Lake Tahoe Watercraft v. Tahoe Regional Planning

• Citation: 24 F.Supp.2d 1062
• Decision Date: 28 October 1998
• Docket Number: No. CIV. S-97-2053 FCD DJD.,CIV. S-97-2053 FCD DJD.
• Court: United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Eastern District of California
• Parties: LAKE TAHOE WATERCRAFT RECREATION ASSOCIATION, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY, Defendant, The League to Save Lake Tahoe, Intervenor-Defendant.

24 F.Supp.2d 1062

LAKE TAHOE WATERCRAFT RECREATION ASSOCIATION, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY, Defendant The League to Save Lake Tahoe, Intervenor-Defendant.

No. CIV. S-97-2053 FCD DJD.

United States District Court, E.D. California.

October 28, 1998.

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John E. Fagan, Jennifer L. Pruski, Hancock, Rothert & Bunshoft LLP, Tahoe City, CA, Brian A. Kelly, Mert A. Howard, Hancock, Rothert & Bunshoft LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiffs National Marine Manufacturers Ass'n and Personal Watercraft Industry Ass'n.

Lawrence L. Hoffman, Hoffman Law Offices, Tahoe City, CA, for All Other Plaintiffs.

E. Clement Shute, Ellison Folk, Robert S. Perlmutter, Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger, San Francisco, CA, Daniel P. Selmi, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.

Stephan C. Volker, Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund, Inc., San Francisco, CA, for Intervenor-Defendant The League to Save Lake Tahoe.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DAMRELL, District Judge.

The Lake Tahoe Watercraft Recreation Association and various watercraft manufacturers, retailers and users bring this action challenging the legality of Tahoe Regional Planning Agency ("TRPA") Ordinance No. 97-12 ("Ordinance"). In particular, plaintiffs challenge the portion of the Ordinance prohibiting the discharge of unburned fuel and oil from the operation of watercraft propelled by carbureted two-stroke engines commencing June 1, 1999.

Plaintiffs' complaint alleges: violations of the equal protection, due process, and commerce clauses of the United States Constitution; an illegal taking; violation of the Federal Aid in Sport Fish Restoration Act; the Ordinance obstructs access to a navigable waterway; failure to comply with various provisions of the Compact; the Ordinance is void for vagueness; and violations of the California and Nevada Constitutions and laws. Defendant TRPA moves for judgment on the pleadings as to the first through fifth and ninth through eighteenth causes of action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). Intervenor-defendant The League to Save Lake Tahoe ("League")¹ moves to dismiss the first through eighteenth causes of action. Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).² The League also contends the entire action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Defendants' motions are granted; plaintiffs are given leave to file an amended complaint as to certain causes of action.

BACKGROUND

In 1968, California and Nevada entered into the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact ("Compact") to create a regional agency with extensive powers to regulate and control development within the Lake Tahoe Basin in order to protect the natural resources and ecological balance of the area. League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 507 F.2d 517, 518 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 974, 95 S.Ct. 1398, 43 L.Ed.2d 654 (1975). See also Cal. Gov.Code §§ 66800, 66801; Nev.Rev.Stat. §§ 277.190 — 277.220. In 1969, Congress consented to the Compact, pursuant to Article I, § 10, cl. 3 of the United States Constitution.³ Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub.L. No. 91-148, 82 Stat. 360 (1969).

In 1980, California and Nevada extensively amended the Compact to impose numerous specific mandates on TRPA. Congress consented to the Compact that same year. Tahoe Regional Planning Compact — Consent of Congress, Pub.L. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233 (1980).⁴ The Compact, as amended, directed TRPA to adopt environmental threshold carrying capacities for the region,⁵ including standards for water quality, and to implement these environmental standards through agency ordinances rules and regulations. Compact, Art. V(c) & (d), Art. VI(a).

On June 25, 1997, TRPA adopted Ordinance No. 97-12 which, among other things, prohibits "[t]he discharge of unburned fuel and oil from the operation of watercraft propelled by carbureted two-stroke engines [in Lake Tahoe and certain other lakes and waterways]... commencing June 1, 1999."⁶ The Ordinance amended an existing TRPA ordinance prohibiting the discharge of toxic or hazardous waste to Lake Tahoe and the Tahoe Region. TRPA Code of Ordinances 81.2.D.

STANDARD

A complaint will not be dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) "unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [his or] her claim that would entitle [him or] her to relief." Yamaguchi v. Department of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir.1997)(quoting Lewis v. Telephone Employees Credit Union, 87 F.3d 1537, 1545 (9th Cir.1996)). "All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Cahill v. Liberty Mut., Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir.1996).

The standard governing a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that governing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The motion will not be granted if, accepting as true all material allegations contained in the nonmoving party's pleadings, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir.1989).

ANALYSIS

1. Statute of Limitations

The League contends that plaintiffs' claims are barred because they failed to commence the instant action within 60 days after final action by TRPA.

Pursuant to the Compact, actions "arising out of the adoption or amendment of ... any ordinance or regulation of the agency, ... shall be commenced within 60 days after final action by the agency." Compact, Art. VI(j)(4). The Ordinance's adoption on June 25, 1997 constituted "final action by the agency." Plaintiffs did not commence this action until October 30, 1997, over two months after the expiration of the sixty day period. Plaintiffs respond that TRPA expressly waived the filing deadline on two occasions, and defendants are therefore estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense. The League does not dispute plaintiffs' assertion that TRPA waived the deadline, but rather, contends that (1) the 60-day period is jurisdictional, and cannot be waived, (2) TRPA lacked the authority to waive the deadline, and (3) TRPA's waiver did not bind the League, and thus, the League is free to raise the statute of limitations as a defense.

The League is prohibited from raising a statute of limitations defense. An intervenor is limited to the field of litigation open to the original parties; it cannot enlarge the issues tendered by or arising of out plaintiff's bill. Chandler & Price Co. v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 296 U.S. 53, 58, 56 S.Ct. 6, 80 L.Ed. 39 (1935). The statute of limitations was not raised by TRPA and therefore goes beyond the scope of the original litigation. Torrington Co. v. United States, 731 F.Supp. 1073, 1074-75 (C.I.T. 1990). Accordingly, dismissal is not appropriate on this basis.

Even if the League were allowed to raise a statute of limitations defense, TRPA's waiver would defeat such a defense.⁷ Equitable tolling is a defense to all federal statutes of limitations, unless Congress provides otherwise. Fadem v. United States, 52 F.3d 202, 205 (9th Cir.1995) (citing Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 92, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990)).⁸ The language of the Compact does not provide that the 60-day period is jurisdictional. Indeed, similarly and more harshly phrased timing provisions have been held subject to equitable tolling. See, e.g., Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 426, 85 S.Ct. 1050, 13 L.Ed.2d 941 (1965) ("[N]o action shall be maintained ... unless commenced within three years of the day the cause of action accrued."); Cedars-Sinai Medical Ctr. v. Shalala, 125 F.3d 765, 770 (9th Cir.1997) ("Except as provided by the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, every civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues."); William G. Tadlock Const. v. United Stated Dept. of Defense, 91 F.3d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir.1996) ("[C]omplaint may not be filed more than 180 days after the later of the date on which the violation is alleged to have occurred or was discovered.)"

Equitable tolling extends to situations where the complainant has been induced by his adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96-97, 111 S.Ct. at 458. Although TRPA's alleged waivers do not amount to misconduct, they appear to have induced plaintiffs into allowing the 60-day deadline to pass. If that is the case, the statute may have been tolled, and thus, dismissal would not be appropriate on this basis.

2. The Ordinance As Federal Law

Whether the Ordinance is state or federal law is a threshold issue bearing on a number of plaintiffs' claims. Thus, the court will address this issue at the outset.

As set forth above, California and Nevada entered into the Compact to create a regional agency with extensive powers to regulate and control development within the Lake Tahoe Basin in order to protect the natural resources and ecological balance of the area. League to Save Lake Tahoe, 507 F.2d at 518. Subsequent thereto, Congress consented to the Compact "in order to encourage the wise use and conservation of the waters of Lake Tahoe and the resources of the area around said lake." Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub.L. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360 (1960); Tahoe Regional Planning Compact — Consent of Congress, Pub.L. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233 (1980). It is well settled, and plaintiffs do not dispute, that congressional consent transformed the Compact into federal law. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438, 101 S.Ct. 703, 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981); League to Save Lake Tahoe, 507 F.2d at 519. The parties, however, dispute whether the Ordinance is federal or state law.

This hybrid legislation represents a conscious effort by the state participants, through Congressional consent, to impose the federal imprimatur on actions affecting important and often...