Land v. State, 21136
Citation | 262 S.E.2d 735,274 S.C. 243 |
Decision Date | 28 January 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 21136,21136 |
Parties | Gary McArthur LAND, Appellant, v. STATE of South Carolina, Respondent. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
H. F. Partee and Martha A. Miller, Asst. Public Defenders, Greenville, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod, Deputy Atty. Gen. Emmet H. Clair and Staff Atty. B. J. Willoughby, Columbia, for respondent.
Gary Land appeals from the summary dismissal of his second application for post-conviction relief, asserting that the court erred in finding, without a hearing, that his petition is barred as successive. We affirm.
Land was convicted of armed robbery and three counts of assault and battery with intent to kill in February of 1976. Upon appeal, his conviction was affirmed by this court in February of 1977 (memorandum opinion 77-12). In June of that year he filed his first application for post-conviction relief, alleging only that his sentences were indefinite and vague by their terms, and averring that the petition included ". . . every ground known to me for vacating, setting aside or correcting the conviction and sentences attacked in this application; . . . ."
A hearing was held in March of 1978, at which time the judge granted relief in the form of a clarification of the sentences.
In August of 1978, Land filed a second application for post-conviction relief, setting forth allegations which had not been included in either the appeal on its merits or his first application for post-conviction relief. To this second application, the State filed its return, and moved to summarily dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was successive in nature and barred under § 17-27-90, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), and under Rule 3 of this court, governing Uniform Post Conviction Procedures. Both the statute and the court rule are designed to require an applicant to include all of his grounds for relief in one action. In response to the State's return, Land filed supplemental allegations and a reply to the State's motion. He claimed that, both at trial and on appeal, and during his first post-conviction proceeding, he was denied effective assistance of counsel. He blames his failure to include the new allegations in his first post-conviction relief action on his attorney. The judge granted the State's motion to dismiss, without a hearing, because of Land's failure to point out in his pleadings sufficient reason for failing to raise the issues in the first action.
Section 17-27-90 provides as follows:
Pursuant to § 17-27-110, this...
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