Lamb v. Village of Bagley, 51923.

• Decision Date: 13 November 1981
• Docket Number: No. 51923.,51923.
• Parties: Joseph LAMB, Petitioner, Appellant, v. VILLAGE OF BAGLEY, Respondent, State of Minnesota, by Marilyn E. McClure, Commissioner, Department of Human Rights, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

310 N.W.2d 508 (1981)

Joseph LAMB, Petitioner, Appellant, v. VILLAGE OF BAGLEY, Respondent, State of Minnesota, by Marilyn E. McClure, Commissioner, Department of Human Rights, Respondent.

No. 51923.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

September 25, 1981.

Rehearing Denied November 13, 1981.

Treuer & Day and Margaret Seelye Treuer, Bemidji, for petitioner, appellant.

Ekvall & Rasmussen and James R. Wilson, Bagley, for Village of Bagley.

Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen. and Mark Levinger, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for State of Minnesota.

Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.

SIMONETT, Justice.

We granted a petition to review the decision of a three-judge district court panel affirming the decision of the hearing examiner that respondent village did not violate Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 1(2) (1980), by discriminating against one of its police officers on the basis of race, nor did the city invoke unfair reprisals against the police officer contrary to subdivision 7 of the same section. We reverse.

Appellant Joseph Lamb,¹ who is half Indian, worked from June 1974 through May 1975 for the Police Department of the Village of Bagley. During this 1-year period the department had four members, Chief Francis "Fritz" LaRoque, Tom Neeland, Norvald Anderson and Lamb. LaRoque was over one-half Indian. Neeland was five-eighths Indian and Anderson was white. In March 1975, during this 1-year period, Anderson left the force and was replaced by David Rivera, part Spanish and part white. After Lamb left in May 1975, he was replaced by a white officer.

LaRoque was extremely abusive to Lamb. He addressed Lamb as a "damn Indian." He called Lamb a "big fat Indian," a "dumb Indian," and a "fat dumb nigger." The police log is replete with derogatory remarks, some about Lamb's weight, some stories about his association with women, and at least one reference to Lamb as a "big, fat black nigger."

Lamb was paid $475 a month during the course of his employment; his predecessor was paid $570 a month and his successor, a white officer, was started at $540 a month. Lamb was promised a $125 clothing allowance but never received it; all other officers did.

Chief LaRoque spread rumors about Lamb chasing women and on one occasion called Lamb's wife to report that Lamb was with another woman at that moment. Lamb was at home. LaRoque started rumors that Lamb and several Indian friends were deer shining. He required Lamb and Neeland to move into town as a condition of employment but did not require the non-Indian police officers to do so; no explanation was offered by the village for this disparity in treatment. The two Indian officers were ordered to lose weight under threat of suspension, while Lamb's successor, a non-Indian who weighed 300 pounds, was not required to go on a diet. Neither was this disparity of treatment explained by the village. LaRoque disciplined Lamb and Neeland more severely than others on the force and more severely than was warranted. One night when Lamb was working late, the Chief remarked to him, "You damn Indians should be home in bed where you belong," and remarked at other times that Indians "should stay on the reservation."

It is clear from the record that Lamb was subjected to humiliating and discriminatory treatment by LaRoque. The hearing examiner agreed, describing LaRoque's actions as "terribly abusive activities." The hearing examiner, however, found this abuse was not racially motivated against Lamb as an Indian but instead that this treatment was due to his "position at the bottom of the pecking order in the police department because of his education, his lack of law enforcement experience, and his weight."

As we view this record, appellant Lamb presented a prima facie case of unfair employment practices consisting of discrimination, not based on a bona fide occupational qualification, "against a person with respect to his * * * compensation, terms, upgrading, conditions, facilities, or privileges of employment." Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 1(2)(c) (1980). In Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395 (Minn.1978), we held, consistent with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), that the complainant has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Danz, 263 N.W.2d at 399. This prima facie case is established upon a showing of unequal treatment. Discriminatory intent need not be proved at this stage. The burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for disparity in treatment. If the defendant comes forward with sufficient proper rebuttal evidence, the complainant must then carry the ultimate burden of persuasion to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant are not so, but only a pretext for discrimination. In carrying the burden of persuasion, the complainant may succeed either by persuading the trier of fact that it is more likely the defendant was racially motivated or that the defendant's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.

In rebuttal the village introduced evidence showing Chief LaRoque abused others in his department as well as Lamb, whites as well as Indians; that Lamb's successor, a white, was treated as badly; that with respect to fights at the municipal liquor store, whites and Indians were treated no differently; that with respect to other complaints, there were permissible grounds for disparity in treatment; and that the police chief lacked professional training and managerial ability and was simply the kind of person who indulged in pranks and horseplay. With respect to Lamb's claim the Chief gave him bad job references, the village introduced evidence to the contrary and the hearing examiner concluded, correctly we agree, there was insufficient evidence of any "reprisal" within Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 7 (1980).

Unfortunately, the hearing examiner's decision did not analyze the evidence in terms of the shifting burdens of going forward with the evidence as outlined in Danz. We see no need, however, to remand for clarification, as we did in Danz, because here the racial epithets, admittedly made, coupled...