Lakeland Ideal Farm & Drainage Dist. v. Mitchell

• Decision Date: 24 May 1929
• Citation: 122 So. 516,97 Fla. 890
• Parties: LAKELAND IDEAL FARM & DRAINAGE DIST. et al. v. MITCHELL.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

122 So. 516

97 Fla. 890

LAKELAND IDEAL FARM & DRAINAGE DIST. et al. v. MITCHELL.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

May 24, 1929

Suit by E. M. Mitchell against the Lakeland Ideal Farm & Drainage District and others. From an order overruling a demurrer to the bill, defendants appeal.

Reversed with directions.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Statute does not give circuit court of county, wherein petition to incorporate drainage district is filed, jurisdiction of suit to enjoin overflow of lands outside county (Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, § 1451 et seq., and § 1452). Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 1099 (Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, § 1452) giving circuit court of county, in which petition is filed for incorporation of drainage district under sections 1098 et seq. (Comp. Gen Laws 1927, § 1451 et seq.) exclusive jurisdiction co-extensive with district boundaries, without regard to county lines, relates only to formation, incorporation, and perhaps administration, of district, and does not give such court jurisdiction of suit to enjoin district from overflowing lands in another county.

Statutes authorizing suits in county where any defendant resides do not confer extraterritorial jurisdiction or alter local action rule (Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, §§ 4219, 4220, 4889). Rev Gen. St. 1920, §§ 2579, 2580, 3105 (Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, §§ 4219, 4220, 4889), authorizing suits in county wherein defendant or any of several defendants resides, affect only venue of actions, and do not confer generally extraterritorial jurisdiction of subject-matter located in another county, nor change existing rules as to venue of actions essentially local.

Action to restrain trespasses injuring freehold and growing crops must be maintained in county where land lies. Action to restrain continuing acts of trespass, causing injury to freehold and growing crops, is local, and must be maintained in county where land lies as actually or potentially involving determination of ownership of realty, in absence of competent and applicable statutory provision to contrary though acts of trespass complained of are in nature of personal acts.

Action to enjoin drainage district from overflowing land must be brought in county wherein land lies. Action to enjoin drainage district and others from obstructing flow of stream, causing overflow on complainant's land outside county in which suit was brought, is local, and hence maintainable only in county where land lies, though decree would be in nature of one in personam; acts complained of amounting to tort, for which action quare clausum fregit would lie at law, and principal relief sought hinging on land and its ownership.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Polk County; H. C. Petteway, judge.

COUNSEL

Cassels & Trinkle, of Plant City, for appellants.

John S. Edwards, of Lakeland, for appellee.

OPINION

STRUM J.

The defendants below, Lakeland Ideal Farm & Drainage District, and others, prosecute this appeal from an order overruling their demurrer to the bill of complaint brought against them by complainant below, E. M. Mitchell. The bill alleges that the Lakeland Ideal Farm & Drainage District has been duly organized and incorporated in Polk county pursuant to section 1098 et seq., Rev. Gen. Stats. 1920 (sections 1451 et seq., Comp. G. L. 1927). The district lies partly in Polk county and partly in Hillsborough county. Complainant below, E. M. Mitchell, alleges that he is the owner and in possession of certain land embraced within the limits of the drainage district, complainant's lands being situate in Hillsborough county. The bill of complaint was brought in the circuit court for Polk county. The bill further alleges the construction by the drainage district of a certain drainage canal along a stream flowing through the lands of complainant; that the defendant drainage district, acting through its trustees and other agents, have cut trees and thrown them into and across the stream, thereby stopping the flow of the water in its natural flow along said stream, causing an overflow upon complainant's lands, irreparably, so it is alleged, damaging the same, as well as certain crops of the complainant growing upon and affixed to said lands. The bill alleges past, present, and continuing acts of trespass causing irreparable damage. The bill is brought against the drainage district, a corporation, and against the individuals who are its trustees, in their capacity as such, and certain other persons alleged to be participating in the acts of trespass by authority of the district and its trustees. The bill prays for injunction and damages. It is alleged in the bill that certain of the trustees who are defendants are desidents of Polk county, in which the suit was brought.

The defendants demurred to the bill upon the grounds, amongst others, that the bill shows upon its face that the subject-matter of the suit, complainant's land, is not within the jurisdiction of the circuit court of Polk county, and that the suit is therefore not cognizable by that court. The demurrer was overruled, from which order this appeal is taken.

Complainant below, appellee here, seeks to sustain the jurisdiction of the circuit court of Polk county upon authority of sections 1098 et seq., Rev. Gen. Stats. 1920 (sections 1451 et seq., Comp. G. L. 1927). Those sections provide in detail for the formation and incorporation of drainage districts, by petition, by the persons and under the circumstances and procedure therein set out. Section 1099 (Rev. Gen. St. 1920) concludes with the language: 'The Circuit Court of the County in which said petition has been filed shall thereafter maintain and have original and exclusive jurisdiction, co-extensive with the boundaries and limits of said District, without regard to County lines, for all purposes of this article.' Complainant contends that since the district was organized in Polk county, Fla., and since the damage occurred in carrying out the authorized functions of the district, this suit may be maintained in Polk county upon authority of the statutory provision just quoted. It is clear, however, that the provision just quoted, taken in connection with the context in which it is found, related only to the formation, incorporation, and perhaps to the administration of such district. It does not embrace matters of the character here under consideration.

Complainant further contends that the provisions of sections 2579, 2580, and 3105, Rev. Gen. Stats. 1920 (sections 4219 et seq. Comp. G. L. 1927), authorize the bringing of this suit in Polk county, since certain of the defendant trustees of the district are residents of Polk county. Section 2579, supra, is the general locality of action statute relating to actions at law, which provides that suits shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, or where the cause of action accrues, or where the property in litigation is. Section 2580, supra, provides that suits against two or more defendants residing in different counties may be brought in any county or district in which any defendant resides. Section 3105 provides that all provisions of law governing locality of actions at law, when they can be made applicable, govern those in chancery.

The statutes last mentioned affect only the venue of actions. The authority of the statute to bring the action in the county of defendant's residence, or where there are two or more defendants, in the county where any of them reside, necessarily presupposes that the court in which the action is brought possesses jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action as well as of the parties. Those statutes do not purport to confer generally extraterritorial jurisdiction as to subject-matter located in another county, nor to change existing rules with reference to the locality of actions which in their essential nature are local and therefore must be brought in a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter as well as of the parties.

Certain actions incidentally and secondarily involving real property are transitory in their nature and may be brought in the county of residence of the defendant, even though the defendant therein is compelled to allege, and if denied, to prove, the ownership of the land. See Hodges v. Hunter, 61 Fla. 280, 54 So. 811, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 994, and Morgan v. Eaton, 59 Fla. 557, 51 So. 814, the former an action in trover for conversion of logs which the defendants felled and removed from plaintiff's land; the latter a suit for specific performance; in the first of which cases it was held that the action could be maintained in a state, and in the second a county, other than that of the situs of the land. See, also, Bucki v. Cone, 25 Fla. 1, 6 So. 160; Stone v. U. S., 167 U.S. 178, 17 S.Ct. 778, 42 L.Ed. 127; Ophir Silver Mine Co. v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. 467, 82 P. 70, 3 Ann. Cas. 340; Ft. Wayne Trust Co. v. Sihler, 34 Ind.App. 140, 72 N.E. 494; Towne v. Campbell, 35 Minn. 231, 28 N.W. 254.

Where however, as here, a single cause of action is presented, in which a present and continuing trespass upon real estate is the sole basis of the suit and a determination of ownership is actually or potentially involved as a major issue, and the gravamen of the action is injury to the freehold and to crops affixed to and growing upon the land, and the principal relief sought is to restrain the continuing acts of trespass which occasion that damage, the rule is otherwise. Such an action is necessarily local in its nature, and must be maintained in the county...