Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, Ohio

• Decision Date: 02 February 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-3004,82-3004
• Citation: 699 F.2d 303
• Parties: LAKEWOOD, OHIO CONGREGATION OF JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF LAKEWOOD, OHIO, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 303

699 F.2d 303

LAKEWOOD, OHIO CONGREGATION OF JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES, INC. Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF LAKEWOOD, OHIO, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 82-3004.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued Oct. 20, 1982.

Decided Feb. 2, 1983.

Sheldon Berns (argued), Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellant.

William E. Blackie, Lakewood, Ohio, Henry B. Fischer (argued), Cleveland, Ohio, for defendant-appellee.

Before MARTIN, Circuit Judge, BROWN, Senior Circuit Judge, and SPEIGEL, District Judge. ^*

BOYCE F. MARTIN, Jr., Circuit Judge.

The principal question presented in this appeal is whether a municipal zoning ordinance, which prohibits the construction of church buildings in virtually all residential districts in the city, violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. ¹ Although many state courts have addressed this issue, ² no other federal circuit court has resolved the question.

The Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, as a representative of its individual members, sued the City of Lakewood. It challenged the City's comprehensive zoning plan which designates portions of the City for exclusive residential use. The Congregation argued that the ordinance infringed its first, fifth, and fourteenth amendment rights ³ and asked for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The district court carefully analyzed each asserted ground for relief but found them all to be without merit. On appeal, the Congregation has argued only its first amendment claim. We find the claim meritless and affirm the judgment of the district court.

Lakewood, Ohio is a municipal corporation located on the western border of Cleveland with a population of approximately 62,000 residents. It is an older suburban community composed primarily of one and two-family residences. Its commercial districts line two major east-west arteries through the City. The City is well developed and few vacant lots for either commercial or residential use remain within its five and a half square mile limits.

The 175-member Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, a non-profit corporation organized under Ohio law in 1972, has worshipped in Lakewood since 1944. The Congregation's church building, called Kingdom Hall, is currently located in a storefront on one of the main commercial arteries in the City. Kingdom Hall houses regular programs on Tuesday evenings for Bible study, on Thursday evenings for theocratic school meetings, and on Sunday morning for worship services. The central tenets and missions of the Jehovah's Witnesses are the distribution of literature to homes and on the street, and the conduct of in-home Bible studies for the purpose of instructing and encouraging people to apply biblical teachings to daily life.

In 1972 the Congregation decided to relocate Kingdom Hall and began searching for a site more conducive to worship and capable of accommodating a larger building. In early 1972 it entered into an option contract for and subsequently purchased a half-acre lot in northwest Lakewood. The lot fronts on Clifton Boulevard, a six lane east-west thoroughfare, and West Clifton Avenue, a north-south secondary route. The surrounding neighborhood consists of large, stately one and two-family homes, most of which were constructed before 1930. The design for the new Kingdom Hall featured a low, square building with a rustic stone exterior intended to blend with the neighboring properties. The design, insofar as possible, preserved the trees on the land and sheltered the forty-two car parking lot from homes nearby.

When the Congregation entered into the option contract for the lot, the area was zoned for residential use. However, the Board of Zoning Appeals had power to grant zoning exceptions. Before the Congregation purchased the lot, the Board denied its application for an exception because a church on the corner would create traffic hazards, increase noise levels, potentially decrease property values, and cause various other problems. The Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court and the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County affirmed the Board's decision.

In 1973, after the Congregation had purchased the lot, the City enacted a new zoning code, Lakewood Ordinance 55-78. The ordinance divided the City into the following districts:

                One Family District            R-1 District
                One Family District            R-2 District
                Two Family District            R-3 District
                Multiple Family, Low Density   M-1 District
                Multiple Family, Medium
                 Density                       M-2 District
                Multiple Family, High Density  M-3 District
                Business-Residential            BR District
                Office District                B-1 District
                Retail District                B-2 District
                Industrial District              X District
                Flood Plain                    FFP District
                

The Congregation's lot is designated R-2, limiting its uses to single family dwellings and "roomers." Church buildings are permitted only in M-3, M-2, B-R, and B-2 districts, which comprise approximately ten percent of the City's land.

In 1975 the Congregation again sought approval to construct a church on its lot. The Building Commissioner of Lakewood denied the Congregation a building permit because the area was zoned exclusively for residential use. The Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court found the Lakewood zoning code to be constitutional. Lakewood Ohio Congregation v. Lakewood, et al., 9 Ohio Ops.3d 314 (1978). However, on appeal the county appellate court ordered the lower court to determine whether or not the ordinance is constitutional as applied to the Congregation's lot specifically. The common pleas court had not reached a decision on the question at the time the Congregation filed this present suit in the Northern District of Ohio.

The question before us is whether the Lakewood zoning ordinance is constitutional. The Congregation claims that the ordinance infringes its right to freedom of religion by prohibiting it from constructing Kingdom Hall on the lot it owns. If the ordinance does infringe the Congregation's first amendment right, the City must justify the ordinance by a compelling governmental interest. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963). See also Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). If there is no first amendment infringement, we must determine whether the ordinance denies the Congregation the liberty to use its property without due process, violating the Fourteenth Amendment. According to traditional analysis a zoning ordinance does not violate the Due Process Clause if it is reasonable and substantially related to governmental public welfare concerns. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926).

Whether the Lakewood ordinance should be subject to "compelling interest" or "rational basis" scrutiny depends on whether the ordinance in fact infringes the Congregation's right to free exercise of religion. Commonly, courts evaluate an infringement of religious freedom in terms of the burdens government imposes on the exercise of religious freedom. As a general rule, the greater the cost of practicing one's religion, the more probable that the statute creates an unconstitutional infringement.

The landmark cases of Wisconsin v. Yoder and Sherbert v. Verner depict primary examples of government actions which infringe religious freedom. In Yoder the price of religious observance was the imposition of criminal penalties. There, a Wisconsin statute compelled school attendance until the age of sixteen. The statute conflicted with the religious beliefs and practices of the Old Order Amish who withdrew their children from school after eighth grade to protect them from harmful worldly influences. The Supreme Court recognized:

The impact of the compulsory-attendance law on respondents' practice of the Amish religion is not only severe, but inescapable, for the Wisconsin law affirmatively compels them, under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs.

406 U.S. at 218, 92 S.Ct. at 1534.

In Sherbert the Supreme Court identified severe, life-threatening economic sanctions as infringements of religious freedom. In that case, South Carolina denied unemployment benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist because she refused to accept available jobs. The state ignored the fact that the believer's religion prohibited her from accepting jobs which required Saturday attendance. The state ruling

forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.

* * *

* * *

[To] condition the availability of benefits upon this appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties.

374 U.S. at 404-406, 83 S.Ct. at 1794-1795.

Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961), presents an informative contrast to Yoder and Sherbert. Braunfield held that one's religious freedom is not infringed by a statute which makes religious observance more expensive. Orthodox Jewish merchants who rested from work on Saturday challenged the Pennsylvania Sunday closing law. That law effectively required Jewish merchants to make a financial sacrifice to practice their religion. However, the incidental economic burden was not unconstitutional because neither the purpose nor the effect of the law was to impede religious observation or to discriminate among religions. 366 U.S. at 607, 81 S.Ct. at 1148. Inconvenient economic burdens on religious freedom do not rise to a constitutionally impermissible infringement of free exercise.

Although a court's primary concern in determining whether religious freedom has been...