Lambert Lumber Co. v. Jones Engineering & Construction Co.
Decision Date | 02 February 1931 |
Docket Number | No. 8875.,8875. |
Parties | LAMBERT LUMBER CO. v. JONES ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION CO., Inc., et al. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Harris L. Moore, of Kansas City, Mo. (John W. Moore and W. C. Michaels, both of Kansas City, Mo., on the brief), for appellant.
David A. Murphy, of Kansas City, Mo. (John T. Harding and R. Carter Tucker, both of Kansas City, Mo., on the brief), for appellees.
Before KENYON and GARDNER, Circuit Judges, and MUNGER, District Judge.
Appellant furnished material to the Jones Engineering & Construction Company to be used in the performance of a contract for the construction of a government hospital at Excelsior Springs, Mo. It sought on March 15, 1926, to intervene in an action brought by another contractor under section 270, title 40, chapter 3, USCA, against the Jones Engineering & Construction Company and the sureties on its bond.
A jury was waived in writing. The trial court held that the intervention was not in time, as it was attempted over a year after the work was performed and final settlement made between the government and the contractor, and dismissed intervener's petition.
Findings of fact were made by the court, i. e., that the bond contemplated under section 270 (40 USCA) was duly given; that intervener furnished the materials to the contractor, as claimed, and is entitled to recover, if its intervention was in time; that an original contract and a supplemental contract had been entered into; that suit was originally filed upon the bond by another company, which was dismissed but afterwards reinstated to permit intervention; that the work undertaken by the contractor was completed more than one year before intervention; that material had been furnished by intervener both for the original contract and the supplemental contract; but that it was unnecessary to separate the liability of the several sureties. We quote certain of the findings:
The trial court filed an opinion pointing out that the only question was the time of final settlement, and stated that the litigants were in agreement that "a `final settlement' is when the government finally determines according to administrative methods what amount it is willing to pay to the contractor." It relied on Illinois Surety Co. v. Peeler, 240 U. S. 214, 36 S. Ct. 321, 324, 60 L. Ed. 609, in its holding that "`the appropriate administrative determination with respect to the amount due' was committed to the Bureau of Yards and Docks, Navy Department and the Director of the U. S. Veterans' Bureau." It took the position that the Comptroller General was not in a position to ascertain the amount actually due under the contract, and that it was not "a part of his administrative function."
Two reasons seem to be controlling in the court's decision: First, that there was no authority in the General Accounting Office, represented by the Comptroller General, to make a final settlement within the meaning of section 270, title 40 USCA; and, second, that the appropriate administrative determination as to the amount due was in the Bureau of Yards and Docks of the Navy Department and the Director of the Veterans' Bureau.
Section 270, title 40, USCA, reads substantially the same as the Act of February 24, 1905, c. 778, 33 Stat. 811, which amends the Act of August 13, 1894, c. 280, 28 Stat. 278, the only change being the substitution of the words "District Court" in section 270 for Circuit Court, as appeared in the Act of February 24, 1905. Section 270 contains this proviso:
"Provided, That where suit is instituted by any of such creditors on the bond of the contractor it shall not be commenced until after the complete performance of said contract and final settlement thereof, and shall be commenced within one year after the performance and final settlement of said contract, and not later."
There is no controversy on the proposition that a complete performance of the contract had taken place more than a year before intervention was sought, so that question is eliminated from the case.
The only question here is, When was final settlement made as that term is used in said section? If made prior to March 15, 1925, then the intervention is barred. If made on April 2, 1925, as claimed by appellant, then the intervention is not barred.
At the threshold of the case, we are met with a question raised by appellees that, in view of a jury being waived in writing, the finding of the trial court "that final settlement occurred prior to March 15, 1925 and that the intervention herein was filed more than one year after the date of final settlement and that therefore intervener cannot recover," is a finding of fact, that of necessity it supports the judgment, no evidence being before this court, and hence that there is nothing for this court to determine.
The procedure of waiver of jury in writing is under section 773 and section 875 of 28 USCA. Section 773...
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