Lambert v. Abid
| Decision Date | 17 August 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. A09-2071,No. 62-CV-07-4412,A09-2071,62-CV-07-4412 |
| Parties | Marjorie Lambert, Appellant. v. Munir Abid, Defendant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Claude Theodore Anderson, Respondent.
John M. Gearin, John M. Gearin, P.A., Zachary A. Longsdorf, Longsdorf Law Firm, P.L.C., Oakdale, Minnesota (for appellant).
Richard J. Kruger, Edina, Minnesota (for respondent).
Ramsey County District Court
Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Worke, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Marjorie Lambert was injured in a three-car accident on Interstate Highway 35E in St. Paul. The car in which she was a passenger was struck from behind by a car driven by Munir Abid, which then was struck from behind by a sport-utility vehicle driven by Claude Theodore Anderson. After a trial on Lambert's negligence claim against Anderson, a Ramsey County jury found that Anderson was not negligent. On Lambert's appeal, we conclude that the district court did not err by admitting Abid's and Anderson's testimony that there was black ice on the road surface or by denying Lambert's post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. Therefore we affirm.
The automobile accident at issue in this case occurred on February 8, 2007, at approximately 8:00 a.m. Lambert's husband was driving in the center lane of southbound traffic on I-35E during rush-hour traffic. As vehicles in front of the Lamberts slowed and came to a stop, Lambert's husband stopped as well. But after he stopped, Abid's car struck the Lamberts' car from behind. After the Lamberts' car and Abid's car stopped, Abid's car was struck by an SUV driven by Anderson. That impact caused Abid's vehicle to strike the Lamberts' car a second time. Lambert alleged that, as a result of the collisions, she was injured and required a hip replacement.
In October 2007, Lambert commenced this negligence action against Abid and Anderson. Lambert's claim against Abid was dismissed after she entered into a settlement agreement with him. Lambert's claim against Anderson went to trial in June 2009.
At trial, Abid testified (by way of a videotaped deposition) that he believed that there was black ice on the road that morning. He testified that he engaged his vehicle's anti-lock braking system when he tried to stop but that there "must have been" black ice because he could not stop. Abid testified that he did not get out of his car while the accident was being investigated.
Anderson also attributed his inability to stop to black ice. He testified that he applied the brakes to try to stop his vehicle and that the anti-lock braking system engaged but that the car did not slow down. He testified that he told a state trooper that the car would not stop but that he did not recall if he specifically told her about black ice. He also testified that he did not verify that there was black ice on the road.
Sergeant Kelly A. Collins of the Minnesota State Patrol testified that neither Anderson nor Abid told her that they were unable to stop due to icy road conditions. Sergeant Collins testified that her accident report noted road conditions as "dry." She admitted, however, that she did not walk to the center lane, where the accident occurred, and that the vehicles involved in the accident had moved to the shoulder of the road by the time she arrived. Sergeant Collins concluded that the collisions occurred because Abid and Anderson were following too closely and driving at an excessive speed. Anderson did not disagree with Trooper Collins's conclusion that he was driving too fast for conditions and following too closely.
The jury found that Anderson was not negligent in the operation of his vehicle. Lambert moved for judgment as a matter of law and requested that the district court find that Anderson was negligent. In the alternative, Lambert sought a new trial. The districtcourt denied Lambert's post-trial motion and entered judgment for Anderson. Lambert appeals.
Lambert raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the district court erred by admitting the testimony of Abid and Anderson concerning black ice; (2) whether the district court erred by denying her motion for judgment as a matter of law; and (3) whether the district court erred by denying her alternative motion for a new trial. We will begin by analyzing the evidentiary issue because it informs our analysis of the other issues.
Lambert argues that the district court erred by admitting into evidence Abid's and Anderson's testimony that they believed that black ice was on the road and caused the accident. More specifically, Lambert argues that Anderson's testimony and Abid's testimony concerning black ice lacked foundation because neither witness established that he had personal knowledge of the existence of black ice.
Minn. R. Evid. 602. As the comment to the rule explains, "Testimony simply is not relevant unless the witness testifies from firsthand knowledge." Minn. R. Evid. 602, 1977 comm. cmt. Lambert assumes that the testimony about black ice was lay opinion testimony, which is governed by a rule that states:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinion or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
Minn. R. Evid. 701. We apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to evidentiary rulings concerning foundation. Johnson v. Washington County, 518 N.W.2d 594, 601 (Minn. 1994).
In this case, Abid and Anderson testified based on their perceptions of how their respective vehicles reacted when they attempted to stop. Both witnesses believed that there was black ice on the roadway. Abid testified that his anti-lock braking system activated and that there "must have been" black ice on the road or he would have stopped before hitting Lambert's car. Anderson testified that his brakes did not slow his car at all and that his "assumption was there was black ice." Each witness's testimony is rationally based on his perception of the accident. This is the type of "personal knowledge" that is required to establish foundation under rule 602. Lambert contends that Abid's and Anderson's testimony is "based on speculation and conjecture" because neither driver inspected the road for black ice. But an inspection of that type is unnecessary to establish foundation because each witness had other bases for his belief that there was black ice on the road.
Lambert relies on Gerster v. Special Adm'r for Estate ofWedin, 294 Minn. 155, 199 N.W.2d 633 (1972), in which a fire marshal testified that an apartment fire probably was caused by careless cigarette smoking. Id. at 159, 199 N.W.2d at 635. The supreme courtheld that there was no foundation for the testimony because, first, the fire marshal was not present at the apartment when the fire started and, second, there was no evidence that cigarettes, remains of cigarettes, matches, or related objects were found in the apartment. Id. at 160, 199 N.W.2d at 636. The present case is distinguishable from Gerster because Abid and Anderson were present at the scene of the accident and involved in the accident.
Lambert cites additional cases in which testimony was held to be inadmissible due to a lack of personal knowledge. Each case, however, is distinguishable. In Bisbee v. Ruppert, 306 Minn. 39, 235 N.W.2d 364 (1975), the supreme court affirmed the district court's exclusion of the testimony of a witness who admitted that his view of an accident was obstructed. Id. at 43-44, 235 N.W.2d at 368. Similarly, in Holweger v. Great N. Ry. Co., 269 Minn. 83, 130 N.W.2d 354 (1964), the supreme court affirmed the district court's exclusion of testimony about the defective nature of a railroad part on the ground that the witness never had seen or operated the part or knew anything about the conditions present when the part failed. Id. at 95, 130 N.W.2d at 362. In both of these cases, the witness did not see the events about which he was called to testify or simply was not present. Those cases are different from the present cases because Abid and Anderson were at the accident scene. The other cases cited by Lambert are distinguishable for the same essential reason. See Muehlhauser v. Erickson, 621 N.W.2d 24, 28-29 (Minn. App. 2000) (); Dahlbeck v. DICO Co., 355 N.W.2d 157, 165-66 (Minn. App. 1984) (), review denied (Minn. Feb. 6, 1985); Koehnle v. M.W. Ettinger, Inc., 353 N.W.2d 612, 615 (Minn. App. 1984) (). Furthermore, the cases cited by Lambert arise from a different procedural posture; in each case, the trial court excluded the proffered testimony, and the appellate court affirmed. In this case, Lambert is seeking to reverse the district court's ruling admitting testimony.
Thus, the district court did not err by admitting Anderson's and Abid's testimony concerning their belief that black ice was on the surface of the road and caused the accident.
Lambert also argues that the district court erred by denying her post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 50.02.
Judgment as a...
To continue reading
Request your trial