Lambert v. La Conner Trading & Transp. Co.

• Decision Date: 02 December 1902
• Citation: 70 P. 960,30 Wash. 346
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: LAMBERT v. LA CONNER TRADING & TRANSP. CO.*

70 P. 960

30 Wash. 346

LAMBERT v. LA CONNER TRADING & TRANSP. CO.*

Supreme Court of Washington

December 2, 1902

Appeal from superior court, King county; W. R. Bell, Judge.

Action by Joseph P. Lambert against La Conner Trading &amp Transportation Company. From a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

A. W Buddress, for appellant.

Ira Bronson, for respondent.

DUNBAR J.

The appellant (plaintiff) brought this action against the respondent to recover damages for personal injuries received by him while in the employ of the company, caused by the alleged negligence of the company in running its steamer into a drawbridge. The case was tried by a jury, and, upon the conclusion of plaintiff's testimony, the court, on motion of the defendant, granted a nonsuit on the ground that the testimony introduced by the plaintiff did not show negligence on the part of the defendant.

The cause was dismissed, and from said judgment of dismissal this appeal is taken.

This cause will have to be reversed in any event for the following error, which is assigned by the appellant: The appellant sought to prove by a witness that the master of the boat had made certain statements immediately after the accident occurred. Objection was made to this testimony which objection was sustained by the court. It is urged by the respondent that the question was not sufficiently limited as to time, and that it did not appear that it was at or immediately after the accident that the conversation sought to be elicited was indulged in. But we think the respondent is mistaken in this regard. On page 15 of the record appears the following question asked by appellant's counsel of the witness Lambert: 'Did you ever have any conversation with the master of this vessel, after the injury, in regard to this injury?' This question was probably objectionable, and was objected to by Mr. Bronson, counsel for respondent, in the following manner: 'If the court please, he has absolutely condemned his question now by placing a time limit. This master could not say anything after this injury took place which would in any way affect the defendant in this case. The master of a vessel, of course, is a man of very large powers, and can bind the owners to a very large extent, in given lines, under certain fixed rules. But he hasn't any authority to make statements and admissions after the transaction has occurred.' The Court: 'I sustain the objection.' Counsel for the appellant then sought to make the question more definite by asking the following: 'I want to ask you whether or not, immediately after the injury, the master saw you in regard to this injury?' Answer: 'Why, he saw me.' Question: 'Did he talk to you in regard to the injury?' This question also was objected to, on the ground that it was leading, and for the further reason that what the master might have talked with the witness about the injury--what he might have said about it--would not have any effect upon the trial of the cause. The Court: 'I think not. I don't think he could make any statement at all that would be binding upon his employers. I do not think that that was within the scope of a master's duties, to make a statement after an accident.' The appellant then took exceptions to the ruling of the court, and the...