Lake Shore & M. S. R. v. Platt

• Decision Date: 25 June 1895
• Citation: 41 N.E. 243,53 Ohio St. 254
• Parties: LAKE SHORE & M. S. R. R. v. PLATT et al.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

41 N.E. 243

53 Ohio St. 254

LAKE SHORE & M. S. R. R. v. PLATT et al.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

June 25, 1895

Error to circuit court, Lucas county.

Action by Platt and others against the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railroad. From a judgment of the circuit court affirming a judgment of the court of common pleas in favor of plaintiff, defendant brings error. Reversed.

January 17, 1876, Platt et al. brought ejectment in the common pleas court of Lucas county to recover the subaqueous ground lying between the former and present dock lines along the Maumee river, and in front of a part of lot 11 in the city of Toledo. Each party asserts title in fee to such ground, and their rights depend upon the following material facts, as shown by the pleadings and the stipulations upon which the cause was submitted in the common pleas: In 1852 Harriet O Hall was the owner in fee of lot 11, which included the premises in controversy. August 9, 1852, the Lake Shore Company (its predecessor) commenced proceedings in the probate court to appropriate lands for railroad purposes. The appropriation by metes and bounds carried the line of the company's property thus acquired to the former dock line which was approximately parallel with the shore line, and where there was available, for purposes of navigation, a depth of water somewhat exceeding nine feet. The company at once took possession of the lands acquired for landing, dock and terminal purposes (for which purposes they had been acquired), and built its dock upon the line established. June 21, 1855, Mrs. Hall executed to the company a deed for the same property for the express purpose of assuring its title. The description in this deed also carried the line to the former dock line, and granted the premises described ‘ with all privileges and appurtenances to the same belonging.’ The company took possession, and constructed the docks necessary for traffic in connection with boats navigating the river and lakes, upon the dock line, which was established by authority. September 10, 1869 Mrs. Hall conveyed to Platt et al. a number of tracts of land, including lot 11, but expressly ‘ reserving that portion of tract 11 which lies northwesterly of the center of the river road, the same being now in possession of the railroad company,’ -such reservation including the premises now in controversy. Thereafter the dock line was changed for the purpose of accommodating vessels of greater draught, and the railroad company docked out to the new line thus established, completing the reconstruction of its dock in July, 1873. April 13, 1874, Mrs. Hall by quitclaim granted to Plett et al. all her interest in lot 11. In the court of common pleas, Platt et al. recovered, and that judgment was affirmed by the circuit court.

Syllabus by the Court

A conveyance of lands situated upon a navigable stream, the description being by courses and distances from a fixed monument, and establishing a boundary line coincident with the line of navigation, conveys the grantor's title as far as the central thread of the stream.

E. D. Potter, Jr., and Geo. C. Greene, for plaintiff in error.

Frank H. Hurd, for defendants in error.

SHAUCK, J.

At the dates of the appropriation by the company and the subsequent grant of June 21, 1855, Mrs. Hall, the grantor, and the railway company, the grantee, were alone interested in what is now the subject of controversy. In the practical interpretation of its rights, acquired by the appropriation and the grant, the company took actual possession, not only of the bank of the stream, but of so much of the river as might be necessary to reach the established dock line at a depth of water of nine feet. By the deed of September 10, 1869, Platt et al. acquired no title to the premises in controversy, for they were expressly excepted from the operation of the deed. Not only so, but by the terms of the reservation or exception the grantees were notified that the grantor had, by a former conveyance, granted to the company the premises now in controversy. The exception was, not of ‘ so much of tract 11 as the railroad company now occupies,’ but it was of ‘ that portion of tract 11 which lies northwesterly of the river road, the same being now in possession of the railroad company.’ This was express notice to the grantees that the company was in possession, not only of the bank of the stream, but of all that portion of tract 11 which lay between the bank and the central thread of the stream. On April 13, 1874, when the defendants in error received from Mrs. Hall the quitclaim under which they now assert title, they found that the company had extended its docks over the disputed premises to the newly-established dock line. This had been done in the assertion of the rights acquired by virtue of the appropriation and the deed of June 21, 1855, and with the acquiescence of Mrs. Hall, to whom these parties now look as the common source of title.

The defendants in error took nothing by the quitclaim, because not only the terms of their former deed, but the actual possession of the company, affected them with notice of the rights now asserted by the company, which rights their grantor could not then contest, since she had acquiesced in the company's possession continuously from the date of the appropriation. But from a consideration of the rules which prevail in the construction of grants of this character, we think the premises in controversy passed to the company by the terms of the deed of 1855. It is true of...