Land v. State
Decision Date | 20 March 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 44269,44269 |
Citation | 293 So.2d 704 |
Parties | Leo LAND, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
David J. Busch, Asst. Public Defender; and Robert C. Parker, Jr., Special Asst. Public Defender, for petitioner.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to the District Court of Appeal, First District. That court has certified that its decision, reported at 280 So.2d 706, is one passing upon a question of great public interest, giving this Court jurisdiction under Article V, Section 3(b)(3), of the Constitution of the State of Florida, F.S.A.
The facts of the case, as reported by the District Court, are as follows:
'Defendant seeks appellate review of a judgment of conviction and sentence based upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of causing the death of a human being by the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated, contrary to the provisions of law. The sole point on appeal challenges the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial on the ground that the court erred in refusing to grant him an evidentiary hearing out of the presence of the jury on his motion to suppress a confession made by him because it was involuntarily given.
'From the record it appears without dispute that during the progress of the trial while the State was putting on its evidence, the county sheriff was called as a witness. After a few preliminary questions and answers, the jury was excused in order that the State might proffer an alleged confession made by appellant to the sheriff following the incident out of which this prosecution arose. In this proffer the sheriff testified that after administering the Miranda warnings to appellant and securing from him a waiver of his constitutional rights, appellant told the sheriff that at the time and place in question he had 'bumped a woman' in front of the bank building and continued on in his automobile. At the conclusion of the sheriff's proffered testimony, appellant's trial counsel requested the court for permission to place defendant on the stand for the purpose of offering testimony bearing on the question of the voluntariness of the statements made by him to the sheriff as testified to by the latter in his proffer. The court denied defendant's request, noting that it would permit defendant only to cross-examine the sheriff concerning his proffered testimony. When defendant's counsel declined to cross-examine the sheriff, the court ruled that it would admit into evidence the proffered testimony of the sheriff concerning defendant's confession. When the jury returned to the courtroom, the sheriff completed his testimony concerning defendant's confession as testified to in his proffer.
'After the jury returned its verdict of guilty, appellant filed in the cause his motion for new trial which included as one of its grounds the allegation that the court erred in denying him the right to testify in the absenceof the jury concerning the voluntariness of the confession given by him to the sheriff. After hearing, the court rendered its order in which it held that upon further consideration it concluded that it had erred in denying appellant the right to testify outside the presence of the jury concerning the voluntariness of his confession. Because of such confessed error on its part, the trial court deferred ruling on appellant's motion for a new trial and directed that an evidentiary hearing be held for the purpose of determining the voluntariness of appellant's confession. The order recited that only if after such hearing the court found and determined that the confession by appellant was involuntarily given, would justice require the granting of a new trial. A full evidentiary hearing was subsequently held and both parties were granted the opportunity of offering such evidence as they had concerning the voluntariness of appellant's confession. The record reflects that at the commencement of the hearing appellant's counsel announced that he had no evidence to offer concerning the voluntariness of appellant's confession, but he would stand on his motion for new trial and insisted that a new trial on all issues, including the guilt or innocence of defendant, be granted. Because of this announcement the court adjourned the hearing, denied appellant's motion for a new trial and rendered the judgment of conviction and sentence which is appealed herein.
'The primary question raised by appellant concerns the procedure followed by the trial court in disposing of his motion for new trial. He contends that once the trial court acknowledged its error in denying him the right to a full evidentiary hearing during the course of the trial outside the jury's presence on his motion to suppress the confession, it had no alternative but to set aside the verdict of guilty rendered by the jury and to grant him a new trial on all issues in the case.
1
On the basis of the foregoing facts, the District Court held that the refusal to set aside the verdict finding the defendant guilty, and the refusal to grant a new trial on all of the issues in the case, because the defendant had been erroneously denied the right to testify outside the presence of the jury concerning the voluntariness of his confession, and the deferral of a ruling on his motion for new trial until a full evidentiary hearing could be held to determine whether the defendant's confession was voluntary, was not an abuse of discretion. We hereby reverse the decision of the District Court, for reasons which will be set forth below.
The State attempted to establish the predicate for the admission of Petitioner's inculpatory statement to the sheriff. The sheriff's testimony was taken outside the presence of the jury. Petitioner, however, was denied an opportunity to testify outside the presence of the jury for the limited purpose of disputing the voluntariness of the confession. Defense counsel was careful to preserve the record in that regard:
The trial court's ruling was clearly erroneous under Florida law. Graham v. State. 2 The trial court recognized its mistake, and admitted having erred in its Order on Motion for New Trial, where it stated:
The trial court concluded, however, that such error did not require the granting of a new trial. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court reasoned:
Accordingly, the trial court held a post-trial evidentiary hearing for the purpose of allowing Petitioner an opportunity to present testimony concerning the voluntariness of his confession which had previously been submitted to the jury. At this hearing, defense counsel announced a decision not to proceed further with such an evidentiary hearing on the grounds that such a post-trial proceeding was improper under recent decisional law and denied Petitioner the right to be accorded due process of law. The trial court thereupon denied Petitioner's Motion for New Trial, and entered judgment and sentence. By a split decision, the District Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, and adopted its reasoning as to the necessity for granting new trials under...
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