Lamb v. Old Colony R. Co.
| Decision Date | 03 September 1885 |
| Citation | 140 Mass. 79,2 N.E. 932 |
| Parties | LAMB v. OLD COLONY R. CO. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
J.G. Abbott and George A. Sawyer, for plaintiff.
J.H. Benton, Jr., for defendant.
As the plaintiff was driving his horse along a highway parallel to and adjoining the defendant's railroad, his horse was frightened by the smoke from the engine of a train passing on the railroad in a direction opposite to that in which the plaintiff was going, and the plaintiff was injured in consequence. After the plaintiff's evidence was all in, the court ruled that there was no evidence for the jury, and the plaintiff excepted to the ruling.
The evidence is not stated in the exceptions, but a full report of it is annexed to them. It does not appear upon what ground the ruling was placed, or what questions of law were intended to be presented. It is not a case where a single question of fact, involving a single proposition of law, is presented upon evidence stated in the exceptions; but all the testimony applicable to distinct questions of fact, and involving in its application distinct propositions of law, is sent to us to examine and discover upon what questions and for what reason it was ruled or may be now held that the evidence was insufficient to prove the plaintiff's case. Nearly the whole bill of exceptions is taken up with statements of what the plaintiffs claimed the evidence tended to prove. No ruling was asked or given in relation to this.
As the rulings and exceptions are to the insufficiency of the evidence, the question of the sufficiency of the facts claimed by the plaintiff to be proved is not before us. The ruling was that upon the whole evidence the plaintiff could not recover. We think that this ruling was right, because the evidence was not sufficient to prove that the defendant was negligent. The defendant had a right to run its trains on its railroad adjoining the highway, and was not responsible to travelers on the highway for the consequences of noise, vibration, or smoke caused by the prudent running of its trains. Favor v. Boston & L.R. Co., 114 Mass. 350.
The smoke which frightened the plaintiff's horse was occasioned by firing up the engine; that is, mending the fire, or adding coal to it, the ordinary effect of which is to occasion the emission, for a short time, of very black, dense smoke from the smoke-stack. The plaintiff contended that there was evidence that it was practicable to run the train for the whole distance where the railroad adjoined the highway without firing up, and that the act of firing up in the stretch of railroad adjoining the highway was unnecessary for the ordinary running of trains, and exposed travelers to an unnecessary danger, and was therefore negligent, and might be found such by a jury.
Without considering the proposition of law involved, we think the court below might properly have...
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