Lakin v. Stine

• Decision Date: 19 December 2005
• Docket Number: No. 05-1388.,05-1388.
• Citation: 431 F.3d 959
• Parties: David Patrick LAKIN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Wayne W. STINE, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

431 F.3d 959

David Patrick LAKIN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Wayne W. STINE, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 05-1388.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: December 9, 2005.

Decided and Filed: December 19, 2005.

ARGUED: Margaret Sind Raben, Gurewitz & Raben, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. Jerrold E. Schrotenboer, Office of the Attorney General, Jackson, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Margaret Sind Raben, Gurewitz & Raben, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. Jerrold E. Schrotenboer, Office of the Attorney General, Jackson, Michigan, for Appellee.

Before: MERRITT, MARTIN, and COLE, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge.

David Patrick Lakin appeals the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging constitutional error because he was forced to wear leg iron shackles during his trial in state court. The district court found that Lakin's due process rights were violated when he was forced to wear leg irons during his trial, but concluded that the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of Lakin's guilt. Consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis last Term in Deck v. Missouri, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005), we agree with the district court and hold that the shackling was constitutional error, but that it was nevertheless harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of Lakin's guilt. We therefore AFFIRM the district court's judgment denying Lakin's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

I.

Lakin was serving a twenty-to-thirty year prison sentence when he and four other inmates attempted to escape in January 1990. See Lakin v. Stine, 2000 WL 1256900, *1 (6th Cir.2000) ("Lakin I"). The inmates escaped by crawling through a storm drain pipe to reach the outside of the prison where they acted as if they were on a work detail. This Court previously summarized the facts as follows.

Two corrections officers, Sheila Duncan and Danny Norman, drove over to the inmates in a state vehicle to determine if they were authorized to be there. During the encounter, the inmates assaulted the two officers, placed them into the vehicle and handcuffed them. The inmates then drove off in the vehicle, taking the handcuffed officers with them. After eluding law enforcement in a high-speed chase, Lakin and his fellow escapees surrendered after an ensuing chase. Lakin and his co-defendants were returned to prison and charged with kidnapping, prison escape, assault on a prison employee, and unlawfully driving away an automobile.

Id. Lakin was convicted on all counts. On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals addressed only one of Lakin's and his co-defendants's five claims — that the trial court failed to comply with applicable rules governing the defendants's decision to discharge counsel and represent themselves. Finding that reversal was not required, the court affirmed the convictions. Regarding all other claims, the court wrote: "We have carefully considered the remaining issues raised by defendants. However, we conclude they require neither reversal nor discussion." The Michigan Supreme Court declined discretionary review.

Lakin then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court granted a conditional writ finding that Lakin's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when he was denied the opportunity to consult with counsel outside of the presence of prison guards. This Court reversed and remanded. See Lakin I, 2000 WL 1256900. On remand, the district court addressed another of Lakin's claims — that he was denied a fair and impartial trial when the trial court prevented him from presenting a duress and necessity defense — and again issued a conditional writ. This Court again reversed and remanded. Lakin v. Stine, 80 Fed.Appx. 368 (6th Cir.2003) ("Lakin II").

On the second remand, the district court addressed Lakin's remaining claims including the only claim now before this Court — that Lakin's due process rights were violated when he was forced to wear leg irons during his trial. Because the Michigan Court of Appeals provided no explanation for the basis of its denial of Lakin's claim, the district court "proceed[ed] with an independent review of this claim `through the lens of § 2254(d).'" The district court concluded that Lakin's due process rights were violated because the trial court failed to conduct any inquiry into or make any findings regarding the necessity of the shackles. Nevertheless, the district court found that the error was harmless in light of "the overwhelming evidence of [Lakin]'s guilt presented at trial," and denied Lakin's petition for relief.

II.

A. Standard of Review

Lakin's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and this Court must therefore apply the standard of review set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Pursuant to that section, a writ of habeas corpus may not be granted unless the state court's adjudication of the claim "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). To determine what constitutes clearly established law, this Court looks to the law as established by the Supreme Court's holdings and not its dicta. See Ruimveld v. Birkett, 404 F.3d 1006, 1010 (6th Cir.2005) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) and Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004)). Nevertheless, an explicit statement by the Supreme Court is unnecessary; rather, "the legal principles and standards flowing from [Supreme Court] precedent" also qualify as "clearly established law." Ruimveld, 404 F.3d at 1010 (quoting Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846, 852 (6th Cir.2002)). This Court reviews the district court's decision to deny the writ de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Towns v. Smith, 395 F.3d 251, 257 (6th Cir.2005).

B. Review of Supreme Court Law

Recently in Ruimveld, this Court conducted a "brief review of Supreme Court cases related to prejudicial trappings at trial." 404 F.3d at 1010-1012. Just one month later, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Deck v. Missouri addressing "whether shackling a convicted offender during the penalty phase of a capital trial violates the Federal Constitution." Deck, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 2009, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005). In Deck, the Supreme Court held "that the Constitution forbids the use of visible shackles during the penalty phase, as it forbids their use during the guilt phase, unless that use is justified by an essential state interest — such as the interest in courtroom security — specific to the defendant on trial." Id. at 2009 (quotations omitted and emphasis in original) (citing Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-69, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986) and Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-44, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970)).

Citing "deep roots in the common law," the Supreme Court held that "[t]he answer is clear: The law has long forbidden routine use of visible shackles during the guilt phase; it permits a State to shackle a criminal defendant only in the presence of a special need." Id. at 2010. The Court further stated that

it is clear that this Court's prior statements gave voice to a principle deeply embedded in the law. We now conclude that those statements identify a basic element of the "due process of law" protected by the Federal Constitution. Thus, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial. Such a determination may of course take into account the factors that courts have traditionally relied on in gauging potential security problems and the risk of escape at trial.

Id. at 2012.¹

Notwithstanding the constitutional rule, the Court noted that there will be cases "where these perils of shackling are unavoidable." Id. at 2014 (citation omitted). The Court did not "underestimate the need to restrain dangerous defendants . . . or the need to give trial courts latitude in making individualized security determinations," but given shackles "prejudicial effect, due process does not permit the use of visible restrains if the trial court has not taken account of the circumstances of the particular case." Id.

In Deck itself, the Supreme Court applied these principles and rejected Missouri's argument that the trial judge acted within his discretion. Id. at 2015. This argument, the Court wrote, "founders on the record's failure to indicate that the trial judge saw the matter as one calling for discretion. The record contains no formal or informal findings." Id. The absence of findings, according to the Court, does not meet the "case-by-case determination" that the due process clause requires. Id.² Notwithstanding, the Court hypothesized that there might be "an exceptional case where the record itself makes clear that there are indisputably good reasons for shackling." Id.

Finally, the Supreme Court held that "the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process violation." Id. Instead, harmless error analysis applies — that is, "[t]he State must prove `beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shackling] error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'" Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)).

C. The Law Was Clearly Established

Although Deck was only recently decided, the Supreme Court made clear that the guilt phase rule was clearly established law prior to the date of the Deck decision. Deck addressed whether the guilt phase rule...