LaMothe v. LeBlanc

Decision Date15 March 2013
Docket NumberNo. 11–292.,11–292.
Citation2013 VT 21,70 A.3d 977
CourtVermont Supreme Court
PartiesChristine LaMOTHE v. Christopher LeBLANC.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Priscilla B. Dubé and Adam P. Bergeron of Bergeron, Paradis & Fitzpatrick, LLP, Burlington, for PlaintiffAppellee.

Christopher L. LeBlanc, Pro Se, Williston, DefendantAppellant.

Present: REIBER, C.J., DOOLEY, SKOGLUND, BURGESS and ROBINSON, JJ.

ROBINSON, J.

¶ 1. Father appeals an order of the superior court's family division upholding the magistrate's denial of his motion to modify his child support obligation. In particular, father argues that the magistrate erred in declining to impute income to mother, and that the magistrate failed to properly apply a credit in his favor to account for derivative benefits paid directly to mother on behalf of the minor child by the Social Security Administration on account of father's disability. We reverse.

¶ 2. Father and mother are the parents of a minor child born in January 2000. In 2006, by stipulation of the parties in this parentage action, the family court assigned physical rights and responsibilities to mother, who had been the sole custodial parent prior to that stipulation, and increased father's parent-child contact to include every other Tuesday to Monday during the school year. During the summer, the minor child was to spend fifty percent of his time with each parent. Because the new order contemplated that the minor child would spend well over thirty percent of nights with father, the parties stipulated to a new child support order pursuant to the shared custody guidelines. The child support order obligated father to pay $175 per month, and obligated the parties to split equally all unreimbursed health-related expenses, including dental.

¶ 3. In November 2008, because father was unable to work due to severe injuries he suffered in a motor vehicle accident, the family court issued a modified child support order that did not require either party to pay child support. The order reflected that upon father's return to full-time employment, child support payments, calculated pursuant to the guidelines, would resume. The parties remained obligated pursuant to that order to split unreimbursed health-related expenses equally.

¶ 4. In December 2010, father filed a pro se motion to modify child support by establishing an order requiring mother to pay him child support. Father represented that he had begun receiving Social Security Disability (SSDI) benefits, and that the minor child had begun receiving derivative benefits on account of father's disability. In his motion, father raised three issues. First, he represented that the Social Security Administration (SSA) was sending the $190/month derivative benefit for the minor child directly to mother, and he essentially argued that he should receive some benefit in the determination of his child support obligation on account of that payment. Second, he explained that the SSA mailed the initial derivative benefit check for the minor child, which included accumulated benefits in the amount of $4370, to mother; he argued that this lump sum payment should be credited toward his share of the $5780 uninsured dental bill for the minor child's braces. Third, he asked the magistrate to take mother's voluntary underemployment into account in fashioning a new child support order.

¶ 5. In a March 2011 order, the magistrate denied father's motion. With respect to the monthly child support obligation, the magistrate made the following relevant findings: (1) The parties shared physical rights and responsibilities for the minor child based upon an approximate overnight schedule of fifty-three percent with mother and forty-seven percent with father; 1 (2) father received $1035 per month in direct SSDI benefits; (3) in addition to the minor child that is the subject of this parentage action, father has two other minor children; (4) mother resides with two other minor children in addition to the minor child that is the subject of this parentage action; (5) mother collected $1026 in monthly unemployment benefits, earned approximately sixty dollars per week tending bar, and received $700 per month in child support on account of her other two children; (6) the $190 monthly derivative SSDI benefit for the minor child on account of father's disability was paid directly from the SSA to mother on account of her status as the primary custodial parent.2 None of these facts are in dispute.

¶ 6. The magistrate did not impute additional income to mother, and did not make any findings relating to this determination.

¶ 7. The magistrate noted that father operated a business that had generated more than $50,000 in gross receipts in 2008 and 2009, but with respect to which father's tax return showed a net loss in each year. The court stated that it assumed that father did not continue to operate that business without some financial benefit, despite the losses reflected on paper, but did not make any finding that the business generated income to father, and did not impute any additional income to father on account of this business.

¶ 8. Recognizing that the court was powerless to order SSA to divide the derivative benefit between the parents or send it to father rather than mother, the magistrate explained that this Court's decision in Cantin v. Young, 171 Vt. 659, 662, 770 A.2d 449, 452 (2000) (mem.), provided the framework for considering the derivative payment in the child-support-guidelines calculation: first, the court would consider the derivative benefit as income to father; then it would treat the benefit as a child support payment from father to mother. Purportedly applying this methodology, the magistrate concluded that a guidelines calculation “would result in a nominal obligation from father to mother after including the derivative benefit.” Given the nominal obligation, the trial court opted to keep the zero child support order in place. It further noted that neither party had the current ability to pay support to the other.

¶ 9. With respect to the lump sum accumulated derivative benefit of $4370 that had been paid directly to mother, the magistrate declined to credit father for that sum, explaining that mother's receipt of the lump sum did not alter the parties' respective obligations to pay half the cost of uninsured medical and dental costs.

¶ 10. Father appealed to the family division, which upheld the magistrate's decision. Concerning father's request that the magistrate impute income to mother on account of voluntary underemployment, the family division noted that imputation of additional income would only be appropriate if the magistrate found that mother, who testified that she had been laid off and was looking for work, was voluntarily underemployed. Reviewing the record, the family division affirmed that the magistrate did not err in failing to make such a finding.

¶ 11. With respect to the SSDI derivative benefit, the family division stated, “The court has been unable to find any case law from other states authorizing a trial court to divide among parents the monthly SSA derivative benefits received by the custodial parent.” Accordingly, the family division affirmed on this point. Likewise, the family division concluded that the magistrate's order denying father's request to split the lump sum arrearage payment was not erroneous. Father timely appealed.

I.

¶ 12. Before considering the magistrate's calculation of ongoing child support in light of the derivative benefit, we address the dissent's suggestion that this issue is not before this Court because it was not raised below. Post, ¶¶ 44–53. The magistrate's decision reflects that father,representing himself, was “seeking an order that he receive a portion of [the minor child's] ongoing derivative benefit.” The superior court's order on appeal recites father's argument that the “Family Court needs to order an equitable means of distributing the benefit ($190/month) to account for support the child [sic] when he is with disabled parent 47% of the time, and with his able-bodied parent 53% of the time.” That court further noted that father's legal argument for appeal “boils down to two points.” The first of those points was father's claim that he is entitled to some of the SSA derivative benefit ... which mother receives directly from the SSA.” Like the magistrate, the superior court on appeal squarely considered not only its authority, or lack thereof, to “divide up” the derivative benefit, but it analyzed and ruled on the application of the child support guidelines to these facts in light of our decision in Cantin, 171 Vt. 659, 770 A.2d 449. This latter question, which is the central issue in father's brief, is squarely before us given this record. The suggestion that because father initially framed his argument below as one to “divide the benefit” we cannot consider the proper application of the child support guidelines to these facts ignores the thrust of unrepresented father's arguments below, as well as the reality that both lower courts squarely addressed the argument presented on appeal. See Rutland Herald v. Vt. State Police, 2012 VT 24, ¶¶ 33–34, 191 Vt. 357, 49 A.3d 91 (acknowledging that party could have made its constitutional arguments “more pointedly” in trial court, but holding that issues were preserved because briefing made it sufficiently clear that party argued that applicable statute should be construed in light of constitutional considerations); Bradford Oil Co. v. Stonington Ins. Co., 2011 VT 108, ¶ 22, 190 Vt. 330, 54 A.3d 983 (“Preservation requires a party to present the issue with specificity and clarity at the trial court in order to ensure that the original forum is given an opportunity to rule on an issue prior to review by this Court. (emphasis added) (quotations omitted)); see also Sandgate Sch. Dist. v. Cate, 2005 VT 88, ¶ 9, 178 Vt. 625, 883 A.2d 774 (mem.) (acknowledging “wider leeway” traditionally accorded...

To continue reading

Request your trial
9 cases
  • In re Stephenson
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • October 9, 2015
    ...direct reimbursement unavailable. See, e.g., Brevard v. Brevard, 74 N.C.App. 484, 487–88, 328 S.E.2d 789 (1985) ; LaMothe v. LeBlanc, 193 Vt. 399, 409, 70 A.3d 977 (2013) ; Steel, 209 W.Va. at 709–10, 551 S.E.2d 42. More generally, several courts have held that the doctrine of federal preem......
  • Stephenson v. Papineau
    • United States
    • Kansas Court of Appeals
    • September 13, 2013
    ...under the divorce decree distinct from the child support itself, such as uninsured healthcare costs. See, e.g., LaMothe v. LeBlanc, 2013 Vt. 21, ––––, 70 A.3d 977 (2013). Any payment from Stephenson to Papineau, either in a lump sum or in smaller periodic amounts, ought to be tailored to av......
  • Bomba v. Bazakis (In re Bazakis)
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • June 23, 2022
    ...See, e.g., In re Marriage of Stephenson and Papineau, 302 Kan.851, 875-876; 358 P.3d 86 (2015) and LaMothe v LeBlanc, 193 Vt 399, 414; 2013 VT 21; 70 A.3d 977 (2013). [9] Bomba has not waived this issue. A waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. Quality Prod......
  • Merchant v. Merchant
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • May 15, 2015
    ...support obligation shall be increased by 50 percent to reflect the additional costs of maintaining two households.”); see also LaMothe v. LeBlanc,2013 VT 21, ¶ 27, 193 Vt. 399, 70 A.3d 977(“In a shared-custody-child-support environment, bothparents are presumed to be maintaining households ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT