Ferguson v. Lieurance, Civ. No. R-83-37 BRT.

Decision Date28 June 1983
Docket NumberCiv. No. R-83-37 BRT.
Citation565 F. Supp. 1013
PartiesEllis R. FERGUSON, Plaintiff, v. Maxwell LIEURANCE, Wyoming State Director, Bureau of Land Management; Robert Burford, Director, Bureau of Land Management, Washington, D.C.; James Watt, Secretary of the Interior, being Agencies of the United States Department of the Interior, United States of America, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Nevada

Ellis R. Ferguson, pro se.

Lamond R. Mills, U.S. Atty. by Shirley Smith, Asst. U.S. Atty., Reno, Nev., for defendants.

ORDER TRANSFERRING VENUE

BRUCE R. THOMPSON, District Judge.

Ellis Ferguson filed this action on February 2, 1983, against Maxwell Lieurance (Wyoming State Director of the BLM), Robert Burford (Director of the BLM), James Watt (Secretary of the Interior), and the United States, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361 and 2201. The complaint alleges that the BLM improperly rejected the plaintiff's 17 oil and gas lease applications. Consequently, the plaintiff's applications were not included in the November 1981 oil and gas lease drawings for government lands located in Wyoming. The complaint seeks the following: (1) a declaration that the plaintiff's applications were improperly rejected; (2) that the plaintiff's applications be included in a reselection procedure; and (3) that the defendants be enjoined from issuing the oil and gas leases until after the reselection. The case is presently before the court on the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for improper venue and failure to join indispensable parties.

Venue in this case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) which provides in part:

(e) A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority, or an agency of the United States, or the United States, may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the action resides, or (2) the cause of action arose, or (3) any real property involved in the action is situated, or (4) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action.

Ferguson alleges that venue in Nevada is proper under § 1391(e)(4) because he resides here and no real property is involved in the action. The defendants, on the other hand, contend that venue of the case is controlled by § 1391(e)(3) because there is real property involved. Thus, the issue in this case is whether the lawsuit involves real property.

For purposes of § 1391(e) an action involves real property if it is a suit involving the protection or recovery of real property or an estate therein. As the court in Natural Resource Defense Council v. TVA, 340 F.Supp. 400, 406 (S.D.N.Y.1971), stated:

The touchstone for applying § 1391(e)(4) cannot sensibly be whether real property is marginally affected by the case at issue. Rather, the action must center directly on the real property, as with actions concerning the right, title or interest in real property.

Where the action does center on real property, it is a local action which must be brought in the district where the realty is situated.

Two district court cases are directly concerned with this venue problem. In Landis v. Watt, 510 F.Supp. 178 (D.Idaho 1981), a change of venue was granted. The court quoted from the Congressional history and determined that the language "real property involved" as used in the statute was not intended to have some artistic, esoteric meaning, but should be construed in its normal sense, that is, where the real property is is where the action should be also. The Landis co...

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4 cases
  • Earth Island Inst. v. Quinn
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
    • 21 Julio 2014
    ...Lieurance, followed NRDC v. TVA, and noted that the plaintiff in the case “seeks” to “acquire ... [a] real property interest.” 565 F.Supp. 1013, 1015 (D.Nev.1983). CBD v. BLM, in turn, followed both Ferguson and NRDC v. TVA, and noted that the federal plan challenged in that case involved “......
  • Santa Fe Intern. Corp. v. Watt
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Delaware
    • 1 Febrero 1984
    ...gas leases and lease applications. See Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Watt, No. 81-C-899 (D.Colo. July 14, 1983); Ferguson v. Lieurance, 565 F.Supp. 1013 (D.Nev.1983); Landis v. Watt, 510 F.Supp. 178 (D.Idaho 1981); Ashley v. Andrus, 474 F.Supp. 495 (E.D.Wis.1979). Proper venue in this......
  • Shell Oil Co. v. Babbitt
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Delaware
    • 13 Marzo 1996
    ...the heart of a lawsuit, real property is involved in the action for purposes of the federal venue statute. See e.g., Ferguson v. Lieurance, 565 F.Supp. 1013 (D.Nev.1983); Landis v. Watt, 510 F.Supp. 178 (D.Idaho 1981). In construing this subsection of the venue statute, courts have also uni......
  • W. Org. of Res. Councils v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Montana
    • 24 Febrero 2021
    ...application to acquire a property interest in public land in the form of oil and gas leases. See id. at *2 (citing Ferguson v. Lieurance, 565 F.Supp. 1013, 1015 (D. Nev. 1983)). The plaintiff in Ferguson sought to contest a right in real property—namely, leasehold interests in oil and gas. ......

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