Lambert v. Saul

• Decision Date: 17 November 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-17102,19-17102
• Citation: 980 F.3d 1266
• Parties: Karen Lynette LAMBERT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Andrew M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

980 F.3d 1266

Karen Lynette LAMBERT, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Andrew M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 19-17102

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted August 12, 2020 San Francisco, California

Filed November 17, 2020

John V. Johnson (argued), Chico, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Shea L. Bond (argued) and Allison J. Cheung, Special Assistant United States Attorneys; Deborah Lee Stachel, Regional Chief Counsel; McGregor W. Scott, United States Attorney; Social Security Administration, San Francisco, California; for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: Susan P. Graber and Daniel A. Bress, Circuit Judges, and Robert T. Dawson,^* District Judge.

BRESS, Circuit Judge:

We address in this case a question that has caused confusion in our Social Security disability benefits cases: whether a claimant's prior disability determination entitles her to a presumption of continuing disability. We recognized such a presumption in Patti v. Schweiker , 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982), and applied it most relevantly in Bellamy v. Secretary of Health & Human Services , 755 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1985). After Bellamy , however, the Social Security Administration (SSA) interpreted then-recent amendments to the Social Security Act as foreclosing any presumption of continuing disability.

We conclude that we must defer to the SSA's intervening interpretation of the statute, which is a reasonable one. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs. , 545 U.S. 967, 125 S.Ct. 2688, 162 L.Ed.2d 820 (2005) ; Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council , 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). We therefore hold that there is no presumption of continuing disability under the Social Security Act. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) thus did not err in evaluating, without any such presumption, the SSA's determination that claimant Karen Lambert is no longer disabled.

The ALJ did err, however, in failing to articulate sufficient reasons for refusing to credit Lambert's testimony about the severity of her medical condition. Under our cases, the ALJ must identify the specific testimony that he discredited and explain the evidence undermining it. Here, the ALJ did neither. We therefore vacate the district court's judgment and remand with instructions to return this case to the ALJ for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I

Karen Lambert, now age 54, was employed as a deli clerk and overnight retail stocker until 2005, when she developed pain related to rheumatoid arthritis

. The pain prevented her from working. Lambert applied for Disability Insurance Benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. , and Supplemental Social Security Income, 42 U.S.C. § 1382, et seq. , and an ALJ found her disabled beginning June 1, 2005.

The Commissioner of the SSA must conduct periodic continuing disability reviews of persons who receive disability benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 421(i) ; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1590. As part of such a continuing review, the Commissioner, on January 6, 2015, determined that Lambert's disability had ended January 1, 2015. Lambert sought reconsideration before a disability hearing officer, who denied reconsideration. Lambert then requested a hearing before an ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.929.

At her hearing, Lambert testified that she continues to suffer from rheumatoid arthritis

, in addition to a thyroid condition, vision problems, anxiety, and depression. She also has a bone spur in her foot, pain in her Achilles tendon, and five bulging discs in her neck and back, which make it difficult for her to walk and stand. Despite the many medications she takes, Lambert stated that her pain is debilitating. She asserted that she spends most of her time in her bedroom "because it's unbearable to move."

Lambert provided examples about how her medical conditions affect her daily life. She cannot lift most items or complete certain household chores. She sometimes relies on her daughter to help her with personal care tasks, including bathing and dressing. She requires crutches to get to the bathroom but has trouble using them. She drives only short distances because her knees become stiff and painful after long periods of sitting. Because of these limitations, Lambert testified she would not be able to perform any job that required standing for extended periods, frequent fingering and handling of objects, or working in "overwhelm[ing]" situations.

Lambert also submitted medical evidence from her treating physicians. Several of her doctors found that her rheumatoid arthritis

was stable and that her joints showed reasonable ranges of motion and minimal inflammation. But doctors also noted that Lambert reported continued pain and stiffness and displayed difficulty grasping objects. Lambert saw two podiatrists for her heel pain, and a later x-ray revealed mild thickening of the soft tissue in that area. At the recommendation of one podiatrist, Lambert underwent a surgical debridement of her Achilles tendon to remove a bone spur. Lambert also saw a pain management specialist who administered epidural steroid injections in her back, which were moderately successful in managing her disc-related pain.

Finally, the ALJ received reports from several State agency physicians on behalf of the SSA. These consultants offered opinions that differed from Lambert's self-assessment. The consultants opined that Lambert was capable of working, including work that was somewhat strenuous in nature. Dr. Sarupinder Bhangoo, who examined Lambert in October 2014, reported that Lambert "move[d] around well" and "d[id] not seem to be in pain." He concluded that Lambert could walk up to six hours, sit up to eight hours, and carry up to fifty pounds. Two other doctors reviewed Lambert's file and agreed with Dr. Bhangoo's conclusions, though they did not actually examine Lambert.

The ALJ issued his decision on August 7, 2017, without applying a presumption of continuing disability. The ALJ found that Lambert's current impairments consisted of rheumatoid arthritis

, bilateral calcaneal spurs, right Achilles tendinopathy, and degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine and lumbar spine. The ALJ concluded that Lambert was not able to perform her prior work. But notwithstanding Lambert's impairments, the ALJ determined that Lambert could perform modified "light work," which includes lifting up to twenty pounds, a "good deal of walking and standing," and "pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls." See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).

The ALJ noted that, in reaching this conclusion, he gave the SSA's medical consultants "little weight." Dr. Bhangoo "did not have the benefit of reviewing the other medical reports contained in the current record," and his opinion was "not consistent with the record in its entirety." The ALJ also gave "little weight" to the opinions of the two other consultants. These doctors did not personally examine Lambert, and their opinions were also "not consistent with the record as a whole."

Although the ALJ found the SSA's medical experts largely unpersuasive, he declined to credit Lambert's testimony either. According to the ALJ:

After considering the evidence of record, I find that the claimant's current medically determinable impairment could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the objective medical and other evidence for the reasons explained in this decision. Accordingly, these statements have been found to affect the claimant's ability to work only to the extent they can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical and other evidence.

The ALJ determined that Lambert's testimony was "less than fully consistent with the evidence" for four reasons. First, Lambert had "not generally received the type of medical treatment one would expect for a totally disabled individual." Second, the "record reflect[ed] significant gaps in [her] history of treatment and relatively infrequent trips to the doctor for the allegedly disabling symptoms." Third, Lambert's "use of medications does not suggest the presence of impairments which is more limiting than found in this decision." And finally, "medications have been relatively effective in controlling [her] symptoms."

Lambert requested review of the ALJ's decision, but the SSA's Appeals Council denied her request. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.967. Lambert then filed an action in federal court challenging the denial of benefits. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c). The district court granted summary judgment for the Commissioner. This appeal followed. We "review the district court's order affirming the ALJ's denial of social security benefits de novo and will disturb the denial of benefits only if the decision contains legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence." Tommasetti v. Astrue , 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation and quotations omitted).

II

We first address the purely legal question whether the ALJ erred in not applying a presumption of continuing disability because of Lambert's earlier, 2005 disability determination. We hold that the ALJ did not err. The SSA has interpreted later amendments to the Social Security Act to preclude such a presumption, and that reasonable interpretation warrants our deference.

A

When a claimant was previously found to be disabled and the SSA is conducting a continuing disability review, is the claimant entitled to any presumption that her disability still persists? Our cases point in different directions.

In Patti v. Schweiker , 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982), a claimant received disability benefits but the SSA determined that her disability had resolved. We used the occasion to announce a presumption of continuing disability, holding that "a prior ruling of disability can give rise to a presumption that the disability still exists." Id. at 586. We explained that we wer...