Lambert v. Lambert
| Decision Date | 19 November 1918 |
| Citation | 104 A. 820 |
| Parties | LAMBERT v. LAMBERT. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Gift Causa Mortis; Testament]
Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Franklin County.
Action by Mertie A. Lambert against James M. Lambert, with an appeal by James M. Lambert from decree of judge of probate. In both cases the trial justice ruled against said James M. Lambert and he brings exceptions. Exceptions overruled.
Argued before CORNISH, C. J., and HANSON, PHILBROOK, DUNN, MORRILL, WILSON, and DEASY, JJ.
McGillicuddy & Morey, of Lewiston, for Mertie A. Lambert.
C. W. Blanchard, of Wilton, and J. B. Morrison, of Phillips, for James M. Lambert.
DEASY, J. One point only is presented by the exceptions in these cases, to wit: That under existing statutes gifts causa mortis are in this state invalid.
James M. Lambert is defendant in one case, and appellant in the other. For convenience we shall refer to him as the defendant.
Augusta E. Lambert, owning a promissory note of the defendant, indorsed and delivered it to Mertie A. Lambert as a gift causa mortis. Augusta E. Lambert afterward died testate, and Mertie A. Lambert was made executrix of her will. The executrix did not include the note in the inventory of the estate. Individually she brought suit upon it. Hence the two proceedings. In both the presiding justice ruled that "a gift causa mortis of personal property, as in this case, is a valid gift." To these rulings the defendant excepted.
The printed case does not show the relationship between the defendant and Augusta E. Lambert. Counsel for both parties, however, in their briefs assume that he is her surviving husband. If the defendant's contention is that gifts causa mortis are under all circumstances invalid, we perceive no reason and find no authority to sustain such proposition. There are, however, respectable authorities holding that gifts causa mortis, being in the nature of testaments, are invalid as to surviving husbands or wives. For the purpose of reaching and passing upon what we understand to be the real merits of the case, we shall assume that the defendant is the surviving husband of Augusta E. Lambert, and that the exceptions raise the question of the validity of such a gift as against him.
The defendant bases his claim upon chapter 160 of the Public Laws of 1903, as amended by chapter 260 of the Public Laws of 1909, and incorporated in the Revised Statutes of 1916 as section 14 of chapter 80.
One contention is that under the statute above cited a husband has an interest in the nature of a vested right in his wife's personal property, which he cannot be deprived of without his consent. Were this contention well founded, it would, of course, follow that a wife has a similar interest in her husband's personal property. This doctrine, if admitted, would invalidate, not only gifts causa mortis, but also gifts inter vivos, and sales by husbands or wives without consent of the other. But the statute neither creates nor recognizes such rights. It applies only to property left by a husband or wife at death. The statute refers only to "estate of such testator or testatrix." It does not relate to personal property which the decedent has parted with during life, either by gift or sale.
The defendant contends that a gift causa mortis is tantamount to a testamentary disposition, without the safeguards and formalities required...
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Staples v. King
...to defeat the claims of the spouse, as long as that depletion is accomplished through complete gifts. See, e. g., Lambert v. Lambert, 117 Me. 471, 104 A. 820 (1918). However, where the married person purports to transfer property out of his estate but in fact retains substantial control ove......
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