one disturbed a congregation by unlawfully and willfully throwing a jug in at a window, and that he unlawfully and willfully disturbed a congregation by throwing a jug in at a window, mean practically the same. The throwing of the jug in at the window was the means used to disturb the congregation; and, if the throwing was willfully done, the disturbing of the congregation was consequently willfully done. The charge may be inaptly worded, but it sufficiently informed the jury that the act must have been willfully done.

Appellant complains of the charge of the court in this, to wit: The information alleges the congregation had assembled for religious "worship," while the charge uses the words "religious purposes." The objection to this charge is not definite enough to require the review of this court; but, should we do so, this variance is immaterial. In State v. Yarborough, 19 Tex. 162, it was held that the allegation that the congregation "were attending a protracted or other religious meeting" was equivalent to an allegation that they were assembled for religious worship.

Appellant insists that the court erred in refusing his special charge to the effect that if the jury find that the parties, or either of them, who threw the jug in at the window, etc., was riding a mule, to find the defendant not guilty. The information does not allege that the parties who committed the offense were riding horses, or that they were riding...