Lamb v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 23 June 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-10924,98-10924
• Citation: 179 F.3d 352
• Parties: John Michael LAMB, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Gary L. JOHNSON, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 352

179 F.3d 352

John Michael LAMB, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Gary L. JOHNSON, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 98-10924.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

June 23, 1999.

Ronald L. Goranson, Dallas, TX, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Erik E. Cary, Austin, TX, for Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before KING, Chief Judge, and BARKSDALE and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner John Michael Lamb, convicted of capital murder in Texas and sentenced to death, requests from this Court a Certificate of Appealability ("COA") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). For the reasons set forth below, we DENY the COA.

FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Lamb was convicted by a jury of capital murder and sentenced to death in 1983. The pertinent facts can be found in the substance of his confession contained in the state court opinion affirming his conviction:

Friday November 5, 1982[:] I got out of Jail in Searcy Arkansas about 10:30 a.m. I started hitchhiking toward Texas. I caught a ride into a town about 45 miles from Dallas on Interstate Highway 30 between Arkansas and Dallas, Texas. I walked across the Parking Lot of a motel I believe it was a Ramada Inn. I saw this guy in front of a motel room I talked to him a little bit then he went to eat. I stayed around the motel area for awhile. When this guy came back to his room after he had eaten and invited me in the room. We talked for about thirty minutes he was sitting on the bed and I was sitting on a chair nearby. This guy put his hand on my leg and I said take your hand off I don't go for that shit. I got up at this time and he said for me to leave. I had earlier gotten a gun from a bag in the room while this guy was in the bathroom. When I got up I took a step or two toward the door pulled the gun from my pocket and shot the guy three times I shot three times because the gun was an automatic after I shot the guy was on his knees on the bed and I heard him fall to the floor. I got the guys billfold off the nightstand and took a shaving kit. I got the keys to the guys car and drove his car toward Dallas. The car was a tan Nova with Virginia License Plates. The Drivers license and credit card in the billfold had the name of Jerry Chafin. The gun that I shot the guy with was a small automatic Pistol. I threw the gun out of the car somewhere between this town and Dallas. I slept a couple hours in the car in Dallas then drove to Houston. I drove to a Holiday Inn in Houston and checked into the Motel[.] Saturday November 6, 1982[:] I used Jerry Chafin credit card and Drivers License to check into the Holiday Inn. I threw a Television and some other stuff that was in the car into a Garbage bin at the Holiday Inn. I stayed in Houston until Monday then started East toward Louisiana. Tuesday I stopped at a Shamrock station in Lafyette Louisiana. I got some gas and two cases of Budweiser Beer Longnecks. I attempted to use Jerry Chafin credit card and a girl called in to check on the credit card. I took off without the card. I drove East on Interstate 10. Thursday Morning[:] I stopped at store and gas pumps in Greenville Florida. I shot the attendant and took two cases of Budweiser Beer and some money. A few minutes later I was stopped by the Police and arrested. When I was arrested I was driving the car that I got in Texas and had the billfold in my pocket with Jerry Chafin Drivers License of Jerry Chafin.

Lamb v. State, 680 S.W.2d 11, 14 (Tex.Crim.App.1984)(en banc). His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. See id. at 13-17. The United States Supreme Court denied Lamb's petition for a writ of certiorari. See Lamb v. Texas, 470 U.S. 1009, 105 S.Ct. 1372, 84 L.Ed.2d 391 (1985).

Thereafter, Lamb filed several applications for a writ of habeas corpus under Texas law. On October 31, 1985, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the allegations raised in Lamb's first application. The trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, and Lamb's application was denied on January 8, 1986. Lamb filed a motion for stay of execution and a second application for state habeas corpus in February 1986, both of which were also denied.

In February 1986, Lamb filed his first 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application in federal court. His application was initially denied, but the district court granted Lamb's motion to allow him to amend his application asserting additional grounds for relief. Lamb filed his first amended application, and on March 22, 1988, the magistrate judge conducted an evidentiary hearing. Lamb then filed a second amended application adding claims which had not been presented to the state court, and in May 1989, his § 2254 application was dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies. As such, Lamb filed his third application for state habeas corpus in December 1989. The state trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on July 30, 1996. The trial court issued findings and denied the application on April 22, 1997.

Lamb then filed the instant § 2254 petition on April 23, 1997. Lamb raised several claims in this petition. Relevantly, the fifth claim among these was that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of the trial. The magistrate judge conducted a limited evidentiary hearing at which it adopted the previous evidentiary hearing conducted in 1988. The magistrate judge concluded that "Lamb's attorneys' strategic decision to not put on mitigating evidence and, as a result, to not conduct much investigation into such evidence, was entirely reasonable in light of all the circumstances of the case." The magistrate judge further concluded that "there is not a reasonable probability that the result of the punishment phase would have been any different had counsel put on mitigation witnesses." Lamb subsequently objected, arguing that the magistrate judge's conclusion that the attorneys made a strategic decision did not coincide with the facts, and that some mitigating evidence would have provided a reasonable probability that a life sentence could have been obtained. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and denied Lamb's § 2254 application.

Pursuant to § 2253(c)(2), Lamb filed a request for a COA from the district court. After the court below denied this request, he made a similar request to this Court. We now consider this request. ¹

DISCUSSION

I

On April 24, 1996, the President signed into law the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), amending the procedures for seeking and obtaining a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court. Lamb filed his habeas application in the district court on April 23, 1997, after the effective date of AEDPA. AEDPA applies to those § 2254 applications filed in the district court after the Act's effective date. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2068, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 412-13 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1845, 140 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1998). Under AEDPA, a § 2254 applicant must obtain a COA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). A COA may be issued only if the prisoner has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See id. A petitioner makes a "substantial showing" if he demonstrates that his petition involves issues which are debatable among reasonable jurists, that a court could resolve the issues differently, or that the issues are adequate enough to deserve encouragement to proceed further. See Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 755 (5th Cir.1996).

"The nature of the penalty in a capital case is a 'proper consideration in determining whether to issue a certificate of probable cause, but the severity of the penalty does not in itself suffice to warrant the automatic issuing of a certificate.' " Washington v. Johnson, 90 F.3d 945, 949 (5th Cir.1996) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983)). In a capital case, "any doubts whether CPC [the predecessor to the COA] should be issued are to be resolved in favor of the petitioner." Buxton v. Collins, 925 F.2d 816, 819 (5th Cir.1991).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by AEDPA:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Pure questions of law are reviewed under the "contrary to" standard. See Drinkard, 97 F.3d at 767-68. On the other hand, mixed questions of law and facts are reviewed under the "unreasonable application" standard. "[A]n application of law to facts is unreasonable only when it can be said that reasonable jurists considering the question would be of one view that the state court ruling was incorrect." Id. at 769. "In other words, [the court] can grant habeas relief only if a state court decision is so clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable among reasonable jurists." Id. Finally, pure questions of fact are reviewed under the "unreasonable determination of the facts" standard. See id. at 767.

II

Lamb submits that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of the trial. The ultimate determination of whether c...