Rockwell v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. of Crestwood

Decision Date04 April 1975
Docket NumberNo. 1,M,1
Citation393 Mich. 616,227 N.W.2d 736
Parties, 89 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2017, 77 Lab.Cas. P 53,693 George N. ROCKWELL and Violet P. Rockwell, Plaintiffs, v. The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the SCHOOL DISTRICT OF CRESTWOOD, Defendant- Cross-Plaintiff, Appellant, Crestwood Education Association et al., Defendants-Cross-Defendants, Appellees. arch Term 1975.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Craig, Farber & Stein, P.C., Roger E. Craig, Detroit, for plaintiffs.

Royal G. Targan, Edward L. Homeier, Dearborn, for defendant-cross-plaintiff-appellant.

Levin, Levin, Garvett & Dill, Erwin B. Ellmann, Detroit, for defendants-cross-defendants-appellees.

Clark, Hardy, Lewis & Fine, P.C., Dennis R. Pollard, Birmingham, for amicus curiae.

Fieger, Golden & Cousens, Bernard J. Fieger, Southfield, for Mich. Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, amicus curiae.

Before the Entire Bench.

LEVIN, Justice.

The issue is whether school teachers who strike may be discharged without a prior hearing.

Resolution requires construction of the Public Employment Relations Act (the PERA) 1 in relation to the Teachers' Tenure Act 2 and consideration of the teachers' claim that the PERA is violative of the Due Process Clause unless construed to require a prior hearing.

Section 6 of the PERA provides that public employees who, in concerted action with others, in support of efforts to obtain a change in compensation or other conditions of employment, fail to render services shall be deemed on strike. If the employee is disciplined by his employer for striking, he is entitled, on request, to a determination whether he violated the provisions of the act. The request is to be made 'within 10 days After regular compensation of such employee has ceased or other discipline has been imposed.' (Emphasis added) If the employee is found to have violated the act, he may seek review by the circuit court. 3

In contrast, the Teachers' Tenure Act requires a hearing Before discharge. That act provides that a teacher on continuing tenure may be discharged or demoted 'only for reasonable and just cause, and only After such charges, notice, hearing and determination thereof.' 4 (Emphasis supplied.)

The circuit court found that the failure of the school board to proceed in accordance with the Teachers' Tenure Act required reinstatement of the teachers who were discharged. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 5

We conclude that a teacher, including a teacher on continuing tenure, who strikes in violation of the PERA may be disciplined without a prior hearing, and we reverse the circuit court and the Court of Appeals.

I

The Crestwood Education Association (the union) and the Board of Education of the School District of Crestwood (the school board) have been involved in a prolonged labor dispute. There has been no collective bargaining agreement since August, 1973.

When the school year commenced on September 3, 1974, the teachers, members of the union, did not report for work. This action was brought against the union and the school board on September 30, 1974, by the plaintiffs as homeowners, taxpayers and parents. By subsequent stipulation, the plaintiffs were dismissed and the litigation has continued on the cross-complaint of the school board.

Injunctive orders were issued in October and classes resumed. In December the teachers again did not report for work and classes were suspended. Contempt proceedings followed. Thereafter the school board adopted a resolution requiring the teachers either to report for work or to submit a letter of resignation by December 27, 1974, failing which their employment would be terminated. Thirty-eight teachers reported for work, one submitted a letter of resignation and the remaining 184 were, by school board resolution of December 30, 1974, deemed to have terminated their employment.

The school board hired substitute teachers and attempted to operate the schools.

The union had theretofore filed unfair labor practice charges with the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC). The union then filed an amended charge complaining that the school board had not bargained in good faith and was attempting to destroy and interfere with the union. The teachers sought individual Section 6 hearings on January 6, 1975. On January 10th the circuit court set aside the school board's resolution of December 30, 1974 and directed reinstatement of the teachers and the resumption of classes. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The teachers returned to work.

II

The PERA defines 'strike,' 6 prohibits strikes by public employees, 7 and interdicts any public employer from authorizing a strike. 8 Section 6 of the PERA empowers the officer or body generally having disciplinary authority over an employee to terminate the employment of or impose other discipline on an employee who strikes in violation of the PERA. In providing that an employee's request for a hearing to determine whether he did violate the PERA be filed within 10 days After regular compensation has ceased or other discipline has been imposed, the Legislature manifested an intention that the officer or body may impose discipline without a prior hearing.

Section 6 begins with the words '(n)otwithstanding the provisions of any other law.'

The Legislature, recognizing the diversity of legislation concerning public employees, provided in Section 6 a specific, unitary procedure for the discipline of public employees who strike superseding the diverse procedures applicable to different public employees where the basis for discipline is a ground other than striking.

Section 6 further provides that the proceeding for the determination whether the public employee violated the provisions of the PERA shall be 'appropriate' to a proceeding for the removal of the employee (fn. 3), and thus, in the case of a tenured teacher, consonant, with the tenor of the procedures spelled out in the Teachers' Tenure Act. But to the extent there is conflict--and manifestly there is conflict as the Teachers' Tenure Act provides that discipline may be imposed only after charges, notice, hearing and determination, while the PERA contemplates imposition of discipline before a determination of whether the act has been violated and provides for a hearing only on request of the employee after the imposition of discipline--the PERA is to govern '(n)otwithstanding the provisions of any other law.'

In enacting the PERA, the Legislature did not, apart from the 'notwithstanding the provisions of any other law' clause of Section 6, specifically provide that the PERA supersedes or replaces existing laws which arguably also govern public employee labor relations. The union contends that the quoted clause modifies only the first sentence of Section 6.

This Court has consistently construed the PERA as the dominant law regulating public employee labor relations. In Detroit Police Officers Association v. Detroit, 391 Mich. 44, 214 N.W.2d 803 (1974), we held that residency and retirement benefits are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining under the PERA, although provisions of a city's ordinance and charter, promulgated under the Home Rule Act, 9 would otherwise govern. Earlier, in Regents of University of Michigan v. Employment Relations Commission, 389 Mich. 96, 204 N.W.2d 218 (1973), this Court 'harmonized' the constitutional authority of the Regents to supervise the university 10 and the authority of the Legislature to provide for the resolution of public employee disputes, 11 holding that interns and residents in the University of Michigan Hospital were entitled to engage in collective bargaining. In Wayne County Civil Service Commission v. Board of Supervisors, 384 Mich. 363, 374, 184 N.W.2d 201, 205 (1971), this Court held that the original authority and duty of the Wayne County Civil Service Commission 'was diminished Pro tanto' by the PERA 'to the extent of free administration of the latter.'

The analysis is the same whether we label this reconciliation repeal by expression or by implication, Pro tanto diminishing or harmonizing. The supremacy of the provisions of the PERA is predicated on the constitution (Const.1963, art. 4, § 48) and the apparent legislative intent that the PERA be the governing law for public employee labor relations.

The Teachers' Tenure Act was not intended, either in contemplation or design to cover labor disputes between school boards and their employees. The 1937 Legislature in enacting the Teachers' Tenure Act could not have anticipated collective bargaining or meant to provide for the resolution of labor relations disputes in public employment. This Court's observation in Wayne County Civil Service Commission, supra, is pertinent: 'In (no) instance could collective bargaining by public employees have been in the minds of the people, or of the (1937) legislators. The thought of strikes by public employees was unheard of. The right of collective bargaining, applicable at the time to private employment, was then in comparative infancy and portended no suggestion that it eventually might enter the realm of Public employment.' (Emphasis by the Court.)

The State Tenure Commission has no authority to entertain an unfair labor practice charge against a school board. Its jurisdiction and administrative expertise is limited to questions traditionally arising under the Teachers' Tenure Act.

MERC alone has jurisdiction and administrative expertise to entertain and reconcile competing allegations of unfair labor practices and misconduct under the PERA.

There is no provision in the Teachers' Tenure Act analogous to Section 16(h) of the PERA (See Part VI, Infra) providing for temporary relief by a circuit court pending consideration of an unfair labor practice charge. The circuit court's jurisdiction under the Teachers' Tenure Act does not arise until appeal from a decision of the State Tenure Commission.

All teachers do not have rights of continuing tenure. Yet both tenured and...

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