Turner v. City of Evansville

• Decision Date: 18 January 2001
• Docket Number: No. 82S05-0008-CV-479.,82S05-0008-CV-479.
• Citation: 740 N.E.2d 860
• Parties: Bradley A. TURNER, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. CITY OF EVANSVILLE, et al., Appellees (Defendants Below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

740 N.E.2d 860

Bradley A. TURNER, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. CITY OF EVANSVILLE, et al., Appellees (Defendants Below).

No. 82S05-0008-CV-479.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

January 18, 2001.

Jeffrey W. Waggoner, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.

Michael D. Marine, Bradley L. Williams, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellees.

ON PETITION FOR TRANSFER

SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

The Chief of the Evansville Police Department imposed discipline on an officer, who appealed to the City's Police Merit Commission. The officer then sued the Commission, the Chief, and others, seeking to prevent a hearing on the merits of his appeal and challenging the Chief's right to hold office, the lawfulness of the Commission's existence and the validity of an agreement between the City and the Fraternal Order of Police. We hold that these matters may be the subject of review sought after any final decision of the Commission but may not be pursued collaterally through this lawsuit.

Facts and Procedural History

Appellant Bradley A. Turner began his service with the Evansville Police Department in January 1995, hired from a list created by the Evansville Police Merit Commission. The current dispute began when Chief of Police Arthur A. Gann issued Turner written reprimands on two occasions in 1997, once for failing to use reasonable care in the use of a motor vehicle, and again for failing to follow the police department's standard operating procedures.

Chief Gann suspended Turner in early August 1998 for twenty-one days, with pay, for giving false information in a statement to Internal Affairs and in testimony to the Merit Commission regarding a disciplinary action against another officer. Turner filed a notice of appeal with the Merit Commission regarding this suspension.

When Marvin D. Guest replaced Gann as Chief of Police in late August 1998, Chief Guest amended Turner's suspension to be served without pay. Turner appealed this amended suspension to the Merit Commission. In late 1998, Guest suspended Turner two more times, first for failing to follow standard operating procedures and "repeated violations," and later for being absent from roll call and his assigned posts at the time prescribed and for "repeated violations." (R. at 127-28, 130-31.) Turner filed a notice of appeal for each of these suspensions.

All three of Turner's appeals remain pending before the Merit Commission. Before they could be heard, Turner filed a lawsuit challenging the past and present Chiefs' right to office, the ordinance establishing the Merit Commission and an agreement between the City and the Fraternal Order of Police. He asked the court to enjoin the Commission from conducting a disciplinary hearing while his lawsuit proceeded. The court issued such an order, and it still pends.

The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Among other things, it held the Evansville Police Merit Commission was properly constituted under the relevant statutes and that the Chief of Police was obliged by Article 6, section 6 of the Indiana Constitution to live inside the city limits. Turner v. City of Evansville, 729 N.E.2d 149 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). We grant transfer and vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

It has long been Indiana law that a claimant with an available administrative remedy must pursue that remedy before being allowed access to the courts. City of East Chicago v. Sinclair Refining Co., 232 Ind. 295, 111 N.E.2d 459 (1953). If a party fails to exhaust administrative remedies, the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Town Council of New Harmony v. Parker, 726 N.E.2d 1217 (Ind. 2000).¹

We recently re-emphasized the value of completing administrative proceedings before resorting to judicial review in State Bd. Of Tax Com'rs v. Montgomery, 730 N.E.2d 680, 684 (Ind.2000)(quoting State v. Sproles, 672 N.E.2d 1353, 1358 (Ind.1996)),

The reasons for requiring a party to seek administrative remedies are well established. Premature litigation may be avoided, an adequate record for judicial review may be compiled, and agencies retain the opportunity and autonomy to correct their own errors. Even if the ground of complaint is the unconstitutionality of the statute, which may be beyond the agency's power to resolve, exhaustion may still be required because `administrative action may resolve the case on other grounds without confronting broader legal issues.'

(Citation omitted.)

Turner appropriately filed a notice of appeal of each of his suspensions with the Merit Commission, which would go forward but for the restraining order obtained by Turner. This right of appeal from discipline by a Chief is common in Indiana's various statutory schemes. See, e.g., Ind.Code Ann. § 36-8-3.5-19(b) (West 1997). A decision by the commission is also subject to judicial review. Ind.Code Ann. § 36-8-3.5-18 (West 1997). Turner's challenges to the Chief's authority, and the Commission's own compliance with relevant statutes may be challenged before the body and subsequently raised in court through the process of judicial review. See, e.g., City of Marion v. Antrobus, 448 N.E.2d 325 (Ind.Ct.App.1983)

(board whose composition was challenged at officer's disciplinary hearing later held on judicial review to be unlawfully constituted, officer's suspension reversed). To preserve these issues for judicial review, Turner must first present them at the administrative hearing. See Sullivan v. City of Evansville, 728 N.E.2d 182 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000) (plaintiff waived challenge to authority of police chief by failing to make a timely objection at the hearing).

Turner was required to pursue his administrative remedies and may not avoid doing so through this collateral action.² Consequently, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address the merits of Turner's amended complaint.

Conclusion

Having heard the City's motions, the trial court granted summary judgment and also ordered dismissal. It was the latter action that was appropriate. We affirm the dismissal and direct the court to dissolve the injunction preventing the Merit Commission from hearing Turner's appeal.

DICKSON, SULLIVAN, BOEHM, RUCKER, JJ., concur.

BOEHM, J., concurs with opinion, in which DICKSON and RUCKER, JJ., join.

BOEHM, Justice, concurring.

I join in the opinion of the Court. Because that opinion adequately disposes of this case, I would normally be content to leave resolution of the issue presented by the merits of this case for another day. However, the Court of Appeals addressed an important question in holding that the Indiana Constitution requires that the police chief reside within the Evansville city limits. I agree that Turner has no standing to raise that issue in this lawsuit. Nevertheless, for better or worse, the Court of Appeals has resolved the issue in a published opinion that I assume affects a number of public safety officials and perhaps others serving local governmental units across Indiana. Rather than leave these public servants in doubt as to the need to resign their positions or relocate their families, I would address the question of who is an "officer" within the meaning of Article VI, Section 6 of the Indiana Constitution. It is my view that the Evansville Chief of Police is not subject to the residency requirement in Article VI, Section 6.

The origin of the residency provision can be traced to Article XI, Section 6 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816:

All officers shall reside within the state; and all District, County, or Town officers, within their respective Districts, Counties, or towns (the trustees of the town of Clarkesville [sic] excepted) and shall keep their respective offices, at such places therein, as may be directed by law; and all Militia officers shall reside within the bounds of the Division, Brigade, Regiment, Battalion or company to which they may severally belong.

The proceedings of the 1850 constitutional convention shed little light on the purpose of the original provision or the modified version we now find in Article VI, Section 6. The 1850 debate was concerned solely with the exception for the trustees of the town of Clarksville. That exception did not survive the constitutional convention.³ The constitutions of 1816 and 1851 were written in an era of vastly simpler government, when transportation and communications were extremely difficult.⁴ In 1815, Indiana's population was fewer than 64,000 women, men, and children living in small communities dotting a 36,000 square mile expanse.

It seems to me that the "officers" contemplated by this constitutional provision are those identified in the Indiana Constitution itself as "officers" and those county, township, and town officials who have been identified by statute as those who, in the terms of Article VI, Section 3, are elected or appointed "by law" to perform similar functions. I assume no one would argue that every statutorily provided public employee is an "officer" for these purposes. If that is correct, some rather bright line is required here to permit these public servants and their employers to go about their business with confidence that there will not be constant skirmishing over eligibility to hold municipal and county jobs.

Since 1863, a number of appellate decisions have struggled to determine which local officials are "officers" within the meaning of Article VI, Section 6. Everyone seems to agree that the term, at a minimum, embraces the "officers" identified as such in the constitution itself. These are the county clerk, auditor, recorder, treasurer, sheriff, coroner, and surveyor. In addition, the senior legislative components of local government are required to live in their jurisdictions. All of the foregoing are elected to their posts. Some decisions have held other public servants to be constitutional officers. Relender v. State ex rel. Utz, 149 Ind. 283,...