LAKE CTY. SHERIFF'S CORRECTIONS MERIT BD. v. Peron

• Decision Date: 17 October 2001
• Docket Number: No. 45A04-0106-CV-249.,45A04-0106-CV-249.
• Citation: 756 N.E.2d 1025
• Parties: LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S CORRECTIONS MERIT BOARD, sued as "Merit Board", Appellant-Defendant, v. Richard PERON, John Smith, and Timothy Hogan, Appellees-Plaintiffs, and John Buncich, Sheriff, Appellee-Defendant.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

756 N.E.2d 1025

LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S CORRECTIONS MERIT BOARD, sued as "Merit Board", Appellant-Defendant, v. Richard PERON, John Smith, and Timothy Hogan, Appellees-Plaintiffs, and John Buncich, Sheriff, Appellee-Defendant.

No. 45A04-0106-CV-249.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

October 17, 2001.

Ronald Ostojic, Ostojic & Ostojic, Portage, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

OPINION

VAIDIK, Judge.

Case Summary

The Lake County Sheriff's Corrections Merit Board (the Board) challenges the trial court's order granting a preliminary injunction staying the Board from conducting a disciplinary hearing until discovery could be conducted between the parties. Specifically, the Board argues that the trial court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to intervene in the administrative proceedings. Because the record indicates that Corrections Sergeants Richard Peron, John Smith, and Timothy Hogan failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before they sought judicial intervention, we reverse.

Facts and Procedural History

On May 25, 2001, Lake County Sheriff John Buncich filed disciplinary charges with the Board against Corrections Sergeants Peron, Smith, and Hogan. The charges alleged that the three corrections sergeants had left the jail without the consent of their supervisor, falsified the weekly time sheets and daily jail log books, were absent without authorized leave, and reflected discredit on themselves and the Corrections Division by committing this conduct. On May 29, 2001, notice was filed that the Board had set a disciplinary hearing on these charges for May 31.

On May 30, 2001, Peron, Smith, and Hogan filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction with the Lake County Superior Court asking the court to enjoin the Board from conducting a hearing until they were able to complete their discovery. On May 30, the trial court held a hearing on the preliminary injunction. After concluding that it had jurisdiction over the matter, the court found that the corrections sergeants did not have an adequate remedy at law and that they would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction was not granted. The court granted the preliminary injunction and stayed the Board "from conducting [its] disciplinary hearing of the Plaintiffs for a period not to exceed 45 days from the date of [the] order so that discovery can be conducted between the parties." Appellant's App. P.3. This appeal then ensued.

Discussion and Decision

I. Mootness

As a preliminary matter, we address Peron's motion to dismiss this appeal because the matter for consideration is now moot. Peron asserts that the Preliminary Injunction issued by the trial court expired after 45 days on July 16, 2001. Peron also declares that on July 17, 2001, the Board issued an additional continuance for a period including August 27, 2001. Peron contends that because the preliminary injunction is no longer in effect and the Board followed the injunction with another continuance, this court lacks jurisdiction over the case because no live controversy exists.

An appeal is moot when it is no longer live and the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome or when no effective relief can be rendered to the parties. Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n, Inc. v. Durham, 748 N.E.2d 404, 410 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). However, we may review issues under a public interest exception when the case involves questions of great public importance. City of Huntingburg v. Phoenix Natural Res., Inc., 625 N.E.2d 472, 474 (Ind.Ct.App.1993). The public interest exception usually is recognized in cases that contain issues likely to recur. Id. The issue presented on appeal of whether the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction to intervene before an administrative hearing is held in order to provide more time for discovery is an issue likely to be repeated between different parties and should be addressed as a matter of public policy. Therefore, even though this issue is moot, we review it under the public interest exception because it has an effect on how administrative procedure operates in Indiana and it is an issue that is likely to recur.

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Board asserts that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to intervene in the administrative proceeding because Peron, Smith, and Hogan failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.¹ We agree.

Under Indiana law, a claimant with an available administrative remedy must pursue that remedy before being allowed access to the courts. Turner v. City of Evansville, 740 N.E.2d 860, 861 (Ind. 2001). If a party fails to exhaust administrative remedies, the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 861-62. By requiring a party to first pursue all available administrative remedies before allowing access to the courts, premature litigation may be avoided, an adequate record for judicial review may be compiled, and agencies retain the opportunity and autonomy to correct their own errors. Id. at 862. In this case, Peron, Smith, and Hogan asked the court to enjoin the Board from conducting a hearing before they petitioned the Board for a continuance to conduct discovery or made an objection to the Board about any deficiencies in the notice of the hearing date. By seeking judicial intervention at the outset of the Board process, they did not even attempt to pursue their administrative remedies, let alone exhaust them.

Sheriff's department merit board proceedings are not governed by the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act (AOPA) because the board is a political subdivision and is...