"Sec
1. That the Court of Quarter Sessions of Lancaster County
shall have the power to authorize the extension and opening
of all streets and alleys within the city of Lancaster, in
the manner directed, by and under the provisions of the
general road laws of this commonwealth, except so far as the
same may be herein altered or supplied.
"Sec.
3. That the commissioners of Lancaster county shall open an
account with the city of Lancaster, showing the amount
contributed by said city within the past two years, towards
opening roads and erecting and repairing bridges in said
county, and the amount drawn from the county treasury within
the same period for opening streets or alleys in said city,
to which account shall be charged or credited, from time to
time hereafter, the sums contributed or received by said city
for said purposes, and any damages that may be incurred by
the opening and extending of streets and alleys, while the
balance on said account is against the city, shall be payable
out of the treasury of said county, and be reimbursable out
of the county treasury only when the balance shall be in
favor of said city, and to the extent of such balance."
"By
section 8 of the act of May 8, 1850, P.L. 751, it was
provided, inter alia, that all damages caused by the laying
out of any street or alley in the city of Lancaster should be
paid, not by the county but by the city. This of course
included damages for injuring or removing buildings as well
as for the taking of land.
"The
act of 1854, P.L. 352, which repealed section 8 of the act of
1850, relieved the city to some extent. It left it liable, as
under the act of 1850, for all damages caused by injuring or
removing buildings, but allowed it to apply to the payment of
damages for land taken a certain proportion of the county tax
collected from the taxpayers of the city. This is the
substance of the act although the result just stated is
reached by a somewhat roundabout process. The method adopted
by the act is this: The county is made primarily liable to
the landowner for the damages caused by taking his land, the
city continuing to be liable, both first and last, for the
damages caused by injuring and removing buildings. In any
given year the amount thus advanced by the county (and it is
really nothing more than an advance on behalf of the city) is
charged against the city, and the city is then credited with
the proportion of county tax which its taxpayers have
contributed towards opening roads and erecting and repairing
bridges in the county. If the difference is in favor of the
city it is entitled to be paid in money (which it may recover
by suit if necessary), or to have a credit carried over to
the next year, but if the difference is in favor of the
county, i.e., if the city has spent in advance a part of its
proportion of the county tax for the next year, then the
damages for land taken (as between the county and the city)
are no longer to be paid by the county but by the city, until
there is again a balance in favor of the city, whereupon
these damages are once more to be paid by the county, but (as
between the county and the city) only 'to the extent of
such balance.'
"It
seems quite clear that this simply amounts to allowing the
city to draw back a varying sum each year from the county
tax, and to use it in payment for land taken in opening
streets. But the landowner is not bound to inquire into the
state of the accounts between the county and city and to look
to one or the other as the balance may be found to incline.
As between the county and the landowner the county is made
primarily liable to any extent which viewers and juries may
determine; but, as between the county and the city, the
county is only bound to pay for this particular purpose a
varying proportion (but one easily calculated) year by year
of the city's contribution to the county tax. If this
proportion is not enough to repay the county its advances to
the landowners, one of two things may be done: Either the
balance against the city may be carried over for a year or
for several years in the hope that succeeding credits may
restore the equilibrium; or if the balance is so large that
this would involve a delay the county considers unreasonable,
an action may be brought to recover what is due, and a new
starting point for the future accounting may be reached.
Indeed, there is a third course which the county may adopt if
it sees proper: It may sue for any balance in its favor,
whether large or small, but ordinarily we presume so strict a
settlement would not be insisted upon.
"In
brief, the act makes the county the paymaster for land taken,
and requires it to advance to the landowner whatever may be
needed for this purpose, whether the city is its debtor or
its creditor; but, as between the city and the county, the
county is only bound to pay -- or perhaps to speak more
accurately, to pay back -- the city's due proportion of
the county tax. This proportion the county controls, for it
has the money in its own hands; whatever sum it pays beyond
this is really lent to the city -- lent by compulsion of the
statute, and in our opinion may be recovered by suit.
"This
view of the act of 1854 is only a restatement in other
language of the construction already announced by the Supreme
Court in Lancaster County v. Frey, 128 Pa. 593, as a
few extracts from the opinion will show. On pages 597 and 598
Mr. Justice CLARK says: 'It is conceded that by force of
the second section of the act of 1854 all sums awarded for
damages for the opening of streets in the city of Lancaster
are to be paid out of the county treasury, with the exception
of such damages as may accrue from the removal of or injury
to any house, etc., which are to be separately assessed and
paid out of the city treasury. The second section as thus
construed is a complete adjustment of the rule of
responsibility attaching to the city and the county for the
opening of streets within the city. . . . In the third
section it is assumed that under the second the county will
expend county funds in payment of damages as therein
provided, and the policy of the third section is that the
city shall not thus withdraw from the county fund more than
she contributes to it; that is to say, the city is
responsible to the county that the amount thus expended in
its behalf shall not exceed the amount contributed by the
city to the county funds for opening roads,' etc. He then
shows that the one hundred and eighteenth word in the third
section should be read 'city' instead of
'county' -- a conclusion which we adopt in the
present case, as the question is again raised and we are
asked to pass upon it -- and proceeds to say on page 599:
'But this obligation of the city was to the county, upon
which by the second section the primary obligation to pay was
imposed.' After explaining why the county must be
primarily liable to the landowner, the learned justice
declares that the city must repay the county if the latter
has been forced to advance too much; 'hence it was
provided that the county commissioners should open an account
with the city of Lancaster, showing the amount contributed by
the city to the county treasurer towards opening roads, etc.,
on the one side, and the amount withdrawn from the county
treasury for opening streets, etc., in the city on the other
side; and, whilst the balance on that account was against the
city, the damages incurred in the opening of streets in the
city should be payable out of the treasury of the city --
payable to the county, of course, who is primarily liable to
the property holder.' The opinion is summarized in the
concluding sentence: 'We are of opinion that the question
of the liability of the city in each case can only be raised
in a proceeding between the county and the city; that the
property holder must resort to the county treasury, and the
county must in a proper case resort to the city; and further,
that the city upon payment of any such claim is reimbursable
out of the county treasury, when the balance is in favor of
the city, to the extent of such balance.'
"It
will be observed that this construction accords with the rule
declared by Mr. Justice SHARSWOOD in Holl v
Deshler, 71 Pa. 301: 'Every part of a statute should
be brought into action in order to collect from the whole one
uniform and consistent sense if that may be done, or, in
other words, the construction must be made upon the entire
statute and not merely upon disjointed parts of it:
Broom's Leg. Max. 513. "It is the most natural and
genuine exposition of a statute," says Lord Coke,
"to construe one part of the statute by another part of
the same statute, for that best expresseth the meaning of the
makers."' The same rule is to be found in
Potter's Dwarris on Statutes, p. 144, in this language:
'In the construction of a statute every part of it must
be viewed in connection with the...
