Lambert v. LQ Mgmt., L.L.C.
| Decision Date | 14 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 12-835,12-835 |
| Parties | JOHN R. LAMBERT, II PETITIONER v. LQ MANAGEMENT, L.L.C. RESPONDENT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
MANDATE
CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED
Proceedings of March 14, 2013
JOHN R. LAMBERT, II PETITIONER
v.
LQ MANAGEMENT, L.L.C. RESPONDENT
An Original Action from the
United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas
This certified question of law was submitted to the Arkansas Supreme Court as an original action petition from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, and on briefs of the respective parties. After due consideration, it is the decision of the Court that the certified question is answered for the reasons set out in the attached opinion.
Leslie W. Steen, Clerk, set my hand and affix the
seal this 2nd day of April, A.D. 2013.
______________________
Clerk
CERTIFIED QUESTION FROM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
This case involves a question of Arkansas law certified to this court by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas in accordance with Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8 (2012). On October 11, 2012, we accepted the certified question in Lambert v. LQ Management, L.L.C., 2012 Ark. 391 (per curiam). The certified question is as follows:
On November 1, 2011, Petitioner, John R. Lambert, II, filed a complaint against Respondent, LQ Management, L.L.C. ("LQ Management") in the Pulaski County Circuit Court alleging that he was terminated in retaliation for asserting his rights under the Arkansas workers' compensation statutes. Lambert sought to recover damages under Ark. Code Ann.§ 16-118-107 (Supp. 2011). On February 3, 2012, the case was removed to federal court. After removal, on February 10, 2012, LQ Management filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the claim for retaliation had been abolished under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-107 and therefore, Lambert failed to state a claim. Lambert responded that he was seeking relief allowed under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-118-107, the crime victims' civil-liability statute for felonious conduct. On September 17, 2012, both parties jointly requested that the present question be certified to this court. After we accepted the certified question, both parties filed briefs, and the Arkansas State Chamber of Commerce and Associated Industries of Arkansas, Inc. (as amici curiae) filed a brief as well.
The certified question presents an issue of statutory construction. The two statutes at issue are Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-107 under the "Workers' Compensation Act, and § 16-118-107.
. . .
(c) The employer may also be guilty of a Class D felony.
. . .
(e) A purpose of this section is to preserve the exclusive remedy doctrine andspecifically annul any case law inconsistent herewith, including, but not necessarily limited to: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Baysinger, 306 Ark. 239, 812 S.W.2d 463 (1991); Mapco, Inc. v. Payne, 306 Ark. 198, 812 S.W.2d 483 (1991); and Thomas v. Valmac Industries, Inc., 306 Ark. 228, 812 S.W.2d 673 (1991).
Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-107 (Repl. 2012).
Subsection (e) provides that the remedies for willful discrimination under the workers' compensation statutes are the exclusive remedy. See also Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-105 (a) Subsection (e) also explicitly annulled this court's case law permitting the additional recovery of damages by individuals on account of discriminatory treatment by the employer for filing a workers' compensation claim. Since § 11-9-107's enactment in 1993, no changes have been made to the statute.
. . . .
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-118-107 (Supp. 2011). Accordingly, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-28-101 et seq. (Supp. 2011) (Abuse of Adults Act) and Ark. Code Ann. § 5-55-101 (Supp. 2011) (Fraud Against Government Act) are specifically excepted from Ark. Code Ann. § 16-118-107.
Lambert contends that Ark. Code Ann. § 16-118-107 allows him independent relief separate from Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-107 and permits him to recover additional damages under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-118-107. Lambert asserts that by enacting Ark. Code Ann. § 16-118-107, the General Assembly provided additional remedies for willful violations of the workers' compensation laws because interference with the filing of a workers' compensation claim may constitute a Class D felony. As a result, he contends that the victims of a Class D felony arising from retaliation-related claims have the right to recover additional damages under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-118-107. Lambert further argues that in harmonizing the two statutes and reading the two together, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-107 provides that an employer's conduct "may be a felony," and Ark. Code Ann. § 16-118-107 allows for recovery of additional damages for such conduct. Finally, Lambert contends that this interpretation is clear because certain offenses are specifically excepted from suit under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-118-107, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-28-101 et. seq., and 5-55-101 et. seq.; but, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-107 was not listed as an exception. Lambert asserts that if the General Assembly had intended for Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-107 to be excepted from the recovery of additional damages under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-118-107, it would have expressly done so.
LQ Management responds that § 6 of Act 796 annulled the common-law-retaliation cause of action and reaffirms the exclusive-remedy doctrine. It further asserts that the Act provides two remedies: to treat the retaliation as a crime, and to provide an administrative procedure where the employer could be fined. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-107(a)(1) & (c) (Repl. 2012). However, LQ Management explains that these remedies under the Act areexclusive and that there are no additional remedies available. It further argues that the language of Ark. Code Ann. § 16-118-107 does not repeal or modify the exclusive-remedy doctrine or otherwise reinstate the common-law action of retaliation. LQ Management contends that the statutes address different subject matters and are not similar or related and cannot be harmonized. Finally, LQ Management responds that an "additional remedy" under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-118-107 cannot be harmonized with an exclusive remedy under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-107 because the General Assembly intended for the Workers' Compensation Act to be an exclusive-remedy act.
In reviewing these statutes, the basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature by giving words their usual and ordinary meaning. Ark. Soil & Water Conservation Comm'n v. City of Bentonville, 351 Ark. 289, 92 S.W.3d 47 (2002). Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Richard's Honda Yamaha, 344 Ark. 44, 52, 38 S.W.3d 356, 360 (2001). This court is very hesitant to interpret a legislative act in a manner contrary to its express language, unless it is clear that a drafting error or omission has circumvented legislative intent. Id., 38 S.W.3d 356, 360 (2001). Further, we must give effect to the specific statute over the general. Searcy Farm Supply, LLC v. Merchants & Planters Bank, 369 Ark. 487, 256 S.W.3d 496 (2007). "This court has long held that a general statute must yield to a specific statute involving a particular subject matter." Comcast of Little Rock, Inc. v.Bradshaw, 2011 Ark. 431, at 9, 385 S.W.3d 137, 142-43.
Additionally, we have outlined our statutory-construction rules regarding repeal by implication on numerous occasions. "A statute of a general nature does not repeal a more specific statute unless there is a plain, irreconcilable conflict between the two." Winston v. Robinson, 270 Ark. 996, 1001, 606 S.W.2d 757, 765 (1980). Repeal by implication is recognized in only two situations: (1) where the statutes are in irreconcilable conflict, and (2) where the legislature takes up the whole subject anew, covering the entire subject matter of the earlier statute and adding provisions clearly showing that it was intended as a...
To continue reading
Request your trial