Lambing v. Board of County Commissioners of Twin Falls County

• Citation: 263 P. 992,45 Idaho 468
• Decision Date: 03 January 1928
• Docket Number: 4816
• Parties: WILLIAM LAMBING, Respondent, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF TWIN FALLS COUNTY, Respondents; D. L. ALEXANDER et al., Intervenors and Appellants
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

263 P. 992

45 Idaho 468

WILLIAM LAMBING, Respondent, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF TWIN FALLS COUNTY, Respondents;

D. L. ALEXANDER et al., Intervenors and Appellants

No. 4816

Supreme Court of Idaho

January 3, 1928

COUNTY HOSPITALS-CONTROL. Laws 1921, chap. 141, invests county commissioners with sole authority to control county hospitals.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District for Twin Falls County. Hon. William A. Babcock, Judge.

Appeal from order of county commissioners. Judgment for plaintiff. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed. Costs awarded to respondents. Petition for rehearing denied.

Bothwell & Chapman, for Appellants.

The board of county commissioners are empowered to make suitable rules and regulations for the management and operation of the Twin Falls County General Hospital. (1921 Sess. Laws, chap 141.)

A hospital may provide reasonable rules concerning the qualifications of physicians allowed to practice in the hospital and may refuse to permit physicians professing a certain system of healing to practice in the hospital. (30 C J. 463, sec. 7; Harris v. Thomas (Tex. Civ. App.), 217 S.W. 1068; Van Campen v. Olean General Hospital, 210 A.D. 204, 205 N.Y.S. 554; State ex rel. Wolf v. La Crosse Lutheran Hospital Assn., 181 Wis. 33, 193 N.W. 994.)

The reasonableness of a regulation of the kind involved herein is a question of law. (People v. Manhattan State Hospital, 5 A.D. 249, 39 N.Y.S. 158; 30 C. J. 464.)

In considering the reasonableness of an order made by the board of county commissioners, of which it had jurisdiction and was empowered by law to make, the district court and the supreme court may only determine whether the board abused its discretion in making the order. (Criddle v. Board of Commrs., 42 Idaho 811, 248 P. 465; Etter v. Board of Co. Commrs., 44 Idaho 192, 255 P. 1095; Sullivan v. Board of County Commrs., 22 Idaho 202, 125 P. 191.)

E. M. Wolfe, for Respondent Lambing, cites no authorities on points decided.

GIVENS, J. Wm. E. Lee, C. J., and Taylor and T. Bailey Lee, JJ., concur.

OPINION

GIVENS, J.

The board of county commissioners of Twin Falls county on December 27, 1924, adopted a resolution providing that Twin Falls County General Hospital should be standardized in accordance with the minimum requirements for standardization of the American College of Surgeons. The Twin Falls County Medical Association was requested to form a staff and make the necessary changes required for standardization. Pursuant to the authority granted by this order of the commissioners, resolutions were adopted by an executive committee of the Medical Association, and approved by the board of commissioners, which, in effect, restricted the membership on the hospital staff to the "regular" school of physicians and surgeons and excluded the so-called "irregulars," chiefly the osteopaths and chiropractors.

William Lambing, one of the respondents herein, appealed from the order of the commissioners to the district court, alleging that it resulted in unlawful discrimination among the various schools of licensed practitioners, and further that it would entail greater expense for maintaining the hospital.

D. L. Alexander and the other "regular" practitioners on the staff of the hospital filed a petition in intervention.

Several days before the case came on to be heard, the board of county commissioners adopted a resolution rescinding the order of December 27, 1924. This second resolution had the effect of removing the restrictions as to other than the so-called "regular" practitioners, theretofore affected by the first order or resolution.

When the case was called for trial, counsel for respondent Lambing (plaintiff below) moved that it be dismissed on the ground that the order appealed from had been set aside and there was therefore nothing before the court to consider. This motion was denied. It appeared in the argument that the members of the staff of the hospital who had intervened in the appeal from the first...