Lambert v. Brewster
| Decision Date | 09 September 1924 |
| Docket Number | 5062. |
| Citation | 125 S.E. 244,97 W.Va. 124 |
| Parties | LAMBERT v. BREWSTER. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Submitted May 29, 1924.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 1, 1924.
Syllabus by the Court.
One who willfully commits a tort is liable for the natural consequences thereof, even though such consequences were not foreseen by him.
Where one by his wrongful and unlawful conduct causes nervous shock or fright to another, which is followed by physical ills as a natural sequence, he is liable in an action therefor, even though there was no physical impact between the body of the person injured and the wrongdoer, or any object set in motion by him.
Where defendant wrongfully and violently assaulted and beat plaintiff's father, in plaintiff's sight and hearing thereby causing her to be greatly frightened and as a consequence thereof she suffered a miscarriage defendant is liable to the plaintiff for all damages which can be directly traced to his wrongful conduct, even though he was not aware of her presence or her delicate condition.
Error to Circuit Court, McDowell County.
Action by Mrs. F. M. Lambert against T. J. Brewster. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed and rendered.
Crockett & Sanders, of Welch, for plaintiff in error.
Harman & Harman, of Welch, for defendant in error.
MEREDITH P.
Plaintiff seeks to reverse the judgment of the circuit court of McDowell county setting aside a verdict of $500 in plaintiff's favor. Her action is in trespass on the case, and in her declaration she alleges that, while she was in a state of pregnancy, on September 3, 1922, the defendant, in her sight, and knowing her condition, committed an unjustifiable and forcible assault on her (the plaintiff's) father. She alleges that her father was an elderly man weighing 155 pounds, and that defendant was a young man weighing 175 pounds, and that, by reason of the unjustified assault, during which defendant struck plaintiff's father many violent blows, plaintiff underwent such anguish and distress that she became very ill and disordered, and thereby suffered a miscarriage, for which she seeks compensation in damages.
The evidence leaves little doubt as to what actually occurred. Plaintiff and her husband lived on premises adjoining those of her father, Mr. Wingo, and defendant lived near by. Defendant had five children, and from his testimony it appears that Wingo or members of his family had undertaken to correct one or more of the children while they were playing near the Wingo residence. Defendant resented this interference, and on the evening of September 3, 1922, he called on Wingo to interpose his objections. Arriving at the gate, he called Wingo outside. That the conversation was in heated words, both admit. Receiving no satisfaction, defendant says he started to walk away, when Wingo came out of the gate cursing, whereupon defendant turned and struck him, he says, one time, knocking Wingo down. Wingo's son, Sherman, interfered on behalf of his father; but other persons stopped the encounter before serious harm was done. The testimony does not sustain plaintiff's averments as to the respective weights of her father and defendant. In answer to the question, "When did you knock him down?" defendant replied: "A little bit later, when he got cursing and abusing me." Wingo did not strike or strike at defendant, although defendant claims that Wingo was approaching him with some sort of menacing gestures. Defendant did not attempt, by instruction or otherwise, to introduce the element of self-defense into the case, or to justify his blow upon any other ground than that he was being cursed and abused. This of course does not justify an assault. Defendant's whole case here is that he is not liable for the injury suffered by plaintiff, of whose presence a short distance away and of whose delicate condition he was ignorant.
We see three points which merit discussion:
First. Was plaintiff's miscarriage and suffering the proximate result of defendant's assault upon Wingo?
Second. Does defendant's ignorance of plaintiff's presence and condition, if a fact, relieve him of responsibility for the injury suffered by her?
Third. Can defendant be liable for injuries suffered by plaintiff, which injuries are purely the result of the fright and nervous shock which she experienced?
First. It may be stated at once that, if the injury which plaintiff suffered was not proximately caused by defendant's wrongful act, there would of course be no liability. Plaintiff viewed the encounter from her door, at a perfectly safe distance, so far as danger from physical impact was concerned. At the sight of her father being knocked down she became weak and nervous, began to scream, and although she had previously felt well that day, she was compelled to go to bed at once, and between 9 and 10 o'clock p. m. suffered a miscarriage. She had been pregnant about two months. Defendant offers two explanations of this mishap: First, that she had suffered a miscarriage about a year before from which her organs had not fully recovered; and, second, that her excitement was caused, not by defendant's assault on her father, but by the action of her brother, Leo, in running in the house apparently in search of a gun wherewith to attack defendant.
Expert medical testimony was taken on the first question. By it the jury was probably convinced that, having suffered one miscarriage, a woman would be the more readily susceptible to another. As proof that plaintiff's illness on the present occasion was the result of her former miscarriage and not the result of her mental excitement, they were, as their verdict shows, not persuaded. As to her brother's intentions, she says she had an idea that he may have been in search of a gun; but that this was the moving cause of her injury the jury also refused to believe. Leo testifies that, as a matter of fact, his real purpose was to prevent his brother, Sherman, from securing the weapon.
That miscarriages may be and often are the result of nervous shock and mental disturbance there cannot be the slightest doubt. The jury in this case have charged plaintiff's suffering to defendant, whose wrongful assault upon Wingo they have found to be the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. In the light of the testimony we see no reason for holding otherwise.
Second. But defendant says he did not know of plaintiff's presence, and was not aware of her condition; that therefore he could not be responsible for injuries which he could not anticipate or foresee. It is a sufficient answer to this to say that, if defendant's wrongful act is the proximate cause of injury to plaintiff, of the character for which the law allows compensation, then the question whether defendant could or should have foreseen the result becomes immaterial. It is in this respect that damages arising from tort and from contract differ:
" " Washington, etc., Railway Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 120 Va. 620, 89 S.E. 131, 91 S.E. 646, quoting Sedgwick, Damages, § 141.
It seems that some would deny the right of recovery, where the plaintiff's condition at the time of the injury is abnormally delicate, as such susceptibility to injury cannot be reasonably anticipated. This, however, is not sound doctrine.
In Williamson v. Hines and other cases cited, the wrong of the defendant was actionable because of its negligent character; but the principle established would certainly not be less true where the act complained of is not mere negligence but a willful tort. That defendant could not foresee or anticipate plaintiff's injury, therefore, avails him nothing.
Third. We think it can be truly stated that defendant...
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