Landis v. Watt, Civ. No. 80-2110.
Decision Date | 23 March 1981 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 80-2110. |
Citation | 510 F. Supp. 178 |
Parties | Paul H. LANDIS et al., Plaintiffs, v. James WATT, Secretary of the Interior, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Idaho |
Lynn J. Farnworth, Farnworth, Parmenter & Norton, Moscow, Idaho, for plaintiffs.
M. Karl Shurtliff, U. S. Atty., Jeffrey G. Howe, Asst. U. S. Atty., Boise, Idaho, Kathryn A. Oberly, Eleanor M. Granger, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for defendants.
This action was filed on December 23, 1980 to appeal a decision of the Office of Hearings and Appeals, Interior Board of Land Appeals, in which the Administrative Law Judge upheld the rejection of offers and cancellations of 29 oil and gas leases in the states of Colorado, New Mexico, and Montana. The Secretary of the Interior responded by moving to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3), Fed.R.Civ.P., for lack of proper venue. Plaintiffs have objected to the dismissal.
Venue in this case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), the pertinent provisions of which are set out in the margin.1 Plaintiffs allege that venue is proper in Idaho under § 1391(e)(4) because a number of Plaintiffs reside here. The Defendant contends that venue of the case is controlled by § 1391(e)(3) because there is real property involved. The question thus becomes: Is real property involved?
Some light can be shed on this question by consulting the legislative history. In a letter to Senator Eastland, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, then-Deputy Attorney General Byron White suggested the reasons for amending 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) to read as it now does. He said:
The only case that has directly dealt with the present question is Ashley v. Andrus, 474 F.Supp. 495 (E.D.Wis.1979). That case also dealt with venue for an appeal of an Interior Board of Land Appeals decision. The district judge in that case decided that real property was definitely involved, but he held that it was only involved peripherally. The reason for this holding was as follows:
Plaintiff does not request this Court to order the defendants to award plaintiff the leasehold denied in the hearing. Instead, plaintiff merely seeks to have this Court interpret the language of certain statutes and regulations and, if necessary, also determine the constitutionality of those provisions.
Id., at 497. While the plaintiffs in the present case also raise the issue of the constitutionality of the regulations involved, their prayer for relief asks first that the "29 oil...
To continue reading
Request your trial- Brown v. Cuyler, Civ. A. No. 79-360.
-
Santa Fe Intern. Corp. v. Watt
...Legal Foundation v. Watt, No. 81-C-899 (D.Colo. July 14, 1983); Ferguson v. Lieurance, 565 F.Supp. 1013 (D.Nev.1983); Landis v. Watt, 510 F.Supp. 178 (D.Idaho 1981); Ashley v. Andrus, 474 F.Supp. 495 (E.D.Wis.1979). Proper venue in this case hinges on the narrow question of whether "real pr......
-
Shell Oil Co. v. Babbitt, Civil Action No. 95-492 MMS.
...in the action for purposes of the federal venue statute. See e.g., Ferguson v. Lieurance, 565 F.Supp. 1013 (D.Nev.1983); Landis v. Watt, 510 F.Supp. 178 (D.Idaho 1981). In construing this subsection of the venue statute, courts have also uniformly held that if real property is only "periphe......
-
Ferguson v. Lieurance, Civ. No. R-83-37 BRT.
...in the district where the realty is situated. Two district court cases are directly concerned with this venue problem. In Landis v. Watt, 510 F.Supp. 178 (D.Idaho 1981), a change of venue was granted. The court quoted from the Congressional history and determined that the language "real pro......