Lake v. Flagg
| Decision Date | 28 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 13-cv-198-SCW |
| Parties | LAMONTE LAKE, Plaintiff, v. JULIUS FLAGG and NINA HOWER, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' post-trial motion (Doc. 91 and 92). Defendants seek judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 and/or a new trial or remittitur of the verdict. Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition to Defendants' motion (Doc. 95). Based on the following, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion.
Plaintiff filed his complaint on February 27, 2013 (Doc. 1). The claim which ultimately proceeded to trial was a single retaliation claim against Defendants Julius Flagg and Nina Hower for transferring Plaintiff to Hill Correctional Center in retaliation for filing grievances regarding staff misconduct. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff against both Defendants (Doc. 82). Plaintiff was awarded $1.00 in compensatory damages and a punitive damages award of $5,000 against each Defendant for a total of $10,000 in punitive damages (Doc. 82).
Subsequent to the entering of judgment in this case, Defendants filed the pending post-trial motion (Doc. 92). Defendants seek judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50. Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to introduce evidence sufficient to prove his claim that Defendants transferred Plaintiff to Hill Correctional Center in retaliation for Plaintiff filing grievances. In addition to the motion for judgment as a matter of law, Defendants' post-trial motion also included a motion for new trial. The motion for new trial argues that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, the punitive damage award of $10,000 was excessive, and that the Court's jury instructions related to the elements of retaliation and punitive damages award were incorrect. Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition to the motion (Doc. 95).
Defendants seek judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b). Rule 50(b) allows a party to re-raise its previous request for judgment as a matter of law within 28 days of the jury being discharged. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). Such a motion should only be granted when "the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue." Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). "In ruling on the renewed motion, the court may: (1) allowjudgment on the verdict...; (2) order a new trial; or (3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b).
In reviewing a party's motion, the court must construe "the evidence strictly in favor of the party who prevailed before the jury and examines evidence only to determine whether the jury's verdict could reasonably be based on that evidence." Passananti v. Cook County, 689 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Tart v. Illinois Power Co., 366 F.3d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 2004)). The court will also not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Id. (citing Waite v. Board of Trustees of Illinois Comm. College Dist. No. 508, 408 F.3d 339, 343 (7th Cir. 2005)). The Seventh Circuit has stated that "overturning a jury verdict is not something [the court] do[es] lightly," Massey v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Ill., 226 F.3d 922, 925 (7th Cir.2000), and it will only do so if the moving party can show that no rational jury could have brought in a verdict against it. Hossack v. Floor Covering Associates of Joliet, Inc., 492 F.3d 853, 859 (7th Cir.2007).
Defendants seek a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a). Rule 59(a) allows the court, after a jury trial, to grant a new trial on all or as to some of the issues, as to any party, "for any reasons for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court." Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a). See also ADM Marking, Inc. v. Zanasi Fratelli, S.R.L., 353 F.3d 541, 543 (7th Cir. 2003). A court may grant a new trial if "the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, the damagesare excessive or the trial was unfair to the moving party." Miksis v. Howard, 106 F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 1997). Allison v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 1187, 1196 (7th Cir. 1992).
Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Plaintiff failed to prove that his grievances were a motivating factor behind his transfer.1 Establishing a claim of retaliation requires a prisoner to show the following: (1) that he engaged in a protected activity, (2) he suffered a deprivation likely to prevent future protected activities, and (3) there was a causal connection between the two. See also Watkins v. Kasper, 599 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 2010); Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009). A defendant can still prevail, however, if he shows that the offending action would have happened even if there had been no retaliatory motive, i.e. "the harm would have occurred anyway." Mays v. Springborn, 719 F.3d 631, 634-35 (7th Cir. 2013); Greene v. Doruff, 660 F.3d 975, 977-80 (7th Cir. 2011).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff presented no evidence beyond his subjective belief and suspicious timing to support his claim that Defendants retaliated against him.Defendants further argue that the three month delay, from the time his filed his grievance to the time he was transferred, was too remote to support a causal connection because the retaliation must occur no more than a few days after the protected speech to establish a causal connection. To support their argument, they cite Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 966 (7th Cir. 2012). But, in that case, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the adverse action must take place typically within a few days of the protected speech, when the plaintiff is relying on suspicious-timing alone. Id.
When the only evidence a plaintiff has is suspicious timing, then the plaintiff must show that the "adverse...action follows close on the heels of protected expression" and that "the person who decided to impose the adverse action knew of the protected conduct." Id. (quoting Lalvani v. Cook Cnty., 269 F.3d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 2001)).
However, in this case, Plaintiff presented more evidence than just suspicious timing alone. As Plaintiff points out, Hower testified that she did comment that Plaintiff must not like it at Centralia Correctional Center, a statement Plaintiff also testified to. Plaintiff testified that this was during the time that he was filing grievances regarding misappropriations of the Inmate Benefit Fund. Further, there was testimony that Hower initiated the conversation regarding Plaintiff wanting a transfer to another prison for educational purposes, two months after Plaintiff filed his grievances, and offered to request that he be transferred to East Moline. Plaintiff testified that Hill Correctional Center was never discussed during his conversations with Hower and that Hower specifically told him he could not be transferred to Dixon Correctional Centerbecause it had a higher security level than Centralia. Yet, the evidence at trial was that Hower then recommended that Plaintiff be transferred to Hill Correctional Center, a higher security level than Centralia without telling Plaintiff. Plaintiff testified that he never requested a transfer to Hill and would not have requested such a transfer. He only put in a request for Hower to check whether he was eligible to be placed at East Moline, not to transfer to any other facility. Hower marked on the form that Plaintiff wanted the transfer to complete his associate's degree, but the evidence at trial indicated that Hill did not offer the Ethics class that Plaintiff needed to obtain his degree. There was also evidence that Hower told him that she put in a request for East Moline when the documents clearly showed she had requested Plaintiff be transferred to Hill Correctional Center.
There was also evidence that a written request for transfer usually was attached to the transfer report, and Flagg admitted that such a written request from Plaintiff was not attached. Flagg also approved Plaintiff's transfer to Hill and did not ask Plaintiff whether he wanted a transfer or not. There was also evidence that Flagg was one of the individuals that Plaintiff accused of embezzling from the Inmate Benefit Fund in his grievance and he was aware of the grievances as he had an opportunity to respond to the grievance Plaintiff filed against him.
Most telling, however, was evidence that Plaintiff was the only inmate on record who transferred from Centralia Correctional Center to Hill Correctional Center for non-disciplinary reasons. All of the other inmates, Plaintiff testified, had transferredHill after disciplinary issues and Hill was a known location for inmates with disciplinary issues, which Plaintiff did not have. With this evidence, along with the suspicious timing between Plaintiff's filing of grievances and his transfer, a reasonable jury could find retaliation to be Defendants' motive. As Plaintiff points out, the evidence presented reasonably demonstrated that the stated reason for his transfer was mere pretext for the retaliatory transfer. The Court, accordingly, DENIES Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to a new trial because the jury's determination that Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In determining...
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