Lamberton v. Grant

• Decision Date: 07 January 1901
• Parties: LAMBERTON v. GRANT.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

48 A. 127

94 Me. 508

LAMBERTON

v. GRANT.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Jan. 7, 1901.

(Official.)

Report from supreme judicial court, Kennebec county.

Action by Henry W. Lamberton against William S. Grant. Case reported, and judgment for defendant.

Argued before WISWELL, C. J., and WHITEHOUSE, STROUT, SAVAGE, and POWERS, JJ.

Geo. W. Heselton, for plaintiff.

H. M. Heath and C. L. Andrews, for defendant.

WHITEHOUSE, J. This is an action of debt on a judgment for $9,338.85 rendered by the district court of Minnesota November 10, 1877. The cause of action on which the judgment was rendered accrued September 1, 1873, through a guaranty by the defendant of certain promissory notes dated, respectively, June 30 and July 17, 1871. The plaintiff is a resident of Minnesota, and the defendant a resident of Farmingdale, in the state of Maine. The writ in this case is dated January 28, 1899.

It appears that no part of this judgment has ever been paid. Section 1 of article 4 of the constitution of the United States provides that "full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state"; and the act of congress passed May 26, 1790, after providing the mode of authentication, declares that "the said records and judicial proceedings, authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be taken." By this law the judgment of the court "is made a debt of record, not examinable upon its merits; but it does not carry with it into another state the efficacy of a judgment upon property or persons, to be enforced by execution. To give it the force of a judgment in another state, it must be made a judgment there, and can only be executed in the latter as its laws may permit. * * * It is therefore put upon the footing of a domestic judgment, by which is meant, not having the operation and force of a domestic judgment but a domestic judgment as to the merits of the case, or subject-matter of the suit." McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet 312, 10 L. Ed. 177.

In the case at bar, however, no question is made respecting the validity of the judgment in suit at the time it was rendered by the court of Minnesota. The defendant was a resident of that state at the time of the commencement of the action in which this judgment was rendered, and duly ap_: peared by counsel and answered to the suit. There is no suggestion and nothing upon the face of the record to show that the district court of Minnesota did not have jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the suit, as well as of the parties thereto. Its adjudication, therefore, established the relation of debtor and creditor between the parties, and determined the amount of the indebtedness as a matter of record. It was a final and conclusive Judgment between them.

But the defendant pleads nul tiel record, and, in accordance with the specification set out in his brief statement, contends that under a statute of Minnesota, which is printed as a part of the record in the case, the judgment in suit survived for a period of 10 years, and no longer, and that it accordingly ceased to exist as a judgment on the 10th day of November, 1887.

Section 254 of title 21 of chapter 66 of the General Statutes of Minnesota for 1866, as amended by chapter 67 of the Session Laws of 1870, is as follows: "On filing a judgment roll, upon a judgment requiring the payment of money, the judgment shall be docketed by the clerk of the court in which it was rendered, and in any other county, upon filing in the office of the clerk of the district court of such county, a transcript of the original docket; and thereupon the Judgment from the time of docketing the same, becomes a lien on all the real property of the debtor in the county, owned by him at the time of the docketing of the judgment, or afterward acquired; said judgment shall survive, and the Hen thereof continue, for the period of ten years and no longer."

In this amended form, the statute has been in force as the law of Minnesota since Febrdary 12, 1870. In the General Statutes of 1878 it appears as section 277 of chapter 66. It is shown by the transcript of the record introduced in evidence that the judgment in suit was one for the payment of money, and that it was filed and docketed November 10, 1877. It is, therefore, confidently claimed in behalf of the defendant that the rights of the parties to this suit must be determined by the provisions of this statute, and that according to its plain and unambiguous terms the judgment in suit has been extinct more than 11 years prior to the commencement of this action. It could "survive for the period of ten years, and no longer," from November 10, 1877.

In the interpretation of a statute, recourse is properly had to the decisions of the courts which have placed a construction upon it in the state in which it was enacted; such decisions being deemed essentially a part of the law itself. So, in determining what scope and effect shall be given to the statute above quoted, recourse is necessarily had to the official opinions of the supreme court of Minnesota. It is contended by the defendant that the construction given to the statute by that court is in harmony with his contention that the judgment declared upon was not in existence at the date of the plaintiff's writ.

In Newell v. Dart, 28 Minn. 248, 9 N. W. 732, decided August 5, 1881, the judgment was rendered, filed, and docketed June 23, 1870; and on the 21st day of September, 1878, the plaintiff brought a creditors' bill, asking that certain property belonging to the defendant, on which he had no statutory lien, might be applied in part satisfaction of his judgment. October 8, 1880, the district court rendered its decision for the defendant, holding that the judgment ceased to exist June 23, 1880, during the pendency of the plaintiff's bill. On appeal the decision of the district court was affirmed by the supreme court. In the opinion the court say: "The plaintiff's right to the relief sought depends entirely upon the existence of his judgment * * * If the plaintiff's judgment is dead, his whole case falls to the ground. It is provided by statute that a 'judgment shall survive, and the lien thereon continue, for a period of ten years and no longer.' Gen. St. 1878, c. 66, § 277. In the present case this period expired June 23, 1880, and during the pendency of this action. Hence, before the final trial and decision of this case, and before judgment rendered thereon, plaintiff's judgment had ceased to exist either as a cause of action or a lien, unless kept alive by the commencement and pendency of this action beyond the statutory period of ten years. * * * We do not think the pendency of this action had any such effect. * * * We are, therefore, of opinion that plaintiff's judgment became barred and ceased to exist, either as a cause of action or as a lien, during the pendency of this action." This decision was rendered by a unanimous court, and stands unreversed.

In Dole v. Wilson, 39 Minn. 330, 40 N. W. 161, a judgment was recovered against the defendant in the district court for $10,000 in October, 1876. On appeal this judgment was affirmed by the supreme court in October, 1877, and a second judgment for $31 costs was rendered against him. By reason of the false representations of the defendant in regard to his financial condition, the plaintiff refrained from taking any measures to enforce these judgments until October, 1887, more than 10 years after the recovery of the judgment in the district court. He then brought this bill in equity to reach property alleged to have been conveyed by the defendant to his wife in fraud of creditors. In refusing to grant the relief thus sought, the court say: "This action was commenced in October, 1887, more than ten years after the recovery of the plaintiff's judgment in the district court, but a little less than ten years after his judgment for costs in this court. The plaintiff is seeking through the equitable jurisdiction of the court to have this land appropriated to the satisfaction of his judgment after the judgment itself has expired by lapse of time. Equity will regard the statutory limitation upon the life and enforceability, and will not interfere to enforce its satisfaction by means of its peculiar remedies, * * * if by the plaintiff's own neglect the judgment has been suffered to remain unsatisfied until it ceased to exist as a legal obligation.

"As respects the judgment for costs in this court, the result is the same. That judgment was still in force when this action was commenced, but it had expired before the cause was brought to bearing in the district court. It was held in Newell v. Dart, 28 Minn.' 248, 9 N. W. 732, that a judgment is not kept alive by the pendency of an equitable action to enforce satisfaction, and that the expiration of the judgment pending such an action terminates the right of action. As respects the alleged fraudulent conveyance of the defendant what has been said above is applicable to both judgments alike. But, as this latter judgment was still a valid obligation when this action was commenced, we see no reason why, upon the facts alleged, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover a renewed money judgment against the judgment debtor."

In Spencer v. Haug, 45 Minn. 231, 47 N. W. 794, decided January 13, 1891, the defendant claimed title to the land in dispute under a sale made May 20, 1872, on an execution issued on a judgment rendered and docketed May 19, 1862. The principal question presented was whether the execution sale took place during the life of the judgment. In the opinion the court say: "It was settled by Newell v. Dart, 28 Minn. 248, 9 N. W. 732, that the sale on execution must be made within the life of the judgment. The case is, therefore,...