Lancaster County National Bank v. Moore

• Citation: 78 Pa. 407
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Decision Date: 24 May 1875
• Parties: Lancaster County National Bank <I>versus</I> Moore.

78 Pa. 407

Lancaster County National Bank versus Moore.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 3, 1875.

May 24, 1875.

May 3d 1875.

Before AGNEW, C. J., SHARSWOOD, MERCUR, PAXSON and WOODWARD, JJ.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster county: No. 26, to May Term 1875.

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G. Nauman and S. H. Reynolds, for plaintiff in error.—This contract was executed: Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87; Smith on Contracts 107, 229. A defendant cannot set up his own insanity unless it were known by plaintiff: Byles on Bills 47. In an executed contract, the lunacy of defendant being unknown to the defendant, the lunatic cannot take advantage of it: Molton v. Camroux, 4 Exch. 19; Neill v. Morley, 9 Ves. 478; Baxter v. Portsmouth, 2 C. & P. 178; Cook v. Parker, 4 Phila. R. 267; Osmond v. Fitzroy, 3 P. Wms. 130; Dane v. Kirkwall, 8 C. & P. 679. A contract with a lunatic apparently sane cannot be rescinded unless the parties can be placed in statu quo: 1 Parsons on Contracts 385; La Rue v. Gilkyson, 4 Barr 375. The position that one non compos mentis cannot make a contract under any circumstances is untenable: Beals v. See, 10 Barr 56; Nace v. Boyer, 6 Casey 99; State Bank v. McCoy, 19 P. F. Smith 204. The test of capacity given in answer to the plaintiff's second point was too strict; it is enough if the party knows the character of the act, and its resulting responsibility: Noel v. Karper, 3 P. F. Smith 97. Reports of the neighborhood as to defendant's state of mind were inadmissible: 1 Greenl. on Ev., sect. 99; Wright v. Tatham, 1 Ad. & E. 3.

H. M. North and T. E. Franklin, for defendant in error.—The test of liability for a lunatic's contract, is whether it was for necessaries; whether the contract was executed or executory is not material: Desilver's Estate, 5 Rawle 111; Rogers v. Walker, 6 Barr 371; Seaver v. Phillips, 11 Pick. 306; Clark v. Caldwell, 6 Watts 139; Imhoff v. Witmer, 7 Casey 243; Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 20, sect. 8; Pothier on Oblig., part 1, cap. 1, sect. 1, art. 1-4; 3 Bac. Abr. 539; Yates v. Boen, 2 Strange 1104; Gore v. Gibson, 13 M. & W. 623; Pearl v. McDowell, 3 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 659; Bensell v. Chancellor, 5 Whart. 374. A contract of one so far deprived of his reason as to be unable to manage his affairs, is not binding: McElroy's Case, 6 W. & S. 451; Commonwealth v. Schneider, 9 P. F. Smith 328. The finding by the commission de lunatico inquirendo is primâ facie evidence of lunacy: Hutchinson v. Sandt, 4 Rawle 234; Gangwere's Appeal, 4 Casey 466; Willis v. Willis, 2 Jones 159; Commonwealth v. McGinnis, 2 Whart. 213. The report in the neighborhood that the defendant was simple was competent: Rogers v. Walker, 6 Barr 371.

Mr. Justice PAXSON delivered the opinion of the court, May 24th 1875.

The law is well settled that persons who are not sui juris, and have no general capacity to contract debts, are nevertheless liable for their torts, and may bind themselves for necessaries. Such rule rests upon principles of sound public policy. To deny the latter branch of the proposition might in some instances deprive persons laboring under such disabilities of the means of subsistence. In La Rue v. Gilkyson, 4 Barr 375, it was held that the executor of a lunatic was liable for necessaries furnished to his testator while non compos mentis, and before the appointment of a committee. In that case the articles furnished came within the most rigid rule as applied to necessaries, such as board, washing, &c., but Chief Justice Gibson, who delivered the opinion of the court, cites approvingly Baxter v. Portsmouth, 2 C. & P. 178, in which it was held that the word "necessaries" (furnished to a lunatic) "is not to be restricted to articles of the first necessity, but that it includes everything proper for a person's condition; and that to hire carriages for a nobleman who, though actually insane, voted in Parliament, and went about as other men do, carries with it no mark of imposition." And it was also strongly intimated that such a man would even be liable for merchandise innocently furnished to his order under such circumstances. It is true, the latter point was not before the court, and the expression referred to is but dictum, but the mere dictum of so eminent a jurist as the late Chief Justice Gibson is entitled to respect. La Rue v. Gilkyson was followed by Beals v. See, 10 Barr 56, in which it was held that an executed contract by a merchant for the purchase of goods before the day from which the inquest found him to have been non compos, could not be avoided by proof of insanity at the time of the purchase, unless there had been a fraud committed on him by the vendor, or he had knowledge of his condition. There was proof in the case cited that the goods purchased were unsuited to the object for which they were purchased; that the price agreed upon far exceeded their market value, and that plaintiff had tendered them back to the defendants, who declined received receiving them, whereupon they were sold at auction, after notice. Says Gibson, C. J., "Should he have made a wild and unthrifty purchase from a stranger unapprized of his infirmity, who is to bear the loss incurred by one of the parties to it? Not the vendor, who did nothing that any other man would not have done. As an insane man is civilly liable for his torts, he is liable to bear the consequences of his infirmity as he is liable to bear his misfortunes, on the principle that when a loss must be borne by one of two innocent persons it shall be borne by him who occasioned it. A merchant, like any other man, may be mad without showing it, and when such a man goes into the market, makes strange purchases and anticipates extravagant profits, what are those who deal with him to think? To treat him as a madman would exclude every speculator from the transactions of commerce." It will be observed in this case that the goods were purchased two days prior to the day from which the inquest found the purchaser insane, and the transaction was not, therefore, covered by the finding. But the court do not rest their decision upon this ground, but treat it as the purchase of an insane man — insane at the time of the purchase. Such was evidently the view taken of the case in Nace v. Boyer, 6 Casey 99, in which the late Chief Justice Woodward says: "In Beals v. See, 10 Barr 56, this court held that an executed contract by a merchant for the purchase of goods could not be avoided by proof of insanity at the time of the purchase, unless a fraud was committed on him by the vendor, or he had knowledge of his condition." The principles decided in La Rue v. Gilkyson and Beals v. See, are recognised in State Bank v. McCoy, 19 P. F. Smith 204.

We will apply these principles to the facts of this case. George H. Moore, the defendant and alleged lunatic, resided in Lancaster county, about six miles from Lancaster city, where the plaintiff's...