Comcast of Little Rock, Inc. v. Bradshaw

• Decision Date: 13 October 2011
• Docket Number: No. 11–277.,11–277.
• Citation: 2011 Ark. 431,385 S.W.3d 137
• Parties: COMCAST OF LITTLE ROCK, INC., Appellant v. Sarah M. BRADSHAW, in her Official Capacity as the Director of the Tax Division of the Arkansas Public Service Commission; Arkansas Public Service Commission; Debra Buckner, in her Official Capacity as the County Treasurer of Pulaski County, Arkansas; Janet Troutman Ward, in her Official Capacity as the County Assessor of Pulaski County, Arkansas; Pulaski County, Arkansas; Rob McGill, acting Superintendent of the Pulaski County Special School District; Pulaski County Special School District; Gary Fletcher, Mayor, City of Jacksonville, Arkansas; and City of Jacksonville, Arkansas, Appellees.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

2011 Ark. 431

385 S.W.3d 137

COMCAST OF LITTLE ROCK, INC., Appellant

v.Sarah M. BRADSHAW, in her Official Capacity as the Director of the Tax Division of the Arkansas Public Service Commission; Arkansas Public Service Commission; Debra Buckner, in her Official Capacity as the County Treasurer of Pulaski County, Arkansas; Janet Troutman Ward, in her Official Capacity as the County Assessor of Pulaski County, Arkansas; Pulaski County, Arkansas; Rob McGill, acting Superintendent of the Pulaski County Special School District; Pulaski County Special School District; Gary Fletcher, Mayor, City of Jacksonville, Arkansas; and City of Jacksonville, Arkansas, Appellees.

No. 11–277.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Oct. 13, 2011.

Hatfield & Sayre, by: Eugene G. Sayre and Christopher D. Brockett, Little Rock, for appellant.

Kevin M. Lemley and Dallas W. Heltz, Little Rock, for appellees Arkansas Public Service Commission and Sarah M. Bradshaw.

Karla Burnett and Amanda M. Mitchell, Little Rock, for appellees Janet Troutman Ward, Debra Buckner, and Pulaski County, Arkansas.

Bequette and Billingsley, P.A., by: Keith Billingsley and Jay Bequette, for appellees Rob McGill and Pulaski County School District.

Robert E. Bamburg, Jacksonville, for appellees Gary Fletcher and City of Jacksonville, Arkansas.

PAUL E. DANIELSON, Justice.

Appellant Comcast of Little Rock, Inc., appeals from the circuit court's order granting the motions to dismiss Comcast's amended complaint by appellees Sarah M. Bradshaw, in her official capacity as the Director of the Tax Division of the Arkansas Public Service Commission; the Arkansas Public Service Commission (“the Commission”); Debra Buckner, in her officialcapacity as the County Treasurer of Pulaski County, Arkansas; Janet Troutman Ward, in her official capacity as the County Assessor of Pulaski County, Arkansas; Pulaski County, Arkansas; Rob McGill, Acting Superintendent of the Pulaski County Special School District; the Pulaski County Special School District (“PCSSD”); Gary Fletcher, Mayor, City of Jacksonville; and the City of Jacksonville, Arkansas (collectively, “the Appellees”). Comcast asserts the following points on appeal: (1) that the circuit court erred in dismissing its claim for a refund of taxes, pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated § 26–35–901 (Supp.2009), as it constituted a separate cause of action over which the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction; (2) that the circuit court erred in dismissing its illegal-exaction claim, as it too constituted a separate cause of action; and (3) that res judicata did not serve to bar either cause of action. We affirm the circuit court's order.

The relevant facts are these. In 2006, Comcast, a cable-television-services provider, filed a petition for review with the Commission to review Comcast's 2006 ad valorem tax assessment.¹ In its petition, Comcast asserted that the Commission's Tax Division erroneously included the value of Comcast's intangible personal property when it calculated Comcast's ad valorem tax base. Comcast claimed that Ark.Code Ann. § 26–3–302 (Repl.1997) precluded the Tax Division from doing so; however, the Commission's administrative law judge (ALJ) disagreed and concluded that Comcast's 2006 assessment was proper. Comcast applied for rehearing, and the Commission affirmed the ALJ's disposal of Comcast's petition for review. While Comcast filed a notice of appeal from the Commission's decision, the Commission determined that the notice of appeal was untimely and directed its secretary not to lodge the record with the circuit court.

Comcast subsequently filed a petition for review of its 2007 ad valorem tax assessment with the Commission, asserting that the assessment again improperly included the value of Comcast's intangible personal property in contravention of Ark.Code Ann. § 26–3–302. Similarly, it also petitioned for review of its 2008 ad valorem tax assessment on the same basis. The two dockets were consolidated, and following consolidation, the ALJ entered its order dismissing Comcast's petitions with prejudice, finding that they were barred and precluded from consideration by res judicata in light of the Commission's decision in Comcast's challenge to its 2006 assessment. Comcast filed a notice of appeal with the Commission; however, it admittedly abandoned its appeal efforts from these administrative proceedings.

The instant appeal, though, stems from more recent events. On September 18, 2009, Comcast filed a complaint for refund of taxes in the County Court of Pulaski County. In it, Comcast asserted that it was entitled to a refund of taxes erroneously assessed against it. Specifically, Comcast sought a refund pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 26–35–901 and asserted a claim of illegal exaction based on article 16, § 13 of the Arkansas Constitution.

In its complaint, Comcast asserted that the Commission's Tax Division erroneously included the value of Comcast's intangible personal property when calculating its assessments for the years 2005–08.² It maintained that the Tax Division's assessment determination was in direct contravention of Ark.Code Ann. § 26–3–302, which it claimed exempted intangible personal property from ad valorem taxation. Comcast sought four forms of relief: (1) a correction of the “actual and obvious errors” in the assessment determinations and recordation of assessed values; (2) a refund of the taxes erroneously paid for 2005–08; (3) a determination that the assessments constituted illegal exactions, a refund of the illegal portions of tax, and issuance of an injunction to Pulaski County to refuse to record any similar assessments; and (4) an injunction against the Commission's Tax Division prohibiting it from violating section 26–3–302.

Appellees Buckner, Ward, and Pulaski County filed a motion to dismiss, which was joined by the PCSSD, and Fletcher and the City of Jacksonville. In the motion, they asserted that the county court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, contending that section 26–35–901 pertained to real and personal property that had been erroneously assessed, not a challenge to the determination by the Commission of Comcast's assessed property value. The motion contended that Comcast's remedy was a petition for review to the Commission, whose decision could then be appealed to circuit court, pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 26–26–1610 (Supp.2009). They further maintained that Comcast's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, as it was the Commission's duty to assess Comcast's property, and neither the assessor nor the county court had the authority to change that assessment. The county court agreed that it lacked jurisdiction in the matter, and it granted the motion to dismiss.

Pursuant to Arkansas District Court Rule 9, Comcast appealed the county court's order to circuit court, and it filed its complaint for refund of taxes in Pulaski County Circuit Court, amending the complaint to include appellees Sarah Bradshaw and the Commission and asserting the four claims for relief raised to the county court.³ It later filed a first amended complaint for refund of taxes, wherein it asserted these same claims.

On June 14, 2010, appellees Bradshaw and the Commission filed a motion to dismiss Comcast's amended complaint, asserting that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, res judicata, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. They maintained that the Tax Division of the Commission had exclusive authority to assess the ad valorem property of cable companies, such as Comcast, and that pursuant to statute, Comcast had already challenged the Division's assessments by way of petitions for review, which were decided adversely to Comcast. They further asserted that res judicata precluded Comcast from now collaterally attacking the Commission's administrative decisions, and that Comcast's claims were further barred by laches, limitations, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Likewise, appellees Ward, Buckner, and Pulaski County filed a motion to dismiss Comcast's first amended complaint, wherein they also asserted that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and that Comcast's complaint failed to state facts upon which relief could be granted. AppelleesMcGill and the PCSSD moved to adopt the Commission's motion to dismiss, and appellees Fletcher and the City of Jacksonville moved to adopt the Pulaski County defendants' motion to dismiss.

Comcast responded to both motions to dismiss opposing them, and on November 1, 2010, the circuit court held a hearing on the motions to dismiss. After hearing the arguments of counsel, the circuit court ruled orally from the bench, granting the motions to dismiss. A subsequent hearing was held to clarify the circuit court's ruling prior to issuance of the order, at which the circuit court made clear its ruling that jurisdiction of the matter lay in the Commission. In its order, the circuit court granted the motions to dismiss and dismissed all of Comcast's claims with prejudice.⁴ Comcast now appeals.

As an initial matter, we must determine the appropriate standard of review. While the circuit court granted the Appellees' motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the circuit court's order reflected that the circuit court considered “the pleadings, motions and all exhibits thereto” and “heard the arguments of counsel.” It is well settled that when a circuit court considers matters outside the pleadings, the appellate court will treat a motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment. See Koch v. Adams, 2010 Ark. 131, 361 S.W.3d 817. Ordinarily, upon reviewing a court's decision on a summary-judgment motion, we would examine the record to determine if genuine issues of material fact exist. See Travis Lumber Co. v. Deichman, 2009 Ark. 299, 319 S.W.3d 239. However, in a case such as this one, which does not involve the question of whether factual issues exist but...